— Plaintiffs brought this action in equity for a declaratory judgment, asking the court to hold that the operation of their business establishment comes within the exceptions to the licensing requirements of the Iowa Liquor Control Act as amended by chapter 114, section 30, of Senate File 437, passed in 1963 by the Sixtieth General Assembly, which provides:
“It is unlawful for any person, firm, corporation, partnership or association to allow the dispensing or consumption of intoxicating liquor or intoxicating beverages except sacramental wines and beer, in any establishment unless such establishments are licensed under this title.
“Provided, however, the provisions of this section shall not apply to bona fide conventions or meetings where mixed drinks are served to delegates or guests without cost. All other provisions of this chapter shall be applicable to such rooms. The provisions of this section shall have no application to occasional private social gatherings of friends or relatives in a private home or place.”
The trial court held that plaintiffs’ operation was within these exceptions and enjoined the defendants from interfering therewith. Defendants appealed.
*247Plaintiffs have operated the Mayflower in Iowa City for over 14 years. Their business consists of renting the establishment to private persons, firms, corporations or associations for private purposes such as dinners, parties, meetings or other gatherings. Plaintiffs prepare and serve food to such gatherings if requested to do so. Arrangements for the renting of the premises and the menu must be made in advance. The rental charge depends upon the number of dinner reservations. If the number of dinners is less than a fixed minimum there is an additional cash rental.
If mixed drinks are consumed, plaintiffs also charge for the mix, ice and glasses and will furnish a bartender if requested. The parties must supply their own liquor and may mix their own drinks. The establishment is not open to the public in the sense that the public may come in at anytime and be served. A minimum rental must be paid for the privilege of occupying the premises for a particular occasion, at which time the parties leasing the premises have the “run of the place”.
The Lions Club meets there once a week, but does not bring liquor. Representative groups which have rented the premises include the Junior Chamber of Commerce, Optimists Club, Kent Feeds, Johnson County Bar Association, fraternities and sororities, businesses and individuals. There is no question of subterfuge or the violation of any provisions of the Act other than the one in question.
Most of the matters raised on this appeal have been answered in our opinion in Sioux Associates, Inc. v. Iowa Liquor Control Commission, 257 Iowa 308, 132 N.W.2d 421. It would serve no purpose to repeat, at this time, the reasoning and authorities set forth there.
I. Defendants contend the Mayflower is not a “private home or place” within the meaning of the licensing exception. This contention is answered by 'Sioux Associates in which we hold that private modifies both home and place and that a “private place” is one “to which the public does not have and is not permitted to have access and is not a place of public resort.” The Mayflower is closed to the public except by rental arrangements made in advance. When rented, only those invited by the renter are admitted and they have the exclusive use of the estab*248lishment. Although there are separate rooms, only one party has been permitted on any given night since the Act was passed. So long as attendance is restricted to invited guests both the place and the gathering are private.
II. The evidence shows that at least during part of the year the premises are rented four or five nights a week to different parties and that it may be used some 200 times a year. Defendant contends that it therefore is not an “occasional gathering of friends or relatives”. In Sioux Associates we held that occasional did not constitute a restriction on the landlord, but rather a limitation on the use by any one tenant. If the restriction were on the landlord, the exception would become meaningless for no one could maintain facilities large enough to handle large parties or dances if they could only be used a few times a year. The only regular renter here is the Lions Club which meets weekly. Since no liquor is involved at such meeting, there is no question of a statutory violation. All other tenants come within the definition of “occasional” contained in Sioux Associates.
III. Defendants contend plaintiffs have failed to show that parties were “gatherings of friends”. In Sioux Associates we held members of a dance club were friends within the meaning of the statute. The same can be presumed about members of service clubs, associations, fraternal organizations and employers and employees. It must be remembered that “gatherings of friends” applies to homes as well as places. It would create an impossible enforcement problem if the exact nature of the relationship between the parties became the determining factor. Certainly acquaintances with similar interests should be considered as friends for the purpose of this statute. Private parties would presumptively include only friends.
IV. Facts here differ from Sioux Associates in that plaintiffs serve food, sell the mix and ice and will furnish a bartender while in Sioux Associates the renters brought their own mix and ice and sold the setups to the members of the dance clubs. We do1 not believe the factual difference is important as the statute does not punish the actual dispensing or consumption of liquor, but makes it unlawful to allow1 the dispensing or consumption. Plaintiffs in Sioux Associates permitted the dispens*249ing and consumption of liquor on tbeir premises fully as mueb as plaintiffs bere.
Y. Defendants argue orally that some of the rentals which were obviously bona fide conventions or meetings did not come within the exception because the proprietor charged the host for the mix and ice and therefore the drinks were not “served to delegates or guests without cost”. We do not so interpret the statute. The host in some manner will pay for the mixed drinks. Whether he pays the proprietor or buys the mix at a grocery store and brings it himself is immaterial. If there is no cost for the drinks to the delegates or guests at a bona fide convention or meeting, it is within the exception. If the guest or delegate paid for the mix or ice for his mixed drink the exception would not apply.
VI. The trial court granted a temporary injunction enjoining the peace officers, “pending the final disposition of the ease on its merits, from molesting or interfering with the plaintiffs in the operation of the Mayflower, * * * so long as said plaintiffs are not furnishing liquor or selling the same; that the defendants are enjoined from interfering with private parties held at the Mayflower, where the members of the private party furnish their own intoxicating liquor for themselves and do not sell the same, so long as said parties do not become boisterous or loud or a nuisance, it being the intention of the Court that said injunction shall restraiu the defendants and 'their agents and peace officers from construing the Act in any other way pending the litigation of this case -than that section 30 should apply to the plaintiffs herein.”
In its judgment the trial court made the injunction permanent. Defendant claims the court erred in granting this injunction.
We need not decide whether it was error for the trial court to issue a temporary injunction enjoining the officers from interfering with plaintiffs’ business until a declaratory judgment was obtained. That question became moot when final judgment was entered. We shall therefore address our attention to the permanent injunction only.
The record is clear that there was no harassment of *250plaintiffs by any peace officers. There was a genuine disagreement on the legality of plaintiffs’ operation under the Act. It was plaintiff’s fear that the officers, interpreting his operation as a violation of the law, might raid his place and cause embarrassment to his customers. We have now held that plaintiffs’ operation is within the exceptions to the licensing provision and not illegal. There is nothing in the record to indicate the officers will raid plaintiffs’ establishment or cause them any undue difficulty now that the law has been interpreted. In the absence of proof to the contrary we must assume that they will accept this interpretation as the law and abide by it. Plaintiffs are entitled to the same protection as other parties operating within the law, but not to the additional protection of such an extraordinary remedy as an injunction. Peace officers should have the same right to investigate alleged violations on plaintiffs’ premises as on any other.
Injunctions should be granted with great caution. This is particularly applicable when addressed to peace officers conscientiously attempting to enforce the law. Joyner v. Hammond, 199 Iowa 919, 921, 922, 200 N.W. 571, 36 A. L. R. 934; Wood Brothers Thresher Co. v. Eicher, 231 Iowa 550, 558, 559, 1 N.W.2d 655; Kent Products, Inc. v. Hoegh, 245 Iowa 205, 212, 213, 61 N.W.2d 711.
In Kent Products, Inc., at page 215, in canceling the order for a temporary injunction, we say: “It is not shown defendant state officers will engage in needless, oppressive or vexatious prosecutions. All that appears is that they will attempt to do their duty * *
A similar showing is made here. Their duty will now be governed by the law as herein interpreted.
That portion of the judgment making the temporary injunction permanent is reversed. — Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
Larson, Peterson, Thornton, Snell and Moore, JJ., concur. Thompson, J., and Garfield, C. J., dissent. Hays, J., takes no part.