(dissenting). The issue presented is not whether a utility company owes no general duty of reasonable care, regarding the placement and design of utility poles, to occupants of vehicles which leave the traveled portion of a highway. The Court of Appeals, in affirming the rulings of the trial courts, did not premise its decision upon such a conclusion. The Court did not reason, by combining the questions of duty and proximate cause, that a utility company may not incur liability for the negligent placement and design of utility poles because the occupants of vehicles who may sustain *67injuries as a result are "unforeseeable plaintiffs.”1 The Court did not "decline[ ] to impose any obligation on the defendant under the circumstances.”2 It expressly acknowledged that a utility company must "conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent risk”3 (general standard of care). The Court’s decision was reached, rather, by determining that, in the light of the undisputed relevant facts presented, the placement and design of the utility pole in question did not create an unreasonable risk of harm to highway travelers (specific standard of care). In reaching that decision, the Court applied a judicially established rule concerning the specific standard to which the reasonable utility company must conform in the placement of utility poles and concluded that defendant, Detroit Edison, could not, in the. present case, be found to have derogated from its duty to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances. Having so concluded, the issue of causation was not implicated and, therefore, was not addressed.
The Court of Appeals analysis relied upon this Court’s recent decision in Moning v Alfono,4 its earlier decisions in Cramer v Detroit Edison5 and Dawson v Postal Telegraph-Cable Co,6 and several decisions of the courts of other jurisdictions. Because I am persuaded that the reasoning employed by the Court of Appeals is sound, I cannot join the majority opinion for reversal.
*68I
I disagree that the essential question presented is whether the defendant "owes any obligation to avoid negligent conduct,”7 under the facts of the present case. In the famous Palsgraf case,8 the New York Court of Appeals held that the general duty of reasonable care only arises with respect to foreseeable plaintiffs and consequences.9 That theory was not relied upon by the Court of Appeals in the instant case. Nevertheless, to the extent that the defendant relies upon such a theory to, in effect, assert that it is relieved of the duty to conform to the general standard of care — reasonable care under the circumstances — I am in agreement with the majority, and, thus, would reject that assertion.
I am convinced, however, that neither the Court of Appeals in the instant case, this Court in Cramer and Dawson, supra, nor the decisions of the courts of other jurisdictions involving similar cases, have relied upon the Palsgraf — unforeseeable plaintiff — analysis. I am persuaded that the general rule applied in those cases relates to the specific standard of care — the particular conduct required of a utility company to conform to the general standard of reasonable care. I would suggest that the majority opinion appears to have confused the general standard of care with the specific standard of care in this regard. Inaccurately framing the issue as whether a utility company has any legal obligation whatsoever to use reasonable care in the placement and maintenance of utility poles tends to obscure the nature, and difficulty, of the essential question presented._
*69A
The Court of Appeals did not interpret Dawson and Cramer as standing for the proposition that a private utility company owes no duty to exercise reasonable care in the placement and design of utility poles. To the contrary, the Court expressly stated that such a legal duty is imposed, and it did not reason that the defendant was, to any extent, relieved of that general duty.10 The Court stated, quoting from Moning, supra, that in negligence cases that duty is always the same, to "conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent risk.”11 The Court discussed the nature of the risk-benefit analysis required in determining the specific standard of care — what specific conduct is required to satisfy the general duty to exercise reasonable care — quoting the following paragraphs from Moning:
Even if a person recognizes that his conduct involves a risk of invading another person’s interest, he may nevertheless engage in such conduct unless the risk created by his conduct is unreasonable.
The reasonableness of the risk depends on whether its magnitude is outweighed by its utility. The Restatement provides: "Where an act is one which a reasonable man would recognize as involving a risk of harm to another, the risk is unreasonable and the act is negligent if the risk is of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the act or of the particular manner in which it is done.” 2 Restatement, [Torts 2d], §291.
The balancing of the magnitude of the risk and *70the utility of the actor’s conduct requires a consideration by the court and jury of the societal interests involved. The issue of negligence may be removed from jury consideration if the court concludes that overriding considerations of public policy require that a particular view be adopted and applied in all cases. [Moning, supra, 449-450.[12]
The Court emphasized that defining the particular standard of conduct is ordinarily a jury question, but stated that, in the present case, public policy militates in favor of uniformity. The Court reasoned:
Once again, the drawing of this balance is a jury matter unless public policy militates in favor of uniformity. Tort liability has the effect, and to a degree the purpose, of regulating a defendant’s future conduct. It is thus beneficial to develop and adhere to standards governing a utility company’s duty regarding the placement and design of utility poles. The rule set forth by Dawson and Cramer accomplishes this by holding that a utility has acted reasonably in light of the risk of harm if it locates its poles so as not to constitute an obstruction dangerous to anyone properly using the highways. See also MCL 247.185; MSA 9.265. [Emphasis added.][13]
*71Thus, the Court of Appeals viewed the rule set forth in Dawson and Cramer as relating to the specific standard of care. Applying that standard to the undisputed facts of the present case the Court concluded that the defendant could not be found to have created an unreasonable risk by virtue of the location and design of the utility pole in question.
B
I agree with the Court of Appeals interpretation of Dawson and Cramer. The general rule set forth and applied in those cases related to the specific standard of care, not the general issue of duty. I agree that in each of those cases the Court went further to address the element of proximate causation. I am persuaded, however, that the Court’s decision in each of those cases rested independently upon its determination and application of the particular standard of care.14
The general rule applied in each of those cases, as it relates to the specific standard of care, may *72be paraphrased as follows. That as a general proposition, a utility company which lawfully positions poles in or near a public highway (in accordance with all statutory regulations), has acted reasonably in conformance with its duty to exercise ordinary care, unless the placement of such a pole constitutes an obstruction dangerous to one properly using the highway in the ordinary course of travel.
c
The decisions from other jurisdictions, referred to by the Court of Appeals and discussed in the majority opinion, have applied the general rule articulated in Dawson and Cramer. As is reflected in the quotations from those decisions set forth in the majority opinion, those cases were not decided on the basis that a utility company "[does] not owe any duty at all to a motorist leaving the traveled portion of the highway.” Those decisions apply the general rule expressed in Dawson and Cramer as it relates to the specific standard of care required to conform to the general legal duty imposed.
A number of the reported decisions concerning the liability of a utility company for injuries sustained by motorists who have suffered the misfortune of colliding with a utility pole have rested upon the determination of issues other than the negligence question.15 A consistent principle which may be deduced from the cumulative body of those decisions, however, is that, as a general rule, a *73utility company is not guilty of negligence, with respect to the publicly authorized and specifically approved placement of a utility pole, unless it can be found that under the particular circumstances the placement of that pole created a dangerous obstruction to highway travel in the ordinary course.16 A careful reading of those decisions, again, reflects that that principle relates to the particular standard of conduct required in such cases and not to the general duty question, or the issue of proximate cause. The application, in those decisions, of that general principle has resulted, consistent with the nature of common-law jurisprudence and the principle of stare decisis, in judicially defining the particular standard of conduct legally required in such cases.17
When, under the particular circumstances of a given case, reasonable minds could differ concerning whether the placement of a utility pole has created a dangerous and unreasonable obstruction to highway travel in the ordinary course, the question has been submitted to the jury with appropriate instructions.18 When reasonable minds could not differ with regard to the application of that specific standard of conduct, however, the courts have properly withheld the issue from jury determination.19
*74Whether submitted to the jury or decided by the court, the particular conduct required of a utility company, in the lawful placement and design of utility poles, seems to have received broad judicial acceptance. To satisfy its general duty to use ordinary care under the circumstances, a utility company which has, with public authorization and specific approval, undertaken to erect utility poles in or near a public highway, must do so without dangerously and unreasonably obstructing highway travel in the ordinary course. While highway travel in the ordinary course may include slight deviations from the traveled portions of highways, it does not include vehicles which, for whatever reason, completely and uncontrollably leave the traveled portions of those highways. Utility companies, and the governmental authorities responsible for highway design and safety generally, do not incur liability for the injuries sustained by the occupants of such vehicles, not because they have no duty to use ordinary care under the circumstances, but because they have not failed to conform to that legal duty and, therefore, have not by affirmative act or omission committed any wrongful act which may be found to have been in derogation of that duty, an essential element of the common-law negligence action.
ii
The essential question presented requires determination of the following issues. The first, and broader question presented, is whether this Court should reject the judicially established specific standard of conduct applicable in determining whether a utility company, although in compliance with all statutory regulations, has failed to *75exercise due care in the placement and design of a utility pole, and, instead, to require in all cases that the specific standard be submitted for jury definition case by case. Second, and only if the answer to that broader question is no, we must decide whether the evidence presented in the instant case is sufficient to raise a jury question concerning the application of that specific standard.
I am unpersuaded that we should reject the judicially established specific standard of conduct applied by the Court of Appeals in the present case, which was expressed, inter alia, by this Court in Cramer and Dawson. While it is unquestionable that in the generality of negligence cases the particular standard of conduct is appropriately, and necessarily, left to jury determination on a case-by-case basis,20 I am persuaded, for the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals opinion, that public policy militates in favor of uniformity concerning the specific standard of conduct to which a utility company must conform for purposes of the common law of negligence, with respect to the placement of utility poles in or near public highways.
I would note that I am cognizant of the danger, generally, that attempting to define the particular standard to be applied in all similar cases may result in a failure to take account of the unusual situations which may present factors which could affect the standard.21 I would emphasize, however, that the particular standard here in question is not an absolute and inflexible rule which precludes a finding of negligence in all cases in which a utility pole is located outside of the traveled por*76tion of the highway.22 Perhaps most importantly, I am persuaded that the judicially established particular standard here at issue, as applied by the Court of Appeals and generally accepted by the courts of other jurisdictions, accurately reflects the obligation imposed by the law of negligence: ordinary care under the circumstances. Whether a higher standard of care than that which is imposed by the common law should be imposed upon utility companies and the governmental authorities with which they share that obligation is not at issue. Likewise, whether the statutory regulations currently applicable to the placement and design of utility poles should be amended or repealed and replaced to better serve the public interest in highway safety is also beyond the scope of this case.23
With regard to the second issue, I am also in agreement with the Court of Appeals conclusion concerning the application of the particular standard of conduct to the undisputed factual circumstances of the present case. Reasonable minds could not differ that the placement and design of *77the utility pole in question did not create an obstruction dangerous to highway travelers in the ordinary course, and, therefore, that defendant did not breach its legally imposed duty to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances. The undisputed facts and circumstances, and the evidence presented in support of plaintiffs’ allegations viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, are insufficient to raise a jury question concerning whether the placement and design of the utility pole in question created an unreasonable risk to the occupants of vehicles in the ordinary course of highway travel.
Liability could not be imposed upon defendant in the present case on the basis of plaintiffs’ asserted negligence theory.24 The general societal interest underlying that theory — shifting an innocent tort victim’s loss to the tortfeasor whose wrongful conduct is responsible therefor — is inapplicable.
Therefore, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Archer, J., took no part in the decision of this case._Cf. Palsgraf v Long Island R Co, 248 NY 339; 162 NE 99; 59 ALR 1258 (1928). See, generally, Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed), § 43, pp 284-289.
Ante, p 52.
McMillan v State Highway Comm, 130 Mich App 630, 635; 344 NW2d 26 (1983).
400 Mich 425; 254 NW2d 759 (1977).
296 Mich 662; 296 NW 831 (1941).
265 Mich 139; 251 NW 352 (1933).
Ante, p 51.
Palsgraf, n 1 supra.
Id. See, generally, Prosser & Keeton, n 1 supra.
The majority, relying upon the briefs of the parties and of amicus curiae, has inaccurately expressed the basis and analysis of the Court of Appeals decision which is the subject of this appeal.
McMillan, n 3 supra, 635.
Id., 636.
Id., 637. See MCL 247.186; MSA 9.266, which reflects one of a number of statutory regulations applicable to the erection and maintenance of utility poles. That provision relates specifically to the appropriate location of utility poles and provides:
In no case shall any poles or other structures be placed above the ground or road grade between the curb or road shoulder lines, or closer than 15 feet from the center line of the roadway; and in no case shall any wires, cables or other fixtures be placed, or be permitted to remain, at less height than 15 feet above any part of the traveled portion of the road.
See also MCL 247.184; MSA 9.264, which requires the specific *71approval of county and state authorities for, inter alia, the placement of utility poles in or near a public highway.
The Cramer Court concluded:
The defendant was not guilty of actionable negligence. The ornamental light pole was back a short distance [about five feet] from the curb at the east end of the parkway and the [guard] posts set between that pole and the curb of the parkway. So situated the posts were not a menace to travel on the highway, and there was no duty on the part of defendant [particular standard of conduct] to advertise the presence of the posts by warning signs. [Id., 667.]
The Dawson Court discussed the statutory authority of a telegraph company to construct and maintain telegraph lines in or near public highways, and the statutory obligation of such a company not to "incommode the public in its use of the roads.” Id., 142.
That the Dawson Court’s holding was based, first, upon a finding that the defendant in that case had not created an unreasonable risk, an obstruction dangerous to highway travelers, is supported by its *72discussion of O’Brien v Union Telephone Co, 228 Mich 156; 199 NW 671 (1924), and its analysis that O’Brien was factually distinguishable. Dawson, supra, 144. The statement quoted by the Court from 82 ALR 395 related to the particular standard of conduct required to satisfy the general duty to use reasonable care for purposes of a common-law negligence action. See id., 142.
See Anno: 3 ALR2d 6, §§ 2-3, pp 9-14 and §§ 19-27, pp 56-64.
See id., §§ 3-18, pp 13-55. See also Restatement Torts, 2d, § 368, which reflects that generally accepted principle. See, generally, Prosser & Keeton, n 1 supra, § 57, pp 388-390.
The particular standard of conduct may be established by judicial decision. See, e.g., Restatement Torts, 2d, § 285. See generally, Prosser & Keeton, n 1 supra, § 35, p 217.
See, e.g., Scheel v Tremblay, 226 Pa Super 45; 312 A2d 45 (1973); Gerberich v Southern California Edison Co, 5 Cal 2d 46; 53 P2d 948 (1935); Stern v Int’l Ry Co, 220 NY 284; 115 NE 759 (1917).
See, e.g., Shapiro v Toyota Motor Co, Ltd, 38 NC App 658; 248 SE2d 868 (1978); Speigel v Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co, 341 So 2d 832 (Fla App, 1977); Oram v New Jersey Bell Telephone Co, 132 NJ Super 491; 334 A2d 343 (1975). See also, e.g., Hyde v Rensselaer Co, 51 NY2d 927; 434 NYS2d 984; 415 NE2d 972 (1980).
See Prosser & Keeton, n 1 supra, § 37, pp 237-238.
See id., § 35, pp 217-219.
As noted by the Court in Scheel, n 18 supra, and reflected in the quotation from that decision set forth in the majority opinion, liability would not be limited to "those situations in which the pole is located in the roadway itself, but may be imposed where the placement of a pole close to the edge of a highway constitutes . . . [an] unreasonable risk of harm to users of the highway.” Ante, p 60, quoting Scheel, supra, 47-49. The particular standard of conduct requires utility poles to be "so located as to avoid any unreasonable danger to travelers on the highway.” Id. I would also note that highway travel in the ordinary course may include minor deviations from the traveled portion proper of the highway, as opposed to vehicles uncontrollably and entirely leaving it.
Through the extensive off-the-record evidence referred to in the majority opinion (ante, p 62, n 7), plaintiff and amicus curiae seem to assert that currently applicable statutory regulations regarding the appropriate placement and design of utility poles, fail to adequately further highway safety. To the extent that that is a legislative matter, it is, of course, beyond the scope of our decision in this case. See n 13.
To the extent that plaintiffs’ implied warranty of crashworthiness theory is asserted independently of their negligence claim as a theory of products liability, I would expressly reject it. The Detroit Edison Company is no more a proper party for such a claim than is the State Highway Commission. Neither is a manufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer of utility poles. That defendant sells electricity is, of course, irrelevant in a products liability action concerning utility poles.