dissenting.
I believe this matter should be remanded for an additional hearing at which Skjonsby is permitted to appear, at least by deposition. I agree that it was not necessary that Skjonsby appear in person at the hearing concerning the termination of his parental rights. The trial court gave Skjons-by’s counsel the opportunity to depose Skjonsby but apparently this was not done. Although the majority opinion relies on In Interest of F.H., 283 N.W.2d 202 (N.D.1979), a review of that case indicates the parent who was incarcerated appeared by deposition. Our law, Chapter 27-20, N.D. C.C., gives the parent whose parental rights are proposed to be terminated the opportunity to be represented by counsel. I cannot conceive how a defense against an allegation of abandonment can be maintained without the parent’s appearing in person or by deposition.
Furthermore, this case is distinguishable from Mortenson v. Tangedahl, 317 N.W.2d 107 (N.D.1982), in which the parent whose parental rights were terminated was not incarcerated but failed to appear at the hearing and provided no satisfactory explanation for his failure to do so.
There is no doubt that the events surrounding Skjonsby are bizarre. However, Skjonsby apparently maintained contact with his child until the time of his incarceration. He should at least be permitted to explain his actions since that time.
GIERKE, J., concurs.