This is an appeal by defendant-appellant from a judgment of $5000.00 rendered against it in a jury tried case for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff-respondent. Defendant contends that the case was improperly submitted to the jury as an invitee-injured case using MAI 22.03 modified. This is based upon the asserted grounds that (1) the evidence failed to establish the existence of the defect when defendant parted with the possession of the trailer on which plaintiff was injured, and (2) the evidence established plaintiff should have known of the dangerous condition in the exercise of ordinary care.
Defendant is a company engaged in the scrap paper business. Plaintiff’s employer, Johnston Foil Division, American Metal Climax, Inc., (hereinafter employer) is a company which makes paper products. In the course of its operation employer produces scrap paper for which it has no use, but which is of use and benefit to defendant. As a result a course of dealing between defendant and employer has developed over a period of years. Defendant delivers to employer’s premises a trailer belonging to defendant. To this is connected a blow-pipe by defendant’s employee. A blower forces scraps of paper, a by-product of employer’s laminating process, through the pipe, and into defendant’s trailer. When the trailer is full, after a period of a week or longer, employer contacts defendant which picks up the full trailer. Defendant makes no charge for carrying away the paper, which it uses in its business, nor does it pay employer for the paper.
At the time of the accident in question, plaintiff was employed on the 11:00 P.M. shift. His duties included checking periodically to make sure the blow-pipe was properly discharging the scrap paper into defendant’s trailer. He would usually make these checks by looking out a window into the trailer. Immediately prior to the accident he noted that the blow-pipe had fallen and the paper was being blown improperly for correct loading of the trailer. He turned off the blower, picked up a broom and proceeded to the trailer to reattach the blow-pipe and sweep the paper scraps into the correct position in the trailer. He entered the trailer, the floor of which was covered with paper scraps to a depth of one or two inches, took two steps and his right leg went through the floor of the trailer, causing the injuries for which he sought recovery. The evidence established that the lighting of the floor of the trailer coming from the employer’s windows was adequate to see. The evidence further established that the paper as it came out of the blow-pipe was in strips and had a tendency to weave together, and we believe the jury could reasonably infer that such weaving effect could and did conceal any hole in the floor of the trailer.
*418The trailer had been delivered to employer’s premises by defendant sometime between a week and seventeen days before the accident. In keeping with the course of dealing between defendant and employer no employee or agent of defendant had been at the trailer site after its delivery. The employer’s employees were responsible for seeing that the trailer was loaded properly after it was delivered. On occasions it was necessary for employees of the employer to enter the trailer to sweep the scraps into proper position, particularly as the paper began to substantially fill the trailer. Defendant could anticipate that employees of employer would have occasion to enter the trailer while it was located on employer’s premises. There was no evidence of the actual usage of this trailer while on employer’s premises. The trailer was parked in the open some distance from the employer’s building, but there is no evidence that it was in any way protected by fence or guard while on employer’s premises.
Plaintiff’s petition sought recovery on the basis of the negligence of defendant in failing to keep the trailer in proper repair, failing to inspect the trailer, concealing the defective condition of the trailer, and failing to warn of the dangers.
Plaintiff submitted as his verdict-directing instruction MAI 22.03, Invitee Injured. The dangerous condition submitted was “ * * * there was a hole in the floor of defendant’s trailer and as a result the floor was not reasonably safe for persons reasonably expected to be in the trailer, * * It is to be seen that as submitted to the jury plaintiff conditioned his recovery upon defendant’s actual or constructive knowledge of the existence of a hole in the floor. There was no requirement in the instruction that the jury find the hole existed at the time of delivery. We do not believe the evidence warranted such a submission. It is first necessary to examine the duty which defendant owed to plaintiff. The parties are in dispute as to whether plaintiff was an invitee or a licensee. We think neither, as we are here concerned with a chattel not actually in the possession of defendant, but we think the precise terminology is of little importance. Defendant furnished the trailer to employer for defendant’s economic benefit. It was in the scrap paper business, and the nature of its business required it to have a source of supply of scrap paper. The trailer was supplied for the economic benefit of defendant, and the fact that employer also obtained benefit does not affect defendant’s legal status. See Markley v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 338 Mo. 436, 90 S.W.2d 409, a case very similar to this case, although involving a common carrier. The duty imposed is not limited to carriers but to those who negligently furnish a dangerous instrumentality for a business purpose, clearly the case here. See Committee Comment 2 to MAI 26.01. In Reed v. Swift & Co., Mo.App., 117 S.W. 2d 636, this court found liability to an employee of another where the employee was helping defendant’s driver unload a shipment of meat and stepped through the floor of defendant’s truck. The duty found to exist there is equally present in this case.
Defendant does not dispute that it knew it was necessary from time to time for employees of employer to enter the trailer in order to insure the proper loading of the scrap paper, and the evidence supports an inference of such knowledge. Such activities on the part of employer’s employees were for the benefit of defendant. In such posture it was defendant’s duty to furnish a trailer which was reasonably safe for the intended use by the employer’s employees. Markley v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., supra; Reed v. Swift & Co., supra; Sykes v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 178 Mo. 693, 77 S.W. 723. And defendant was required to exercise ordinary care to determine whether the trailer was in fact safe at the time of its delivery to the employer’s premises, and if not to either repair it or warn of the danger. We cannot, however, find either legally or factually a basis for a continuing duty on defendant to inspect after delivery, nor is defendant *419an insurer of any defects occurring- after delivery. Markley v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., supra. Under the facts here we hold that in order to recover on the basis of a hole in the floor, it was necessary for plaintiff to establish the presence of that hole at the time of delivery to employer’s premises. It is in this regard that we think plaintiff’s submission was improper. There was no evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the hole existed at the time of delivery to employer’s premises. Plaintiff would have us indulge the presumption that if the hole existed at the time of accident it must have existed for some time prior thereto. This we cannot do. The trailer was upon the employer’s premises for at least seven days and possibly as long as seventeen days. There was no evidence from which it could be concluded that the hole did not come into being after delivery and prior to the accident. The cases in which a present condition was presumed to have existed at some time prior to the accident involve either very short periods of time, Brooks v. Illinois Terminal R. Co., Mo.App., 269 S.W.2d 136 (nine hours); or surrounding circumstances sufficient to justify an inference that an established fact must have existed at a certain time in the immediate past, Brock v. Gulf, Mobile and Ohio Railroad Company, Mo., 270 S.W.2d 827 [3, 4].1 The evidence at trial here did not establish either of these situations, and did not warrant recovery against defendant based upon its negligence in failing to discover and warn of the hole. See Markley v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., supra.
Plaintiff relies heavily on one bit of testimony to support the conclusion that the hole had existed at the time of delivery. Plaintiff was asked the condition of the wood around the hole when he inspected the trailer the morning after the accident. He stated the wood was “rotten.” Defendant objected that the answer was a conclusion. The court sustained the objection and ordered the answer stricken. We agree with the plaintiff that the court’s ruling was erroneous.
Witnesses are permitted to express conditions in terms understandable to the average person, even though the term utilized is a summary of a combination of sensory impressions- or separate physical conditions. The test is that stated in Brown v. Kroger Co., Mo.App., 358 S.W.2d 429, 1. c. 433: “ * * * when it is impossible or extremely difficult for a witness to convey an accurate and actual meaning, and the nature of the thing described may be more clearly and practically conveyed to the jury by a summary of the witness’s impressions, or by comparison with some ordinary object or condition familiar to the court or jury, then the practical administration of justice requires acceptance of the testimony even though it may be, in a sense, the conclusion of the witness.”
We believe “rotten” as it concerns wood fully meets the test. It is difficult to think of a more accurate method of description of wood in that condition, or one more easily understood. But accepting the plaintiff’s description of the wood as proper evidence does not establish the existence of the hole at the time of delivery of the trailer. It establishes no more than the possibility that the wood in the trailer was in such a condition at the time of delivery that a hole could develop or that the floor was otherwise unsafe for persons thereon. There was no evidence from which a jury could determine whether the hole was old or new. Plaintiff essentially concedes that this evidence does not support the theory submitted by his verdict-director by stating in his brief, “ * * * In other words, even if the hole was created after the trailer came into the possession of plaintiff’s employer, nevertheless, if the floor board was rotten during a period of which it was in the defendant’s possession the *420trailer was defective and dangerous, and the defendant is charged with notice thereof.” Plaintiff’s brief further admits “ * * * from all of which the jury could infer either the existence of the hole when the trailer was delivered or a rotten, defective and easily penetrated condition of the one or two inch boards which made up the bed of the trailer.” But this is not the submission to the jury. The verdict-director was premised on the existence of a hole known actually or constructively to defendant. The evidence is insufficient to establish the existence of such hole at the time of delivery which is the point at which defendant’s knowledge, actual or constructive, is determined on the evidence here.
Normally, we determine the sub-missibility of plaintiff’s case upon the theory actually submitted and not upon possible but unsubmitted theories. If the evidence fails to support the submitted theory we normally reverse outright without remand. But here in the interest of justice we will remand the case. Plaintiff adduced substantial evidence concerning the age of defendant’s trailer, the policies on inspection and repair of defendant’s trailers, the general maintenance policies and facilities of defendant in regard to its trailers. Additionally, there was the evidence that the wood in this particular trailer was rotten. These matters might support a jury finding that defendant failed to exercise ordinary care to discover an unsafe condition in the trailer provided by it. We do not say that such evidence would necessarily establish the discoverability of the defect causing the injury. We remand here because we do not know to what degree the erroneous ruling of the court as to the condition of the floor may have influenced counsel to make the erroneous submission rather than the proper pleaded submission, or precluded counsel from introducing evidence of the discoverability of a rotten condition, of the wood, and a resultant unsafe trailer bed.
Defendant has raised other points including among others excessiveness of the verdict and certain conduct of plaintiff’s counsel claimed to have prejudiced the jury. We need not consider these as we conclude that in the interests of justice retrial should be had on all issues, and the claimed errors may not arise again. We do rule defendant’s contention that the evidence established as a matter of law that plaintiff should have known of the dangerous condition in the exercise of ordinary care. This argument is based on defendant’s interpretation of the evidence that plaintiff had previously been in the trailer. This we believe to be a matter for a jury. The interweaving of the paper could have concealed any hole in the floor. Our inability to presume the existence of the hole on date of delivery leaves us equally unable to presume its appearance at any given point in time. The evidence is not conclusive that plaintiff, in the exercise of ordinary care, could have seen the hole in view of the light conditions. The evidence does not clearly establish that plaintiff had previously been in the trailer, nor does it establish, as we have previously pointed out, that the hole existed when plaintiff may have been in the trailer. As defendant points out, it is possible the hole was caused by the falling of the blow-pipe immediately prior to the accident.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for new trial.
PER CURIAM:
The foregoing opinion by SMITH, C, is adopted as the opinion of this Court. Accordingly, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for new trial.
WOLFE, P. J., and BRADY, J., concur. BRUCE NORMILE, Special Judge, dissents.. The Brock case really appears to stand for the continuation of a pre-existing condition for a substantial period of time (two years) where the evidence failed to establish any change.