dissenting.
Respectfully, I must dissent. In my opinion there simply was no evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that Appellant was sane at the time these crimes were committed.
*335In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979), the United States Supreme Court stated as follows:
[T]he critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction must be not simply to determine whether the jury was properly instructed, but to determine whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. But this inquiry does not require a court to “ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation omitted.] Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation omitted.] This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Once a defendant has been found guilty of the crime charged, the factfinder’s role as weigher of the evidence is preserved through a legal conclusion that upon judicial review all of the evidence is to be considered in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The criterion thus impinges upon “jury” discretion only to the extent necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of law.
That the Thompson [v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 80 S.Ct. 624, 4 L.Ed.2d 654 (1960)] “no evidence” rule is simply inadequate to protect against misapplications of the constitutional standard of reasonable doubt is readily apparent. “[A] mere modicum of evidence may satisfy a ‘no evidence’ standard....” [Citation omitted.] Any evidence that is relevant— that has any tendency to make the existence of an element of a crime slightly more probable than it would be without the evidence, cf. Fed Rul Evid 401 — could be deemed a “mere modicum.” But it could not seriously be argued that such a “modicum” of evidence could by itself rationally support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id., 443 U.S. at 318-320, 99 S.Ct. at 2788-2789, 61 L.Ed.2d at 573-574.
Thus the issue to be resolved is whether there exists in this record more than a “mere modicum” of evidence to counter the expert testimony presented of Appellant’s insanity. The majority cites evidence that during the shooting Appellant appeared to be in control, that he asked for counsel when arrested, and that he testified his victims were shot because they were the source of his frustration. Is this sufficient to overcome the uncontra-dicted testimony of two expert witnesses that Appellant was a paranoid schizophrenic and lacked the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his acts or conform his conduct to the law? I do not believe so.
Even when considered in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence presented in contradiction to the expert testimony is insufficient to support a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. I would reverse Appellant’s convictions and direct entry of a directed verdict.