(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Three separate issues are presented by the briefs, and I concur on Issues 1 and 2 as set forth by the majority opinion.
With respect to Issue 3, rehabilitative alimony, I respectfully dissent.
Per Finding of Fact 17, “[bjoth parties have engaged in a course of conduct during the course of the marriage causing the other party grievous mental suffering.” Per Conclusion of Law 7, both parties were entitled to a divorce.
Goehry v. Goehry, 354 N.W.2d 192 (S.D.1984), cited by the majority opinion, written by the author of this special writing, is not a rehabilitative alimony case. It does, however, set forth the general criteria for the award of alimony. It further cites to Owen v. Owen, 351 N.W.2d 139 (S.D.1984), which holding stands for the proposition that a trial court can, indeed, abuse its discretion and that a decision below must be soundly and substantially based upon the evidence. “The term ‘abuse of discretion’ refers to ‘a discretion exercised to an *884end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against, reason and evidence.’ ” Moore v. Moore, 354 N.W.2d 732, 733 (S.D.1984) (quoting Herndon v, Herndon, 305 N.W.2d 917, 918 (S.D.1981)). It is my contention that the trial court's award of ten years’ “rehabilitative alimony” of $210 per month is an abuse of discretion and that the case should be reversed and remanded for an award which would equitably comport with the facts.
Booth v. Booth, 354 N.W.2d 924 (S.D.1984), cited by the majority, is a rehabilitative alimony case but approved rehabilitative alimony for a period of fifteen months. This is not good authority to back up the majority’s decision.
Tesch v. Tesch, 399 N.W.2d 880 (S.D.1987), cited by the majority, was also written by the author of this special writing. It is a rehabilitative alimony case and the alimony award of $125 per month was for a period of twenty-four months. I do not consider it to be proper authority for an approval of a ten-year rehabilitative award in this case.
In Saint-Pierre v. Saint-Pierre, 357 N.W.2d 250, 262 (S.D.1984), Justice Woll-man cautioned against any rigid, inflexible formula in awarding reimbursement or rehabilitative alimony. A rehabilitative alimony award should make sense and not be based upon any type of formula. Formulas are too mechanistic for Equity, creating inflexible parameters. However the majority may try to mask the fact, it is, in effect, approving a formula of rehabilitative alimony in this case, which is additional grounds for my dissent.
I do not oppose rehabilitative alimony in this case and maintain that this case should be reversed and remanded for the purpose of maintaining rehabilitative alimony for its express purpose which is to permit a person to rehabilitate themselves in a job skill so that the person can earn a living. An award of rehabilitative alimony presupposes a divorced wife’s potential or actual capacity for self-support. Surely, ten years is far too extended a period of time to award this type of alimony to rehabilitate a divorced wife. Therefore, in approving this ten-year rehabilitative alimony award, the majority decision, as well as that of the trial court, is inherently flawed, in that it conflicts with the true concept of rehabilitative alimony.1 Ten years takes on a hue of permanency. With any degree of aptitude and application, appellee should have herself rehabilitated many years before the rehabilitative alimony terminates. Therefore, the trial court’s discretion is abused in that it is clearly against reason and evidence. Herndon, 305 N.W.2d at 918. In my opinion, this decision is a departure from immediate past precedent in this Court and this award exceeds the bounds of liberality.
Although the majority opinion would suggest or hint at medical problems, the record abounds with the fact that neither party has any major medical problems and the few problems that both have are not debilitating nor do they affect their employ-ability.2
The most disturbing aspect of the facts, attending the award of rehabilitative alimony, is summarized by the trial court itself when the trial court reflected from the bench that appellee seemed to have no definite goal, her testimony was consistent with no definite goal, and she had exhibited no desire to go out and support herself. She has, however, previously worked as a payroll clerk. In Shafer v. Shafer, 283 S.C. 205, 320 S.E.2d 730 (1984), a trial court’s award of rehabilitative alimony of $300 per month for sixty months was remanded by the appellate court to the trial court for a redetermination where there *885was no factual finding as to the rehabilitative goal that the alimony was to serve; and, additionally, where the duration bore no reasonable relationship to wife’s educational timetable. Conceded, it is best that she, indeed, principally raise the three children and be a mother unto them and stay home for that worthwhile purpose. Yet, if there is a rehabilitative alimony award, it must be soundly or substantially based upon the evidence. Owen, 351 N.W. 2d 139. Appellee called three experts to the stand. All testified that the majority of the wife’s problems were related to low self-esteem and marital discord. With training and counseling, all further agreed that a substantial portion of her problems would disappear upon termination of the marriage. With training and counseling, the wife’s experts opined that she was capable of obtaining, holding, and advancing in a job as she had the physical and mental abilities to do so. She is forty-one years of age. The wife was groping, as she talked to these counselors, about reconstructing her life, and I can sincerely empathize with her, but it appears that two of these experts directed her efforts toward becoming a CPA; it appears that this would be a professional level that she had not previously aspired to or attempted to bring to fruition. Even were this so, such schooling would not encompass a ten-year period.
A thoughtful analysis of these cases on rehabilitative alimony and the facts of this case do not justify an award of ten years of rehabilitative alimony. Not only is this too long, but the trial court used a fixed formula in arriving at an award. Appellee should be entitled to some rehabilitative alimony, enough to help her make a living in life; however, this “rehabilitative alimony award” equates into, in reality, a $25,200 additional property award. In such regards, it is an unlawful mixture of concepts; rehabilitative alimony and an award of property are totally different awards in domestic relations law in this state, although they may be considered together. Krage v. Krage, 329 N.W.2d 878 (S.D.1983). If this $25,200 ten-year “rehabilitative alimony award” does not amount to an additional property award as I have suggested, then surely it amounts to a type of separate maintenance which is in total conflict with an award of a divorce decree, a divorce having been granted to both of the parties to this litigation. This would conflict with SDCL 25-4-39, which provides: “Though judgment of divorce is denied, the court may in an action for divorce provide for maintenance of a spouse and the children of the parties, or any of them, by the other spouse.” See also SDCL 25-4-40, prescribing an action for separate maintenance without divorce. Under the latter statute, permanent support may be awarded for the spouse under an action for separate maintenance which was not the case here, as separate maintenance was not awarded (by express words). An allowance for support does exist when a divorce is granted under SDCL 25-4-41.
The October 20, 1986 Judgment and Decree of Divorce awards “rehabilitative and restitutional alimony” in the sum of $210 per month for a period of 120 consecutive months, see sixth paragraph thereof. Obviously, the trial court was, once again, confused in its concepts of alimony, for there was no evidence or contentions that the divorced wife had ever made any type of material contributions which required a “restitution”; the majority opinion further confuses the state of this record and husband’s contention by reflecting that husband is arguing against “reimbursement” alimony. Husband’s brief argues against “rehabilitative and restitutional” alimony, both under Issue 3 of his brief. As I have mentioned above, not only has the trial court erred in awarding ten years of rehabilitative alimony, it likewise erred in awarding restitutional alimony.
SDCL 25-4-41 provides that the trial court may award alimony as is deemed just having regard for the circumstances of the parties. To warrant modification of an alimony award, there must merely be a change of circumstances. Cole v. Cole, 384 N.W.2d 312 (S.D.1986); Lambertz v. Lambertz, 375 N.W.2d 645 (S.D.1985).
*886Wegner v. Wegner, 391 N.W.2d 690, 692 (S.D.1986). The trial court’s ten-year award, even if the ex-wife remarries, forecloses any future trial court from taking in the circumstances of the parties contrary to these last cited authorities. The award is so rigid it prohibits a consideration, in futuro, of a “change of circumstances.”
The Decree of Divorce is the final document. Here, it does not incorporate the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, but does mention in the first paragraph that it did enter Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on August 29, 1986. In my opinion, this was an oversight on the part of the trial court, and in this case, it creates another confusing aspect. For, in checking the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in the record, Findings of Fact 55, 56, and 57 are revealing. They state:
Defendant is entitled to alimony in an amount that will assist her in obtaining education, but not enough that will allow her to stay at home and go to school full time.
Alimony in the amount of $210.00 per month for 120 months will assist her in rehabilitating her employment skills. •
The rehabilitative alimony in the sum of $210.00 per month for 120 months shall not abate should the Defendant remarry.
There is no expression in the Decree of Divorce pronouncing a judgment that the “rehabilitative and restitutional alimony” in the sum of $210 per month for a period of 120 consecutive months shall not abate should the defendant remarry. It is silent in that regard. If, indeed, an appellate reviewer would, by inference, deem that the ex-wife is to receive “rehabilitative and restitutional alimony,” and the same is not to abate for a period of ten years even if the ex-wife remarries, then this award becomes even more unreasonable. Appellee-wife could collect alimony from her ex-husband for ten years and could likewise receive support from her new husband. She would be supported by two men at the same time. Were she to remarry and become divorced, nothing could then stop her from asking for alimony from the second husband. Again, this illustrates that the rigidity of the trial court’s award forecloses consideration of changed circumstances in the future.3
Under the settled law of this state, Judge Konenkamp’s attempt to cement and solidify a rehabilitative alimony award for ten years, even though the ex-wife should remarry, should not be upheld. See Marquardt v. Marquardt, 396 N.W.2d 753, 754 (S.D.1986). Marquardt, a case of first impression, adopted a rule in this state that remarriage of one’s ex-wife “establishes a prima facie case for termination of alimony payments.” Id. Under the writing of Justice Morgan, this imposes on the remarried ex-wife a burden to establish that “extraordinary circumstances” exist before the continuation of alimony payments may be ordered. Id. Thus, the trial court’s decision obliterates recent decisional law.
*887This case should be reversed and remanded with instructions to the trial court to amend its decree to comport with the decisional law of this state and to take evidence on the rehabilitation goal of ex-wife and the duration of its fulfillment.
. Rehabilitative alimony is recognized as an alimony payable for a short, specific and determinable amount of time; furthermore, it is to cease when the recipient is, in the exercise of reasonable efforts, in a position of self-support. See generally 24 Am.Jur.2d Divorce and Separation § 746 (1983).
. Per Finding of Fact 11, she is capable of "working full time."
. Justice Sabers has misperceived the major thrust of my dissent which is that a ten-year "rehabilitative alimony award" is not what it says that it is; a ten-year rehabilitative alimony award extends beyond any possible time-frame for rehabilitation. It is, in actuality, either (1) separate maintenance, or (2) an additional property settlement, without calling it such. Rehabilitative alimony continuing for a period of ten years,^ notwithstanding remarriage, is highlighted in my writing. Appellant's counsel cited two recent South Dakota cases in his brief contending the trial court considered "impermissible factors" and “did not properly apply the correct criteria” in awarding alimony. True, this special writer studied and found the Marquardt decision, but settled law in this state can be considered by justices who write opinions/special writings. Put another way, I am not bound, once a litigant raises an issue, to the legal authorities cited by that litigant. Judge Konen-kamp’s ten-year rehabilitative alimony award, though the ex-wife should remarry, is an issue, and I do not apologize for studying current case law of this Court. The author’s reference to Chief Justice Wuest’s statement in Swanson v. Department of Commerce, 417 N.W.2d 385, 388 (S.D.1987), is inapposite; furthermore. Chief Justice Wuest’s writing in Swanson cites his dissenting opinion in State v. Jones, 406 N.W.2d 366, 371 (S.D.1987), which is totally unrecognized in two historic, major cases in this Court, State v. Jones, 406 N.W.2d 366, and Bayer v. Johnson, 349 N.W.2d 447 (S.D.1984).