dissenting.
Finding myself in disagreement with the majority members of the panel, I record my respectful dissent. I would grant appel-lee’s cross-point and affirm the District Court’s judgment.
In their cross-point, appellees contend that there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding on proximate cause.
As the final arbiter of questions of fact, this Court is empowered to review the legal and factual sufficiency of both affirmative jury findings and negative jury findings. See Cropper v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 754 S.W.2d 646, 649-52 (Tex.1988); Herbert v. Herbert, 754 S.W.2d 141, 145 (Tex.1988).
The jury found that: (1) there was a defective condition in the electrical system at 4049 Overbrook; (2) that Bolin knew, or should have known, in the exercise of ordinary care, of that defective condition in the electrical system; and (3) that Bolin’s failure to correct that defective condition was negligent. However, the jury answered “No” when asked whether the negligence was a proximate cause of the occurrence in question.
Long before the existence of the common law implied warranty of habitability, there existed in Texas a tort duty on the landlord to repair after notice of a defective condition. Harvey v. Seale, 362 S.W.2d 310, 312 (Tex.1962); Stool v. J.C. Penney Co., 404 F.2d 562, 569 (5th Cir.1968) (applying Texas law). “The tort duty arises from lessors’ ability to make repairs and his control over them, and it is not necessary for the plaintiff to establish that the covenant to repair was made for the purpose of preventing personal injury....” Harvey, 362 S.W.2d at 312.
Here, the evidence revealed that the landlord, Bolin, had knowledge, through numerous complaints, of a defective condition in the electrical system at the tenant’s dwelling. Further, Bolin’s control over the repairs was established. Mr. Bolin admitted that the ultimate decision on whatever repairs needed to be performed fell on him. So long as the landlord’s negligent failure to repair is a “substantial factor” in causing the occurrence, proximate cause is established. See Gannett Outdoor Co. of *822Texas v. Kubeczka, 710 S.W.2d 79, 85-86 (1986). The jury was not free to disregard the evidence of proximate cause merely because Bolin did not foresee that his omissions would lead to the type of harm that occurred. Id. at 88.
The evidence was clear that Bolin’s negligence was a substantial factor in causing the occurrence. But for a licensed electrician, the licensed electrician that the tenants pleaded for and that Bolin promised, the electrical problems could have been identified and corrected. Bolin admitted that if there were a defective condition in the electrical system, it could cause a fire and he should do all in his power to eliminate that condition. Although it may be reasonable for a landlord to rely on a licensed electrician to do the work, it is not reasonable for a landlord to rely on a licensed electrician to correct a defect, if the licensed electrician does not appear.
Therefore, the jury finding of no proximate cause was so against the great weight of the evidence as to be manifestly wrong and unjust. Accordingly, I would affirm the District Court’s judgment.