¶ 56. (dissenting). I respectfully dissent. The majority interprets Wisconsin's Family Code to authorize circuit courts to consider periods of premarital cohabitation in awarding maintenance in divorce actions. This is a form of "palimony," and I cannot find support for it in the language or purposes of the Family Code.
¶ 57. We know the Family Code does not apply to claims of parties who are dissolving non-marital cohabitation relationships. See Watts v. Watts, 137 Wis. 2d *754506, 405 N.W.2d 303 (1987). Wisconsin law does not provide legal remedies for separating cohabitants except in the very narrow instance in which one party attempts to retain an unreasonable amount of property acquired during the relationship and the facts support application of a common law contract or quasi-contract theory. Id.
¶ 58. This case is a variation on the theme. Here the issue is whether the Family Code authorizes compensation in the form of maintenance for periods of premarital cohabitation. The question is not whether the Family Code applies (it does), but how far it goes. If a man and a woman live together and then eventually marry, can the period of premarital cohabitation be combined with the marriage for purposes of evaluating an award of maintenance upon divorce?
¶ 59. It may seem perfectly fair to answer this question "yes," and therefore affirm the circuit court's award of maintenance for Julia Meyer's many and significant contributions to Joseph Meyer's achievement of his medical degree during their lengthy premarital cohabitation, which was followed by a shorter marriage. After all, it is commonplace in today's society for couples to live together before marriage, and not unusual for one party to support the other, while higher education and training is pursued during cohabitation, as was the case here.
¶ 60. We are, however, bound by the unambiguous language of the maintenance statute, which cannot reasonably be read to authorize circuit courts to award maintenance for periods of premarital cohabitation. In addition, the quasi-contract theory of unjust enrichment does not extend to "palimony," but only to cases involving the unjust retention of property by one party *755to the cohabitation relationship. Accordingly, I would affirm the court of appeals.
¶ 61. The maintenance statute provides that "[u]pon every judgment of annulment, divorce or legal separation" the circuit court may award maintenance after considering a broad list of factors:
(1) The length of the marriage.
(2) The age and physical and emotional health of the parties.
(3) The division of property made under s. 767.255.
(4) The educational level of each party at the time of marriage and at the time the action is commenced.
(5) The earning capacity of the party seeking maintenance, including educational background, training, employment skills, work experience, length of absence from the job market, custodial responsibilities for children and the time and expense necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to enable the party to find appropriate employment.
(6) The feasibility that the party seeking maintenance can become self-supporting at a standard of living reasonably comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage, and, if so, the length of time necessary to achieve this goal.
(7) The tax consequences to each party.
(8) Any mutual agreement made by the parties before or during the marriage, according to the terms of which one party has made financial or service contributions to the other with the expectation of reciprocation or other compensation in the future, where such repayment has not been made, or any mutual agreement made by the parties before or during the marriage concerning any arrangement for the financial support of the parties.
*756(9) The contribution by one party to the education, training or increased earning power of the other.
(10) Such other factors as the court may in each individual case determine to be relevant.
Wis. Stat. § 767.26 (emphasis added).
¶ 62. The majority rests its decision entirely on subsection (9), which directs circuit courts to consider "[t]he contribution by one party to the education, training or increased earning power of the other." The majority reasons that because subsection (9) contains no language limiting the evaluation of this factor to the "marital period," circuit courts "may freely consider the total contributions and not merely those arising during the marriage." Majority op. at ¶ 20. Thus, according to the majority, circuit courts are free to expand the scope of the inquiry beyond the "marital period" to include any premarital cohabitation that may have preceded it. The majority characterizes this as a "plain language" reading of the statute.
¶ 63. I disagree. The majority approach reads subsection (9) in isolation and ignores the obvious import of the statute as a whole. We are, after all, interpreting a law that pertains to the circuit court's powers and obligations upon the dissolution of a contract of marriage. Marriage is commonly and legally understood to begin when a man and a woman in fact marry, not when they start living together.1
*757¶ 64. It is odd, therefore, that the majority finds the absence of any statutory language limiting subsection (9) to the "marital period" significant to the determination of whether premarital cohabitation can be included in the maintenance equation. I find the absence of language of expansion to be more significant than the absence of language of limitation. That is, since the dissolution of the marriage is the obvious focus of the statute, and since there is nothing in the text of subsection (9) expressly expanding the scope of the inquiry beyond the marriage, we can hardly interpret the statute as authorizing the circuit court to go outside the marriage to reach periods of premarital cohabitation in its maintenance decision.
¶ 65. In fact, subsection (1) of Wis. Stat. § 767.26 directs the circuit court to consider "[t]he length of the marriage" when deciding the issue of maintenance. The statute does not say the circuit court should consider "the length of the marriage plus any period of premarital cohabitation," or "the total length of the parties' relationship," or any other combination of words that would explicitly or implicitly signal that premarital cohabitation is covered. The fact that the legislature did not repeat the "length of the marriage" factor as a sort of "qualifier" in each of the subsequent statutory subsections does not mean that courts are free to disregard it, adding premarital cohabitation to the mix in evaluating subsection (9) or any of the other enumerated factors in the maintenance statute.2
*758¶ 66. The majority purports to find support for its interpretation of subsection (9) in subsection (4) of the statute, which allows the circuit court to consider "[t]he educational level of each party at the time of marriage and at the time the action is commenced." The majority says the language of subsection (4) demonstrates legislative intent to impose a "temporal" limit on the evaluation of this particular maintenance factor. Therefore, the logic goes, the lack of similar limiting language in subsection (9) must mean that the legislature intended no temporal limit on the consideration of one party's contribution to the education of the other.
¶ 67. But a legislative expression of limitation in one part of a statute does not always and necessarily imply limitlessness in another. This technique of interpretation is especially misplaced here, in light of the explicit reference to "the length of the marriage" in subsection (1) of the statute. Furthermore, it is a pretty broad interpretive leap from the "temporal" limitation in subsection (4) to the conclusion that subsection (9) authorizes "palimony" awards for premarital cohabitation. We are not really talking about temporal issues at all, but definitional ones: can premarital cohabitation be considered part of the marriage for purposes of evaluating the propriety, amount, and duration of a maintenance award upon dissolution of the marriage? Not, in my judgment, unless the legislature has said so very clearly. And it has not.
¶ 68. The majority also believes that if subsection (9) is construed to refer to contributions made only during the marriage, it would be rendered "largely superfluous because subsection (4) already covers edu*759cation obtained during the marriage." Majority op. at ¶ 22. This misunderstands the difference between the two subsections. The former tells the circuit court to evaluate the educational level of each party at the time of the marriage and divorce; the latter tells the judge to consider the contributions made by one party to the education and training of the other. These are two very different inquiries, aimed at different considerations. The circuit court looks at the relative educational levels of the parties at the time of the marriage and divorce in order to evaluate post-divorce standard-of-living questions in the maintenance determination. The court looks to the educational contributions of one party to the other in order to provide some compensation for that "investment" in the form of a maintenance award. Interpreting subsection (9) to be confined to educational contributions made during the marriage creates no superfluity.
¶ 69. The majority also disregards, wrongly I think, the legislature's very clear statement of intent that the Family Code pertains only to the institutions of marriage and the family, neither of which is defined in such a way as to include either non-marital or premarital cohabitation. The statement of legislative purpose is unequivocal:
INTENT. It is the intent of chs. 765 to 768 [the Family Code] to promote the stability and best interests of marriage and the family. It is the intent of the legislature to recognize the valuable contributions of both spouses during the marriage and at termination of the marriage by dissolution or death. Marriage is the institution that is the foundation of the family and of society. Its stability is basic to morality and civilization, and of vital interest to society and the state. . . . Under the laws of this *760state, marriage is a legal relationship between 2 equal persons, a husband and wife, who owe to each other mutual responsibility and support. Each spouse has an equal obligation in accordance with his or her ability to contribute money or services or both which are necessary for the adequate support and maintenance of his or her minor children and of the other spouse.
Wis. Stat. § 765.001 (emphasis added).
¶70. The majority dismisses the legislature's statement of intent by saying it is "postdated" and too general to override the "plain language of a specific, substantive statutory provision," that is, subsection (9) of the maintenance statute. But the majority's "plain language" interpretation of subsection (9) is plainly wrong, and the legislature's statement of the Family Code's purpose as a whole cannot be disregarded merely because it was enacted after the particular statutory provision in question. The legislature need not have repealed and recreated each and every section of the Family Code at the time it enacted its statement of intent in order to have that statement respected by the courts.
¶ 71. The majority opinion is also inconsistent with the prior decisions of this court and the court of appeals on this issue.3 In Watts, this court declined to *761extend the Family Code to non-marital cohabitants based upon the clear and unambiguous language restricting its application to marriages and families "within the 'marriage' context." Watts, 137 Wis. 2d at 519. Indeed, the court found its conclusion "almost inescapable" based upon the language of the code:
[T]he Family Code emphasizes marriage. The entire Family Code, of which ch. 767 is an integral part, is governed generally by the provisions of sec. 765.001(2), which states in part that "[i]t is the intent of chs. 765 to 768 to promote the stability and best interests of marriage and the family. . . .Marriage is the institution that is the foundation of family and of society. Its stability is basic to morality and civilization, and of vital interest to society and the state." (Emphasis supplied.) Section 765.001(3) further states that "[clhapters 765 to 768 shall be liberally construed to effect the objectives of sub. (2)." The conclusion is almost inescapable from this language in sec. 765.001(2)(3) that the legislature not only intended chs. 765-768 to protect and promote the "family," but also intended "family" to be within the "marriage" context.
The statutory prohibition of marriages which do not conform to statutory requirements, sec. 765.21, Stats. 1985-86, further suggests that the legislature intended that the Family Code applies, for the most part, to those couples who have been joined in marriage according to law.
*762On the basis of our analysis of sec. 767.255 and the Family Code which revealed no clear evidence that the legislature intended sec. 767.255 to apply to unmarried persons, we decline the invitation to extend the application of sec. 767.255 to unmarried cohabitants.
Watts, 137 Wis. 2d at 518-20.
¶ 72. The majority notes an important distinction between this case and Watts: there, the cohabiting parties never married and yet one attempted to invoke the Family Code upon dissolution of the relationship; here, the cohabiting parties eventually married and were therefore required to proceed under the Family Code upon divorce. This distinction speaks to the applicability of the Family Code but not to its scope. Yes, of course, the Family Code applies to this action, but what does it apply to: the marriage, or the marriage plus any period of premarital cohabitation that preceded it? As noted above, I find nothing in the language of the code, or its purposes, to support the latter answer to the question and much to support the former.
¶ 73. Watts gave effect to the language and expressed intent of the legislature in declining to extend the Family Code to non-marital cohabitation. I see no reason to interpret that same language and expressed legislative intent any differently in the case of premarital cohabitation.
¶ 74. Indeed, in Greenwald v. Greenwald, 154 Wis. 2d 767, 454 N.W.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1990), the court of appeals, based upon Watts, reached the same conclusion. Josephine and Darwin Greenwald lived together for ten years and were married for less than three. Josephine wanted the ten years of premarital cohabitation added to the much shorter marriage for purposes of the property division and maintenance determina*763tions at the time of the parties' divorce. The court of appeals concluded that the statutes would not allow it, for the reasons stated in Watts:
Although Watts did not present a maintenance claim, we are persuaded that Watts also requires us to reject Josephine's claim that her premarital contribution to Darwin's estate is a relevant factor on her maintenance claim. After examining the Family Code's legislative history in Watts, the supreme court concluded that the code did not govern property divisions between unmarried cohabitants. We conclude that this same reasoning applies with equal force to Josephine's maintenance claim....
Nor are we persuaded that the parties' later marriage requires a different result. The matter at issue concerns Josephine's premarital contributions to Darwin's property — the very situation addressed in Watts.
Greenwald, 154 Wis. 2d at 790 (citations omitted).
¶ 75. The majority undermines but does not overrule Greenwald, finding a distinction between premarital and non-marital cohabitation for purposes of interpreting the Family Code, and identifying Wis. Stat. § 767.255(3)(b) as an example of an allowable "premarital consideration" that undercuts Greenwald's premise "that nothing premarital may be considered even if the parties subsequently marry." Majority op. at ¶ 37. However, Wis. Stat. § 767.255(3)(b), part of the property division statute, merely authorizes the circuit court to consider "[t]he property brought to the marriage by each party" in determining division of property in a divorce action. It cannot reasonably be read to support a conclusion that a period of premarital cohabitation may be considered as if it were part of the *764marriage for purposes of a maintenance award under Wis. Stat. § 767.26.
¶ 76. True, in Wis. Stat. § 767.255(3)(b) we find express legislative authorization for the consideration of "something premarital" in a divorce: property brought to the marriage by each party. The legislature is certainly free to authorize the consideration of other premarital factors — even premarital cohabitation — in the property division and maintenance statutes of this state. But it is the legislature's prerogative to do so, not ours. However tempted we may be to expand a statute's reach to achieve a result we believe to be fair, we are bound by the language of the law, absent unconstitutionality or other unusual circumstances not present here. The interpretive power resides legitimately in the judiciary, but we test the limits of our legitimacy when we extrapolate a statute's meaning from something not contained in its text, fairly and fully and reasonably construed. This is especially true in areas as socially and culturally sensitive as marriage, the family and divorce.
¶ 77. There is nothing in the language of the maintenance statute or any part of the Family Code that authorizes circuit courts to consider contributions made by one party to the education of the other during premarital cohabitation. The majority's contrary conclusion is an unwarranted expansion of the scope of the maintenance statute. The lack of limiting language in subsection (9) is not an invitation to read more into the maintenance statute than its language, structure, and purpose as a whole will reasonably bear.4
*765¶ 78. Finally, although the trial court and the majority did not need to reach the common law question in this case, I do. I agree with the court of appeals that the quasi-contract theory of unjust enrichment does not apply to these facts. Watts held that "unmarried cohabitants may raise claims based upon unjust enrichment following the termination of their relationships where one of the parties attempts to retain an unreasonable amount of property acquired through the efforts of both." Watts, 137 Wis. 2d at 532-33. An action for unjust enrichment requires: "(1) a benefit conferred on the defendant by the plaintiff, (2) appreciation or knowledge by the defendant of the benefit, and (3) acceptance or retention of the benefit by the defendant under the circumstances making it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit." Id. at 531.
¶ 79. The court of appeals has held that the theory of unjust enrichment, as applied to a cohabitation *766claim, requires that "the complaining party present proof of specific contributions that directly led to an increase in assets or an accumulation of wealth." Ward v. Jahnke, 220 Wis. 2d 539, 547-48, 583 N.W.2d 656 ( Ct. App. 1998). The complaining party must demonstrate: "(1) an accumulation of assets, (2) acquired through the efforts of the claimant and the other party and (3) retained by the other in an unreasonable amount." Waage v. Borer, 188 Wis. 2d 324, 329-30, 525 N.W.2d 96 (Ct. App. 1994).
¶ 80. In this case the circuit court found that Julia Meyer contributed in significant ways to Joseph Meyer's achievement of his medical degree while they lived together. These contributions, however, did not result in an accumulation of assets or property through the efforts of both. What Julia Meyer is really seeking is a share of Joseph Meyer's future earning potential as a result of having helped him earn his medical degree during their premarital cohabitation. Future earning potential is not an asset or property which can be recovered in an action for unjust enrichment by one cohabitant (non-marital or premarital) against the other.
¶ 81. At present the law of unjust enrichment as applied to cohabitants is narrowly confined to situations in which one cohabitant unfairly retains property acquired through the efforts of both. I would not extend it further. To do so would open the door to all sorts of "palimony" claims. Our cases have not ventured far down this road, for good reason. To provide further measure of legal protection for cohabitation relationships via the common law is a serious step with substantial consequences for the institutions of marriage and the family. It would inject this court into a *767social, cultural and policy debate which I think is better left to the legislative branch.
¶ 82. Accordingly, for these reasons, I would affirm the court of appeals' reversal of the trial court's award of maintenance in this case, and remand for reconsideration of the maintenance issue, excluding consideration of the Meyers' premarital cohabitation.
¶ 83. I am authorized to state that Justices JON P. WILCOX and N. PATRICK CROOKS join this dissent.Wisconsin Stat. §765.16 provides that marriage can be entered into only after a marriage license has been issued and only by the mutual declarations of the parties to be joined as husband and wife before a "duly authorized officiating person" and two adult witnesses. Marriages contracted in violation of the statutory requirements are void. Wis. Stat. § 765.21. Com*757mon law marriages were abolished in 1917. § 21, ch. 218, Laws of 1917.
Contrary to the majority's suggestion, I have not said that the "length of the marriage" subsection should be read into all the subsequent subsections of the maintenance statute, only that it informs our interpretation of the statute as a whole, and *758the question of whether it incorporates periods of premarital cohabitation into the marriage for purposes of a maintenance determination.
The majority cites Haugan v. Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d 200, 343 N.W.2d 796 (1984), Lundberg v. Lundberg, 107 Wis. 2d 1, 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982), and Roberto v. Brown, 107 Wis. 2d 17, 318 N.W.2d 358 (1982), the so-called "university degree-divorce decree" cases, and concludes that this case is merely an addition to the genre. Majority op. at ¶ 39. None of these cases involved the question of whether to include premarital cohabitation as part of a property division or maintenance award in a divorce. Furthermore, while the circuit courts have broad discretion to *761make property division and maintenance decisions to achieve fairness and equity in individual cases, Haugan, 117 Wis. 2d at 211, this case involves an alleged error of law: the inclusion of premarital cohabitation in the maintenance determination without any statutory authority to do so. Accordingly, the "university degree-divorce decree" cases do not help the analysis.
The concurrences suggest that subsection (8), which permits the circuit court to consider premarital agreements regarding financial compensation or support, and subsection (10), the so-called "catchall" provision of the statute, provide *765further justification for the circuit court's maintenance award. My conclusions about the proper interpretation of the maintenance statute apply with equal force to subsection (10). A "catchall" provision in a statute conferring decisionmaking discretion on the circuit court cannot be construed as conferring an unlimited license. Rather, it must be read in context, subject, at least, to whatever limitations in scope are explicit or implicit in the purposes of the statute as a whole. For the reasons I have already discussed, I do not think there is any justification for reading the "catchall" provision in the maintenance statute as authorizing the circuit court to expand the scope of the maintenance inquiry beyond the marriage to include compensation for periods of premarital cohabitation. In addition, regarding the applicability of subsection (8), there is no evidence in this case of a premarital agreement between the parties concerning financial compensation or support, and the circuit court made no findings in this regard. So subsection (8) cannot be invoked as authority for the maintenance award in this case.