dissenting.
Winding up argument in his brief the Harris County District Attorney alludes to a classic tale written for and read to and by children — and more often than not retained long thereafter in the mind of the reader; viz:
“Such a Carollian [sic] interpretation ... would leave the trial bench and bar on the wrong side of the looking-glass. Life would indeed become ‘curiouser and curiouser.’ ”
Today the majority takes this Court through the looking glass.
• In its motion for rehearing the State urged nothing was presented for review so that in effect the court of appeals was without authority to or erroneously did abate this appeal and remand the cause for a hearing on appellant’s motion for new trial.1 While I do not purport to speak for *533judges who voted to grant the motion, presumptively they had in mind to determine that which the State was contending— whether it was proper for the court of appeals to do what it did. My present concern is whether in the posture of the instant cause this Court is authorized to do what the majority would have it do.
In Measeles v. State, 661 S.W.2d 732 (Tex.Cr.App.1983), unanimously (and somewhat summarily) we refused a petition for discretionary review because:
“Ordinarily, this Court will not entertain a petition for discretionary review from an interlocutory order of the Court of Appeals since it does not finally dispose of the case in that court.”2
The court of appeals had ordered the appeal abated until complete statement of facts was prepared, approved and filed with the court. By petition for discretionary review the State challenged authority of the court of appeals to order an abatement for that purpose. Because the court of appeals had not finally disposed of the case, the Court declined to take up the challenge.
In retrospect we should have examined the matter more thoroughly, for at issue is the jurisdiction, power and authority of this Court vis a vis the fourteen courts of appeals when one of the latter is exercising its own appellate jurisdiction. Now that the opportunity again presents itself, I propose to make that examination.
This Court has “final appellate jurisdiction coextensive with the limits of the state ... with such exceptions and under such regulations as may be provided in this Constitution or as prescribed by law.” Appeals in capital cases in which the death penalty has been assessed are directly to this Court, but “appeal of all other cases shall be to the Courts of Appeals as prescribed by law.” Article V, § 5, Constitution of the State of Texas. The courts of appeals have “appellate jurisdiction coextensive with the limits of their respective districts ... under such restrictions and regulations as may be prescribed by law. Article Y, § 6, id. Articles 4.01, 4.03 and 4.04, § 2 are to the same effect; see also Article 44.24 and 44.25, V.A.C.C.P. In criminal cases such is the appellate jurisdiction of this Court and of the courts of appeals.
“In addition, the Court of Criminal Appeals may, on its own motion, review a decision of a Court of Appeals in a criminal case as provided by law.” Ibid. And, again subject to regulations prescribed by law, this Court has power generally to issue writs of habeas corpus and, in criminal law matters, other designated extraordinary writs, as well as protective and fact ascertaining powers. Ibid. Germane law is primarily provided in Articles 4.04, 44.01, 44.24, 44.25, 44.36, 44.38 and 44.45, V.A.C. C.P.
Together the constitutional and statutory provisions design, create and establish a system that assigns to and reposes in the courts of appeals jurisdiction, power and authority over “appeal[s] of all other criminal cases” than capital murder in which the death penalty is assessed. Article V, 5 and Article 4.03, both supra. Ancillary to exercising its jurisdiction, power and authority, the court of appeals “may enter any other appropriate order, as the law and nature of the case may require,” Article 44.24, supra. That is exactly what the Houston (1st) Court of Appeals did in this cause, and at the outset the majority opinion of the Court recognizes the authority of the court below to do so and, as I understand the opinion, never even questions that authority.3
*534Simply put, neither appellate nor discretionary review jurisdiction, power and authority constitutionally and statutorily granted to and bestowed on this Court sustain our overturning an abatement order entered by a court of appeals in the discharge of its duties and responsibilities to decide the criminal case then before it on appeal. Strictly speaking this Court has no appellate governance over a court of appeals — a party is not entitled to “appeal” a final decision of that court to this one. All the constitutional and statutory provisions authorizing discretionary “review” are in terms of our reviewing a “decision” of a court of appeals. Nothing in either so much as implies we may presume to set aside that kind of interlocutory order, which the court below was fully authorized to make.4
A statute mandates that courts of appeals, “in each case decided by them, shall deliver a written opinion, setting forth the reason for such decision” — unless in its discretion the court decides the case by a certificate of affirmance. Article 44.24(c), supra. That mandate means that a “case” must be decided before “the reason for such decision” set forth in a written opinion is ripe for review. This Court may “review” a decision of the court of appeals on its own motion, or a losing party “in a case” may petition this Court “for review of the decision of a court of appeals in that case,” Article 44.45(a) and (b). Similarly, “in each case decided by it,” this Court is required to deliver a written opinion giving “the reasons for such decision.”
By entering an order merely abating an appeal a court of appeals does not “decide a case” nor does it deliver “a written opinion.” Its decision in the case and the reason for that decision awaits outcome of whatever proceeding is to be had in the trial court, reflected in a supplemental record filed in the court of appeals. With that supplemental record before it the court of appeals may then decide the case with a written opinion giving the reason for its decision, after which the losing party is entitled to seek review by this Court.
When that orderly course has been followed, this Court will look squarely at a petition for discretionary review. Today, alas, it goes through a looking glass and makes things “curiouser and curiouser.” Lewis Carroll would be proud.
A looking glass is a mirror. Viewing from this side, I respectfully dissent.
. All emphasis is supplied throughout by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.
. Thus to the extent it contends otherwise the State loses on the merits of the ground a majority of this Court determined to review — erroneously, for in my judgment our reviewing, much less entertaining a petition for review, the kind *534of interlocutory order entered here by the court of appeals is not justified by law.
. Indeed, this Court could not properly reach the order of abatement through any type of extraordinary writ since the court of appeals was exercising and is within its own jurisdiction, power and authority in making the judicial determination to enter its order. See The State of Texas ex rel. Wade v. Mays, Judge, — S.W.2d — (Tex.Cr.App., No. 69,329, delivered February 8, 1985).