(concurring). I agree with the majority’s conclusion that, under any theory of liability, the plaintiff should be denied recovery. I consider unfortunate, however, the interjection of Restatement, 2 Torts 2d, p. 347, sec. 402 A standards, as modified by this court in Dippel v. Sciano (1967), 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N. W. 2d 55, in this negligence case.
This case was brought on a theory of negligence, not strict liability. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant was careless and negligent in the design and manufacture of the machine and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the accident and of the plaintiff’s injuries. Dippel v. Sciano was brought upon an entirely different theory. In Dippel, plaintiff alleged that the manufacturer of the pool table “expressly and impliedly warranted” that the table was reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was used. Plaintiff did not allege or attempt to prove that the pool table was negligently constructed.
Dippel discusses with great thoroughness the reason why, in finding that the plaintiff stated a cause of action, the previous Wisconsin law requiring privity of contract in an action for a breach of implied warranty should be abrogated. That case points out that the ultimate consumer has the right to rely on the safety of a product placed in the stream of commerce. If in fact the product proves to be unsafe, that constitutes a breach of the warranty.
The principal effect of Dippel was to relieve the plaintiff from proving specific acts of negligence and to protect him from the defenses of notice of breach, disclaimer, and privity of contract. All plaintiff is required to show is that the product reached the consumer “in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous” to the user. The rule adopted from sec. 402 A, Restatement, 2 Torts 2d, is, in its original form, not a device for imposing liability for negligence. This is clear from sec. 402 A (2) *600(a), which imposes liability even though “the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product.” Sec. 402 A imposes strict liability for tort, not for negligence. Because our system of tort liability in Wisconsin is based upon findings to be made in respect to a defendant’s negligence and a plaintiff’s contributory negligence, this court concluded, as a matter of policy, that the finding of strict liability under the standards of sec. 402 A was the equivalent of negligence per se.
Negligence per se, however, as Dippel points out, is not grounded upon the failure to exercise ordinary care, which includes within its compass the element of foreseeability.1 Under the implied warranty, 402 A rationale of Dippel, foreseeability is not a factor. The policy purpose so effectuated is apparent. The intent of the Dippel rationale is to permit a plaintiff to recover under such circumstances where it is impossible or unduly burden*601some to show the elements of negligence. It is sufficient for the plaintiff to show that the product reached him in a dangerously defective condition. The purpose of Dippel was to take into account the “just claims of the injured and hapless user or consumer of industrial products.” Dippel, page 450. It is sufficient in a case like Dippel, where the action is brought under implied warranty, to show that the product was “dangerously defective.”
Dippel did not intend to apply the dangerously defective standard to an ordinary negligence case. It was not intended to modify or to limit a plaintiff’s right to recover, but to extend that right to those circumstances where it was impossible to allege the particulars of negligence. It was not intended that Dippel be transplanted to negligence actions. It is interesting to note that the respondent in this case relies not at all upon Dippel or sec. 402 A. Neither is cited. This is because those authorities are totally irrelevant to this action.
This action is governed by Smith v. Atco Co. (1959), 6 Wis. 2d 371, 94 N. W. 2d 697, referred to in the majority opinion. In Smith v. Atco Co., we said:
“We deem the time has come for this court to flatly declare that in a tort action for negligence against a manufacturer, or supplier, whether or not privity exists is wholly immaterial. The question of liability should be approached from the standpoint of the standard of care to be exercised by the reasonably prudent person in the shoes of the defendant manufacturer or supplier.” (P. 383)
Accordingly, under the well-established rules of negligence in Wisconsin, the plaintiff is simply required to prove that the defendant failed to exercise ordinary care and the act or omission complained of was the cause, in the legal sense, of the plaintiff’s injury. That latter consideration, of course, carries with it the entire panoply *602of rules concerned with cause in fact, proximate cause, and intervening cause.
The fundamental question of ordinary care, however, carries with it the concept of foreseeability. Osborne v. Montgomery (1931), 203 Wis. 223, 234, 234 N. W. 372, discussing foreseeability, states:
“The liability of the actor may therefore depend upon whether or not the actor as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person should reasonably have foreseen as a consequence of his act that injury would probably result.”
Accordingly, in the instant case, where the action is grounded on negligence, it was necessary for the plaintiff to show that the respondent La Dow, in the exercise of ordinary care, should have foreseen that his design and method of installation would be unreasonably dangerous to others. This, as the majority opinion correctly points out, he did not prove and, therefore, he cannot recover. It is boiler-plate law that, merely because a product or an operation is not as safe as possible, because there are better methods of manufacture or performing an operation does not lead to the conclusion that the method employed was undertaken with a lack of ordinary care or the product was defective. But the crucial question in the analysis of this case is that, where negligence is asserted, it is necessary to prove what was done and to prove that what was done was foreseeably hazardous to someone. The duty is one of ordinary care. The failure to exercise ordinary care constitutes a breach of the duty; and if harm is caused by that breach of duty, liability results. This is obviously an onerous task for a plaintiff. If the lack of ordinary care results in a defective design, it is indeed true that the product may well be unreasonably dangerous even in the sense of Dippel v. Sciano. As Comment a, to sec. 402 A, page 348, of the Restatement, 2 Torts 2d, says:
*603“The rule stated here is not exclusive, and does not preclude liability based upon the alternative ground of negligence of the seller, where such negligence can be proved.”
See. 402 A does not impose liability for negligence at all. It imposes liability for tort, and it is only for the purposes of fitting the Dippel rationale into the framework of our comparative negligence statute that we refer to it as negligence, albeit, a legal-policy type of negligence per se. In the Dippel type of case, the burden of proof that the product was in a defective condition at the time it reached the hands of the ultimate consumer is upon the plaintiff; and in the event he meets that burden of proof, there is liability. It is not necessary to show any specific acts of negligence. It is not necessary to show duty in terms of foreseeability. It is enough to prove, irrespective of due care, that, because of its dangerously defective nature, the product caused harm.
Where a plaintiff proves negligence — in this case, the lack of ordinary care in the design of a product — there is no doubt that there may be recovery in the event the defective design results in an unreasonably dangerous product,2 but there may be recovery for the negligent design of a product even though it is not unreasonably dangerous in the 402 A sense. All that it is necessary to prove is that the product is designed with a lack of ordinary care and that lack of care resulted in injury. No test of negligence has been called to the attention of this writer that requires that the product be unreasonably dangerous in order to predicate lia*604bility. The use of that and similar terms was laid to rest in Smith v. Atco Co., when we discarded the term, “inherently dangerous.” We said therein:
“If a manufacturer or supplier is hereafter to be relieved from liability as a matter of law by the courts, such result should be reached on the basis there was no causal negligence established against the defendant rather than that the product was not inherently dangerous.” (Pp. 383, 384)
The same rule is applicable in the instant case. While I completely agree with the majority opinion that the proof was insufficient, I am satisfied that the threshold question is not whether the product was unreasonably dangerous but whether the defendant exercised ordinary care and whether that lack of ordinary care was the legal cause of the injuries. It is obviously desirable to attempt to do what the majority strives for — to have some uniformity of rules between the Dippel concept and the ordinary negligence concept. I believe, however, it is a matter of comparing apples and oranges, for Dippel is based upon the public-policy premise that a seller is socially responsible for what he puts into the stream of commerce irrespective of his degree of care. That liability is absolute unless diminished by our concept of contributory negligence. On the other hand, negligence is based upon a theory of fault. We look in the ordinary negligence case not only to the result of the defendant’s action, but rather to his conduct in attaining that result. It is, accordingly, erroneous to conclude that the threshold question in each case is whether the end product is dangerously defective.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Chief Justice Wilkie, Mr. Justice Beilfuss, and Mr. Justice Day join in this concurrence.
Unfortunately, this court has apparently inadvertently revived the issue of the exercise of ordinary care by the manufacturer in products liability cases. In Powers v. Hunt-Wesson Foods, Inc. (1974), 64 Wis. 2d 532, 536, 219 N. W. 2d 393, and Arbet v. Gussarson (1975), 66 Wis. 2d 551, 555, 556, 225 N. W. 2d 431, we noted by way of dicta that strict liability in this state in effect shifts the burden of proof of proving specific acts of negligence from the plaintiff to the defendant to prove he was not negligent in any respect. In this respect, the dicta in those cases impliedly, but somewhat irrationally, qualified the Restatement, 2 Torts 2d, sec. 402 A and Dippel, which state that the seller is liable, even though he has exercised all possible care in the preparation of his product. I do not think that this is, or should be, the law in Wisconsin. By allowing a defendant to prove he was not negligent, the essence of Dippel is destroyed and the basis for construing the nature of liability under see. 402 A as negligence per se is totally obliterated. If Powers is correct, we might as well not have issued the opinion and mandate in Dippel. Under Powers and Arbet, the only effect of strict liability in Wisconsin would be to shift the burden of proof regarding specific acts of negligence from the plaintiff to the defendant. I do net believe this court intended to so dilute sec. 402 A as embodied in the Dippel holding.
Indeed, a showing that the product was unreasonably dangerous would certainly be relevant to proving that the product was designed or constructed in a negligent manner. However, whereas in a sec. 402 A case the focus is upon the condition of the product, in an ordinary negligence case the focus is upon the conduct creating a particular condition of a product.