ON MOTION FOR REHEARING OR TO TRANSFER
PER CURIAM:The defendants have filed a vigorous motion for rehearing or for transfer to the Supreme Court. In the main, the defendants have merely reargued matters already considered, but in one respect they are indubitably correct. In the principal opinion, the court did not specifically discuss defendants’ claim of instructional error in submitting the question of punitive damages. This assignment was not discussed because this court believed that the error assigned was not prejudicial. After rehearing upon the specific point our opinion remains unchanged. However, in fairness to the able advocates who represent the defendants, an explanation is called for.
The trial court submitted the issue of punitive damages against defendants Daugherty, Richardson and Covert by combining the 1978 revision of MAI 10.01 and the 1981 revision of 10.03. The substance of defendants’ objection is that the plaintiffs did not submit the liability of each such defendant by a separate instruction, as required by both the 1981 and 1983 revisions of MAI 10.03. Rule 70.02(c) provides that the giving of an instruction in violation of MAI “shall constitute error, its prejudicial effect to be judicially determined.” Careful reconsideration of the record has led us to believe there was no prejudicial error.
Recently, our Supreme Court has indicated that although litigants are entitled to a submission which is legally correct, it must be recognized that retrials are burdensome, and has noted a trend away from reversal for error in instructions unless there is a substantial indication of prejudice. Fowler v. Park Corp., 673 S.W.2d 749, 756-757 (Mo. banc 1984). Also in Hudson v. Carr, 668 S.W.2d 68, 71 (Mo. banc 1984), the court held inter alia, 668 S.W.2d at 71[3], “... It is not enough to show erroneous deviation unless prejudice also appears....”
Specifically, it is proper to look to the closing arguments to determine whether a deviation from MAI has had a prejudicial effect upon the jury. Fowler v. Park Corp., 673 S.W.2d at 756[13]; Welch v. Hyatt, 578 S.W.2d 905, 914[7] (Mo. banc 1979). At the instructions conference, plaintiffs’ counsel was instructed to identify the defendants against whom plaintiff sought punitive damages. This instruction was faithfully obeyed. The final arguments were preserved. Counsel made it clear that plaintiffs sought punitive damages only from defendants Daugherty, Richardson and Covert, as follows:
“I ask you ... to do what [you] think is correct ... and return to these people what these men have destroyed. There is one way, that is to fill the verdict form in where it says actual damages, place in the figure that you believe is correct. In regard to Mr. Bates and Mr. Craig, I don’t believe they did anything maliciously, wantonly or wilfully. I’m sorry, but I think the ... other ... men did_” (Emphasis ours.)
The form of the verdict given the jury as “Verdict A” was also curative. The verdict form was the 1982 Revision of MAI 36.12; the verdict form itself made allowance for the assessment of punitive damages only against defendants Daugherty, Richardson and Covert.
We have carefully considered the precedents cited to us by defendants’ counsel, *309including Annbar Associates v. American Express Co., 565 S.W.2d 701 (Mo.App.1978), and Saunders v. Flippo, 639 S.W.2d 411 (Mo.App.1982), but we do not find them controlling. Considering the whole record, it is manifest that the jury understood that defendants Daugherty, Richardson and Covert were entitled to have their conduct considered separately for the purpose of determining whether or not punitive damages should be assessed. That is the purpose served by separate submissions of liability for punitive damages. Annbar Associates v. American Express Co., 565 S.W.2d at 710; Fordyce v. Montgomery, 424 S.W.2d 746 at 751[6-8] (Mo.App.1968). There was deviation from MAI; there was no prejudice to the defendants.
The principal opinion has been slightly modified to clarify our views; the defendants’ claim of instructional error which was not addressed has been addressed. The court finds no reason to prolong its opinion. No further motion for rehearing is necessary or appropriate. If the defendants still feel themselves aggrieved, they know their remedy.