dissenting.
The result reached here, the reinstatement of the license of a driver who refused to take the test for blood alcohol content, values form over substance. As I see it, the majority’s decision far extends the envelope of the warning necessary to advise a motorist who is reasonably suspected of driving while impaired of the effect of his or her failure to take the test. The driver in this case knew a revocation of one year would result from his failure to take the test. The appellant driver received sufficient information to understand the impact of his refusal to take the test on his driving privileges. To allow the appellant to escape the effect of the law because “immediate,” or a synonym therefor, was not used, is wrong.
Simply put, the judgment under review is now reversed and driver’s suspension is averted only because the word “immediate” or a like word was not included in the warning. This is illustrated by the language used by the majority at page - of the slip opinion which states:
The problem in this case is not that the officer failed to use the words “immediate,” or “immediately.” The officer need not use the exact wording of the statute. Rather, “any language which clearly conveys the message that the motorist’s license shall be immediately revoked upon refusal to take the test is adequate.” Id. at 171. The difficulty here is that Logan was not given the unequivocal notice that the revocation would occur as soon as he refused the test. (Emphasis added).
Under the opinion adopted today, had the officer told Logan the literal truth under § 577.04.1.1: “if you refuse, I’ll give you a 15 day permit, after which, if you don’t file a petition for review, your license will be revoked for a year,” then this too would have failed to adequately inform the motorist of the consequences.
I share the majority’s concern as to why the director chose to elect to monkey with the language of the notice statute. That decision, while successful at manufacturing this appeal, should not alter the trial court’s decision.
The purpose of this law is to get drunk drivers off the road. Section 577.041 “requires only that the officer inform the arres-tee of the consequences for refusing to submit to the examination as well as why the test is being administered.” Collins v. Director of Revenue, 691 S.W.2d 246, 252 (Mo. banc 1985). Prior to 1993, § 577.041 required the arresting officer to inform the driver the license “may be revoked” for failure to submit. Mullen v. Director of Revenue, 891 S.W.2d 562, 563 (Mo.App.1995). The officer’s report of a failure to submit was sent to the Director of Revenue who was to revoke the license for one year. Bennett v. Director of Revenue, 889 S.W.2d 166, 168-169 (Mo.App.1994). The 1993 amendments to § 577.041 give the officer the authority to: 1) serve a notice of revocation on the driver; 2) take possession of the driver’s license and issue a fifteen day temporary permit; and 3) make a report to the Director, including the driver’s refusal to submit to a chemical test. *892Upon receipt, the director is to revoke the license for a year. In subsection 4. the procedure is defined for a driver to contest the revocation, including judicial determination of “[wjhether or not the person refused to submit to the test.” Bennett v. Director, 889 S.W.2d at 168-69.
This court in Bennett, and the southern district in Vinson v. Director of Revenue, 892 S.W.2d 330 (Mo.App.1995) have addressed the warning or notice given by the arresting officer. In Bennett, following the 1993 amendments in which the statutory language was changed to its present form, (license shall be immediately revoked upon refusal), the officer’s warning used the old language that the license “may” or “could” be revoked, and such warning, by not using “the exact words of the statute,” mislead the motorist. Id. at 168 and 170-71 Vinson reached a like result. The officer “explained to him that his driver’s license might be revoked if he failed to take the test,” and the court held such language failed “to clearly convey [that] ... his operating privilege would be immediately revoked from making an informed decision on whether to take it.” 892 S.W.2d at 332.
The warning given Logan, that the officer “must file ... with the Director ... who shall revoke your drivers license for one year,” while not tracking the statutory language by inserting the word “immediately” in the notice, does not call for a reversal and reinstatement of Logan’s driving privileges. Although Bennett speaks of the post-1993 statute calling for conveying “... the message that upon a refusal, an immediate revocation of the person’s license will occur,” the message in the case at bar should be held sufficient to convey to the driver that the consequence of his not taking the chemical test would be definite, and the loss of his license for a year would be certain. The warning here substantially comports with the statute. The warning here contrasts with Bennett and Vinson, which gave the driver an impression of hope that his license would not certainly be lost for refusal to take the test. As such, this less than perfect notice should be held to be sufficient in helping the driver to make a decision. Mullen v. Director of Revenue, 891 S.W.2d at 563, held as was further stated on page 171 of Bennett:
However, any language which clearly conveys the message that the motorist’s license shall be immediately revoked upon refusal to take the test is adequate.
See also, Spradling v. Deimeke, 528 S.W.2d 759, 766 (Mo.1975).
The intent of the legislature to divert drunk drivers from our roads is evident by a whole statutory scheme, of which § 577.0J..1 is but a part. The construction of this statute, in the result reached here today leads to an unreasonable result, Breeze v. Goldberg, 595 S.W.2d 381, 383 (Mo.App.1980) flies in the face of legislative intent, and reaches an illogical result. Lebeau v. Kelly, 697 S.W.2d 312, 315 (Mo.App.1985).
I would affirm the judgment.