The question presented for review is whether the Second Injury Fund is subro-*108gated to the rights of Walter Johnson in his personal injury suit against a third party. The trial court denied subrogation. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, with one judge dissenting. 678 S.W.2d 225. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
In the course of his employment, Walter Johnson suffered an injury resulting in the loss of vision in his left eye. He had previously lost the vision in his right eye. The cumulative effect of the two injuries thus left him totally and permanently disabled. He received benefits from Texas Employer’s Insurance Association and the Second Injury Fund.
Johnson and his wife then sued Texas Industries, Inc., alleging that Texas Industries had negligently caused the loss of vision in his left eye. TEIA and the Second Injury Fund intervened, alleging that they were subrogated to the rights of the John-sons in their suit against Texas Industries. Texas Industries agreed to a cash settlement and an annuity for the Johnsons. Texas Industries also agreed to reimburse TEIA for the benefits it had paid to Johnson. The agreed judgment did not, however, settle the Fund’s claim to subrogation.
The Second Injury Fund in this cause seeks to establish a right of subrogation in order to increase monies flowing into that fund. The court of appeals held that a subrogation right exists, placing primary reliance on the decisions of Industrial Accident Bd. v. Parker, 348 S.W.2d 188 (Tex. Civ.App. — Texarkana 1960, writ ref’d n.r. e.), and this court’s decision in Industrial Accident Bd. v. Guidry, 162 Tex. 160, 345 S.W.2d 509 (1961). The gist of the lower court’s holding was that since the portion of the workers’ compensation statutes creating the Second Injury Fund is silent on the question of subrogation, the statute should be read in pari materia with the remaining compensation statutes, with the result that the Second Injury Fund becomes an “insurance company” or “association,” with an accompanying statutory right to subrogation.
The Guidry and Parker decisions are inapplicable for at least two reasons. First, unlike the requirements of notice and appeal dealt with in Guidry and Parker, the instant cause addresses the issue of subrogation, a historically limited right in Texas workers’ compensation law. Texas courts construing the workers’ compensation statutes have held that subrogation is entirely a creature of the legislature, and that the right does not exist except when clearly mandated by the legislature. See, e.g., Fidelity Union Casualty Co., et al. v. Texas Power & Light Co., 35 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1931, writ ref’d); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 204 S.W. 376 (Tex.Civ.App. — 1918, writ ref’d). The legislature has not explicitly created any right of subrogation for the Second Injury Fund, yet the court of appeals created one by implication.
Second, the Guidry court placed primary and repeated reliance upon the fact that the Second Injury Fund statute was silent on the question of notice. The statute, however, is by no means silent on the question of how monies shall be obtained for operation of the Fund. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 8306 § 12c-2 (Vernon Supp.1985) provides, in relevant part:
“The special fund known as the ‘Second Injury Fund’ shall be created in the following manner:
(a) In every case of the death of an employee under this Act where there is no person entitled to compensation surviving said employee, the association shall pay to the Industrial Accident Board the full death benefits, but not to exceed 360 weeks of compensation ... to be deposited with the Treasurer of the State for the benefit of said Fund and the Board shall direct the distribution thereof.”
(Emphasis added.)
The legal maxim Expressio unius est exclusio alterius is an accepted rule of statutory construction in this state. In State v. Mauritz-Wells Co., 141 Tex. 634, *109175 S.W.2d 238 (1943), this court held that “it is a settled rule that the express mention or enumeration of one person, thing, consequence or class is equivalent to an express exclusion of all others.” 175 S.W.2d at 241. Similarly, as was recognized in Bryan v. Sundberg, 5 Tex. 418, 422-23 (1849):
“[W]hen the Legislature have undertaken to enumerate what shall be received, the enumeration must, we think, be taken to include all that was intended, and consequently to exclude all that is not included in the enumeration .... ‘And where a statute limits a thing to be done in a particular form it includes in itself a negative, viz, that it shall not be done otherwise.’ ”
See also Harris County v. Crooker, 112 Tex. 450, 248 S.W. 652 (1923). Thus, since the statute clearly mandates that the Second Injury Fund shall be funded only by the collection of unclaimed death benefits, it would be inappropriate for this court to add a second method not countenanced by statute — that the Second Injury Fund can collect a portion of a tort recovery from a living but totally disabled worker.
Moreover, the legislature has a clear history of diligence and vigilance in controlling the amount of money in the Second Injury Fund, and the means by which that money shall enter the Fund. Since enactment of the Second Injury Fund in 1947, section 12c-2 has been amended four times, each time with the clear intent of increasing the total amount of money available to the Fund. See Acts 1983, 68th Leg., Ch. 994 § 1; Acts 1979, 66th Leg., Ch. 639 § 1; Acts 1971, 62nd Leg., Ch. 316 § 3; Acts 1969, 61st Leg., Ch. 18 § 8. The legislature could, at any time, have provided an alternative funding source for the Second Injury Fund, through the mechanism of subrogation, but chose not to do so. Other means of funding have indeed been implemented in some states. See 2 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 59.31(b) (1983). Yet, although the relevant portion of the statute has been amended several times, the Texas Legislature has declined to add additional funding mechanisms, such as subrogation.
The court of appeals relied upon the conclusion in Industrial Accident Bd. v. Parker that the Second Injury Fund is generally viewed as an “insurance company” for purposes of construing the compensation statutes. That decision, however, contains a caveat:
“It is the legislative intention that the Second Injury Fund stand as the compensation insurer in Second Injury cases so far as a just and harmonious interpretation of the numerous provisions of the compensation law will permit. However, this does not mean that a substitution was intended ... where to substitute would result in a conflict or hiatus in provisions, or a nullification of the purposes of the Compensation Law.”
348 S.W.2d at 192 (emphasis added). In the case at bar considering the Second Injury Fund to be an insurance company would create both disharmony and hiatus by reading an implied source of funding into the statute, where none exists.
The Texas Legislature has mandated the method by which the Second Injury Fund shall be financed. We are urged to consider the benefits of creating an additional source of funding, so that at some future time the Second Injury Fund is not depleted. This court has previously declined to recognize a right of action against the Fund when that right was not spelled out by statute; it would be equally inappropriate now to imply such a right in favor of the Fund. See Second Injury Fund v. Keaton, 162 Tex. 250, 345 S.W.2d 711 (1961).
The judgment of the court of appeals is reversed, and that of the trial court is affirmed.
HILL, C.J., files a dissenting opinion in which CAMPBELL and GONZALEZ, JJ., join.