concurring.
Although I agree with the majority’s ultimate resolution of appellant’s third point of error, I write separately to further address his contention that the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s affirmative answer to second punishment issue regarding future dangerousness.
I.
Over the years, this Court has developed a general set of guidelines with which to review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence to support an affirmative answer to the second punishment issue under Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 37.071(b)(2). See, Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 358 (Tex.Cr.App.1995); Wilkerson v. State, 881 S.W.2d 321, 335-336 (Tex.Cr.App.1994) (Baird, J., dissenting); Johnson v. State, 853 S.W.2d 527, 532 (Tex.Cr.App.1992); Valdez v. State, 776 S.W.2d 162, 166-167 (Tex.Cr.App.1989). These factors were first enumerated in Kee-ton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), and include, but are not limited to:
(1) the circumstances of the capital offense, including the defendant’s state of mind and whether he was working alone or in concert with other parties;
(2) the calculated nature of the defendant’s actions;
(3) the forethought and deliberateness exhibited by the crime’s execution;
(4) the existence of a prior criminal record and the severity of the prior offenses;
*38(5) the defendant’s age and personal circumstances at the time of the commission of the offense;
(6) whether the defendant was acting under duress or intoxication or under the domination of another at the time of the commission of the offense;
(7) the lack of psychiatric evidence concerning future dangerousness; and,
(8) any relevant character evidence.
Dinkins, 894 S.W.2d at 358.
Although no single factor is dispositive toward supporting a jury’s affirmative answer to the second punishment issue, “a review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of a continuing threat necessarily involves a balancing between the aggravating and mitigating evidence presented at trial.” Wilkerson, 881 S.W.2d at 336 (Baird, J., dissenting). Accordingly, “while the absence of certain aggravating evidence might not render the evidence insufficient to support an affirmative answer to the second punishment issue, the overwhelming presence of mitigating evidence may.” Id.
II.
A review of the evidence in light of the aforementioned factors supports the jury’s finding that appellant constitutes a future danger to society. With regard to the circumstances and deliberateness of the offense, it is notable that appellant shot the deceased four times at close range after the deceased refused to hand over any money. In Din-kins, this court observed that the “infliction of multiple wounds at close range indicates and wanton and callous disregard for human life_” Id., 894 S.W.2d at 360. The infliction of multiple wounds also indicates deliberateness on the part of a defendant. Id. See also, Johnson v. State, 853 S.W.2d 527, 531-533 (Tex.Cr.App.1992) (multiple gun shot wounds probative of deliberateness of actions). Compare, Bower v. State, 769 S.W.2d 887, 890, 895 (Tex.Cr.App.1989) (multiple gunshot wounds fired at close range). These factors militate against appellant.
Moreover, evidence of a defendant’s calculation and forethought in committing an offense is likewise indicative of future dangerousness. In the instant case, the State presented evidence that appellant coincided the robbery to occur in the morning, when the deceased opened his store, and at a time of the month when the deceased had large sums of cash on the premises. See, Dinkins, 894 S.W.2d at 360-361 (Defendant arranged for meeting with victim and armed self in preparation); Bower, 769 S.W.2d at 895 (Defendant pre-planned burglary and ambushed victims rather than flee when opportunity existed); and, Livingston, 739 S.W.2d at 340 (Defendant waited for victim to return to car). Accordingly, this evidence militates against appellant.
Additionally, appellant’s prior criminal record and the severity of those offense is probative of whether he may constitute a continuing future danger to society. Dinkins, 894 S.W.2d at 361; and, Wilkerson, 881 S.W.2d at 339 (Baird, J., dissenting). Although the State presented evidence of nine prior offenses committed by appellant, many of which involved time in prison or jail, it is notable that none of the offenses involve violence.1 Accordingly, while the majority contends these offenses “show an escalating and on-going pattern of disrespect and continued violations of the law,” I do not believe these offenses, as such, are indicative that appellant would constitute a future danger to society. Compare, Wilkerson, 881 S.W.2d at 339-340 (Baird, J., dissenting) (numerous violent unadjudicated offenses committed as part of crime spree constituted aggravating factors); Russell v. State, 598 S.W.2d 238, 255 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) (Defendant, who was on parole when committing the capital offense, had prior criminal record including burglary, robbery, and assault with intent to murder); and, Brooks v. State, 599 S.W.2d 312 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) (Defendant’s prior *39criminal record contained only conviction for “simple burglary,” theft over $50 and three federal convictions for illegal possession of a firearm).
Evidence of a defendant’s age at the time of the offense is also a relevant consideration to whether a defendant constitutes a future danger to society. Wilkerson, 881 S.W.2d at 340-341 (Baird, J., dissenting op.). The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly approved of the consideration of a defendant’s youth at the time of the offense because the impetuous qualities associated with youth are typically mollified by age and maturity. Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 2668-2669 (1993); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 2698 (1988); and, Eddings v. Oklahoma* 455 U.S. 104, 115-116, 102 S.Ct. 869, 877 (1982). See also, Graham v. Collins, 509 U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 892, 924 (1993) (Souter, J., dissenting). Accordingly, “youth, by its very nature is a mitigating factor to be noted and considered.” Ellason v. State, 815 S.W.2d 656, 663 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). The record indicates appellant was 26 years old when he committed the instant offense. Although we have never held there to be an upper limit to when a defendant’s age ceases to be a mitigating factor, it is notable that appellant was older than the defendants in those eases in which we have held age to be mitigating. See, Id, supra (19); Huffman v. State, 746 S.W.2d 212 (Tex.Cr.App.1988) (22); Beltran v. State, 728 S.W.2d 382 (Tex.Cr.App.1987) (25); and, Warren v. State, 562 S.W.2d 474 (Tex.Cr.App.1978) (25). See also, Wilkerson, 881 S.W.2d at 341 (Baird, J., dissenting op.) (19).
Additionally, evidence of appellant’s good or bad character is relevant to a review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding of a continuing threat to society. See, Dinkins, 894 S.W.2d at 361. Both the State and appellant presented character evidence. An officer in the Corpus Christi Police Department testified from his own experience, as well as knowledge from conversations he had with other officers that appellant was not a peaceful and law-abiding citizen. Moreover, three Harris County jailers testified about appellant’s participation in two separate altercations between inmates. Finally, appellant’s mother testified appellant had admitted to having a cocaine addiction between 1989 and 1991 and that she had observed appellant use marihuana during that period. However, appellant’s mother also testified appellant had never been violent or abusive towards his parents. Moreover, appellant’s half-brother testified that appellant was non-violent in character. Finally, the supervisor at appellant’s full-time job testified appellant was non-violent, hard working, and had occasionally served in an advisory capacity in her absence. While the latter evidence of good character militates against the jury’s verdict, it is notable that such evidence was rebutted. However, even unrebutted evidence of a defendant’s good character is by itself insufficient to overcome a jury’s affirmative answer. Dinkins, 894 S.W.2d at 361; and Rosales v. State, 841 S.W.2d 368, 382 (Tex.Cr.App.1992).
Finally, there is no evidence appellant was acting under the influence or dominion of another when he committed the instant offense. Wilkerson, 881 S.W.2d at 341. Nor is there any contention appellant was intoxicated at the time of the offense. Id., at 341-342. Although neither side presented psychiatric evidence relating to whether appellant posed a future danger, we have held the absence of psychiatric evidence does not automatically undermine a jury’s affirmative answer to the second punishment issue. Dinkins, 894 S.W.2d at 361; and, Rosales, 841 S.W.2d at 382.
III.
In weighing the factors enunciated in Kee-ton, I believe the evidence supports the conclusion that a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was a future danger to society. Appellant entered the store and shot the deceased four times at close range, displaying a callousness and deliberateness to the crime. Moreover, there is evidence appellant pre-planned the offense to occur at a time when the store would have large sums of money. Although appellant’s prior criminal history is relatively minor, there is also (admittedly contested) evidence of appellant’s bad character, inelud-*40mg instances of violence while incarcerated. Finally, appellant was 26 years old when he committed the offense. In light of appellant’s age coupled with his periods of incarceration, appellant lacked the youthful immaturity necessary for the purposes of mitigating against the death penalty.
With these comments, I concur in the resolution of appellant’s third point of error and join the remainder of the majority opinion.
OVERSTREET and MALONEY, JJ., join this opinion.. These offenses consisted of: (1) burglary of a motor vehicle (August 1982 — probated sentence subsequently revoked); (2) possession of marihuana (September 1985);, (3) unauthorized use of a motor vehicle (December 1985); (4) delivery of marihuana (May 20, 1986); (5) delivery of marihuana (May 22, 1986); (6) unlawfully carrying a weapon (knife) (June 1987); (7) trespass of a building (November 1988); (8) unauthorized use of a motor vehicle (August 1988); and (9) possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) (April 1989).