Homer I. Chief Eagle (Chief Eagle) was convicted of third degree burglary under SDCL 22-32-8. Chief Eagle applied for a writ of habeas corpus and a pre-emptory writ was issued. After a full briefing of the issues, the trial court granted Chief Eagle’s writ of habeas corpus. The state filed and served their notice of appeal. We reverse.
The facts of this ease are set out in detail in our prior decision of State v. Chief Eagle, 377 N.W.2d 141 (S.D.1985). In that appeal, Chief Eagle claimed that court-appointed trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to object to an impermissibly suggestive pre-trial iden*862tification. In this habeas corpus proceeding, Chief Eagle again raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. He bases his claim on different facts, however.
.Chief Eagle claims that his arrest was made pursuant to an improperly issued “Magistrate’s Letter” ordering that he be taken into custody. Because the “Magistrate’s Letter” was improperly issued Chief Eagle argues that a showing of probable cause was required to effectuate a valid arrest. Chief Eagle contends that the necessary probable cause was lacking, and the court-appointed counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to move for a suppression of all evidence obtained in the course of the arrest.
Before reaching the ineffective assistance of counsel claim, it is helpful to outline the facts surrounding the issuance of the “Magistrate’s Letter.” On November 7, 1983, nearly a year-and-a-half before the burglary incident, Chief Eagle appeared before a lay magistrate in Tripp County, South Dakota, and pled guilty to disturbing the peace, a violation of a city ordinance. Chief Eagle was sentenced to fifteen days in the city jail and fined thirty- five dollars ($35.00). The jail sentence was suspended, conditioned upon Chief Eagle’s satisfactory completion of a substance abuse program. Chief Eagle successfully completed the program, but failed to pay the fine.
On March 1, 1984, the Tripp County Clerk of Courts, who is also a lay magistrate, submitted a letter to the Winner Police Department advising them that Chief Eagle owed a thirty-five dollar ($35.00) fine and that he should be taken into custody to serve out the unpaid fine at the rate of twenty dollars ($20.00) per day. On April 25, 1984, Chief Eagle was arrested by a city policeman in Winner, South Dakota. The sole basis for Chief Eagle’s arrest was the “Magistrate’s Letter” issued by the Tripp County Clerk of Courts, based upon Chief Eagle’s failure to pay the fine for disturbing the peace.
Acting pursuant to the “Magistrate’s Letter” the police delivered Chief Eagle to the Winner Police Department. Sometime after Chief Eagle was brought to the station, the victim of the burglary arrived at the station to describe the incident. Upon observing Chief Eagle, the victim said, “That’s him.” Chief Eagle replied, “I don’t know why you are so angry, I got out when I seen you.” It is important to stress that Chief Eagle’s presence at the police station at the same time that the victim was present was purely an accident. There is no indication that the police planned the incident in the hope of implicating Chief Eagle. Instead, the record indicates that the meeting was fortuitous, and not the result of any predesign on the part of the Winner Police Department.
We turn first to the validity of Chief Eagle’s arrest pursuant to the “Magistrate’s Letter.” Because the sentence to be enforced was for a fine only, SDCL 23A-27-23 controls. SDCL 23A-27-23 reads:
If the sentence is for a fine alone, execution may issue thereon as a judgment against the defendant in a civil action. Such a judgment is a lien, and may be docketed and collected in the same manner.
Thus, SDCL 23A-27-23 makes it clear that the proper remedy available to the Tripp County Clerk of Courts was pursuing a civil judgment to execution, not taking Chief Eagle into custody. This conclusion is consistent with the approach taken by the United States Supreme Court. For example, in the case of Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 28 L.Ed.2d 130, 91 S.Ct. 668 (1971) the defendant was imprisoned for nonpayment of fines. The court reached the following conclusion with regard to the constitutionality of the imprisonment:
... the Constitution prohibits the State from imposing a fine as a sentence and then automatically converting it into a jail term solely because the defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full.
401 U.S. at 398, 28 L.Ed.2d at 133, 91 S.Ct. at 671, quoting the concurrence in Morris *863v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508, 509, 90 S.Ct. 2232, 2233, 26 L.Ed.2d 773, 773-774 (1970).
Likewise, in the case of Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970), the United States Supreme Court held that a defendant who is financially unable to pay a fine may not be constitutionally imprisoned beyond the maximum duration fixed by statute. In this case, the “Magistrate’s Letter” improperly converted a fine into a term of imprisonment. Chief Eagle cannot, however, ground his ineffective assistance of counsel claim solely on the invalidity of the “Magistrate’s Letter.” In this state more than simple invalidity is required to successfully pursue an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
In order to show the ineffectiveness of trial counsel’s representation, Chief Eagle must show that his trial counsel failed to perform an essential duty and that prejudice resulted therefrom. Anderson v. State, 373 N.W.2d 438 (S.D.1985). The prejudice shown must work to a defendant’s actual and substantial disadvantage and infect the entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions. Id.
The United States Supreme Court delineated the appropriate test for prejudice in the case of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 698 (1984).
[T]he defendant [must] show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
The Strickland court went on to state: “If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.” 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2070, 80 L.Ed.2d at 699.
In this case, the element of prejudice is missing because, in all probability, evidence of the victim’s identification would have been admitted even if counsel had made a motion for suppression. The United States Supreme Court has held that in-court identifications cannot be excluded as the fruit of an unlawful detention where the victim has an independent recollection of the perpetrator which is uninfluenced by the pretrial identifications. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980). We find ample support in the record to conclude that the victim had a sufficient, independent recollection of Chief Eagle, which was uninfluenced by pretrial identifications, to make an in-court identification. Specifically, the record indicates that the area where the victim’s car was parked was well-lighted and the victim had a sufficient and adequate opportunity to identify Chief Eagle.
Consequently, under these facts and the holding in Crews, supra, it is clear that the in-court identification would stand despite the prior improper identification. With an extremely probative in-court identification present in evidence, it cannot be seriously argued under the Strickland, supra, standard that the result of the trial would have been different had the motions to suppress been made. The in-court identification under these facts would have been admissible in any event. Consequently, any deficiency on the part of counsel was nonprejudicial.
We further observe that it is not altogether certain that a motion to suppress could be permissibly granted under these facts. The mistake in issuing these warrants was' the clerk/magistrate’s mistake, not the police’s mistake. As the United States Supreme Court has said with regard to the exclusionary rule: “The exclusionary rule was adopted to deter unlawful searches by police, not to punish the errors of magistrates and judges.” Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 990, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 3429, 82 L.Ed.2d 737, 745 (1984). In this case the police were simply following the directions of the “Magistrate’s Letter.” There are no facts available to them which would indicate that they were acting unlawfully. Rather, the *864record shows that they were motivated by the good faith belief that they were acting pursuant to a valid warrant. Any mistake that occurred was attributable to the magistrate, not to the police. As such, to exclude the evidence in this case would not serve the fundamental purpose of deterring unlawful searches by the police. Because the element of police deterrence is missing, it is probable that the evidence would have been introduced notwithstanding the invalidity of the “Magistrate’s Letter.”
Under the Strickland, supra, standard a successful ineffective counsel claim requires a showing of prejudice. Under these facts, it is clear that the deficiencies on the part of trial counsel, if any, were not prejudicial. The result of the trial would, in all probability, have been the same even if the motions to suppress were made. This court has consistently stopped short of second-guessing the tactical decisions of counsel. We will simply not attempt to substitute our own theoretical judgment for that of Chief Eagle’s counsel. Jibben v. State, 343 N.W.2d 788 (S.D.1984); Grooms v. State, 320 N.W.2d 149 (S.D.1982).
Accordingly, we reverse the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
MORGAN and SABERS, JJ., concur. WUEST, C.J., concurs specially. HENDERSON, J., concurs in part and dissents in part. YOUNG, Circuit Judge, sitting for MILLER, J., disqualified.