(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent upon both points ruled in the principal opinion. Under the particular facts of this case I do not think evidence of the purchase price should have been admitted. This because of the lapse of nine years and the many changes that had occurred in the area which should have *389greatly increased the value of the property. The remoteness, the changes, and the fact defendant had a leasehold interest on the property when it was purchased, considered together, would destroy the relevancy and probative value of that testimony.
I agree with the rule stated in State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Rauscher Chevrolet Company, Mo.Sup., 291 S.W.2d 89, but it should be noted that that case involved the question as to whether evidence of the sale price of property sold during the pendency of the condemnation proceedings was admissible. The ruling in Rauscher has no application to the question we are considering. Several court of appeals cases have dealt with this question. In State ex rel. Highway Commission v. Malone, Mo.App., 45 S.W.2d 84, evidence of the price paid several years before the date of taking was held inadmissible where the land was shown to have depreciated in value after the date of purchase. In State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Pope, Mo.App., 74 S.W.2d 265, 270, the court held it was not error to exclude evidence of the purchase price because the “eviclence related to a time too remote to be of value or competent in estimating the market value of the property taken five years later and during a period, when, as the court well knows, property had greatly depreciated in value generally. The value of the land condemned relates to the time of the appropriation.” As indicated in the principal opinion evidence of the purchase price nine years before the taking was held admissible in City of St. Louis v. Paramount Shoe Mfg. Co., 237 Mo.App. 200, 168 S.W.2d 149. This court held evidence of the purchase price admissible in State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Schutte Investment Company, Mo.Sup., 334 S.W.2d 241, but there the lapse of time between the purchase and taking was just slightly more than one year.
A case which should be discussed in connection with the point here involved is State ex rel. State Highway Commission v. Johnson, Mo.Sup., 287 S.W.2d 835, 837. The opinion therein held that it was not error to permit testimony of the purchase price paid about 25 years before the date of taking because there was evidence “that property values in the area had increased since 1929 [time of purchase], and since the witnesses of both parties valued the property before it was taken at more than $25,000 [purchase price].” That opinion was written prior to the time this court adopted the rule set out in the Rauscher case. In view of the Rauscher rule I respectfully suggest that the Johnson case should no longer be followed on the point we are considering. The basic reason for holding the testimony admissible in Johnson was that the property had increased in value and that would have been a reason for excluding it under the Rauscher rule.
As indicated, I would hold that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the purchase price in this case.
I also have the view that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the amount of rent paid by defendant Esses for the property to which it moved after surrendering possession of the property condemned. That property is located six blocks from the property taken. The principal opinion holds that evidence of the rental paid on properties other than that being condemned is not admissible. However, it justifies the admission of the testimony under consideration for the reason that Esses’ appraiser testified that he considered the rent paid for three nearby properties in forming his opinion as to the fair rental value of the property condemned. One of those properties was next door to the subject property, another was two doors from it and the third was located not more than a block away. Apparently no objection was made to that evidence by plaintiff.
I do not think the foregoing testimony was a sufficient reason for admitting evi*390dence as to the rental value of property six blocks away. That distance in a rural area would not be considered remote but in downtown St. Lguis a distance of six blocks will usually reach an area which is not comparable. It will certainly open the door to a likelihood of confusing juries to hold that evidence on a collateral issue, such as this one, is admissible concerning properties within a twelve block area surrounding the property being condemned. Moreover, it is obvious that plaintiff had some other reason for eliciting this evidence because it sought to prove such during its case in chief and the court properly excluded it. It is also difficult to’ credit plaintiff with good faith in contending that the evidence in question was admissible in order to contradict the testimony of Esses’ appraiser that the condemned property had a fair rental value of 41 cents a square foot because it’s two experts respectively testified that the rental value of that property was 45 cents and 34 cents per square foot, an average of which would be about the same rental fixed by Esses’ witness.
I have concluded that testimony to the effect that Esses was able to rent property in which to carry on its business for 25 cents a square foot was highly prejudicial. All of the evidence indicated that the property taken had a fair rental value of about 41 cents per square foot. If Esses was able to obtain an apparently satisfactory place to carry on its business at a rental which was much less than the rental value of the condemned property, the jury was very likely to conclude that Esses had not fared so badly in having its property taken by plaintiff.
I would reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial.