(concurring). We concur in the affirmance of the convictions.
I
Assault with intent to rob and attempted robbery are distinct offenses. Assault of the intended victim is an element of the greater offense. The *499lesser offense (attempted robbery) can be committed by a person who, having the requisite felonious intent, commits an overt act beyond mere preparation; the overt act can consist of conduct which stops short of an assault.
II
This court’s adoption of MRE 801(d)(1) resolves the question whether an identifying witness may repeat at trial his prior statement of identification.
The rule permits the introduction of such statements where the prior identification occurred at a time and in circumstances that make that identification more probative than in-court identification.
The new rule does not require a trial court to admit evidence of an earlier identification without regard to whether such evidence is within the policy which led to the adoption of the rule. If the police arrange the confrontation between the victim and the defendant, or if it occurs at a time closer to the trial than to the commission of the offense, the probative value of the prior identification evidence would be diminished and the trial court might refuse to admit such evidence.
In this case the police did not arrange the confrontation. It occurred by chance the day after the offense. It is clear that the victim’s identification of the defendants was free of the taint of suggestive circumstances.
We also note that if the police had arranged the circumstances in which the identification was made the admissibility of the identifying witness’s testimony would be subject to the decisions of this Court and of the United States Supreme Court concerning identification procedures.
MRE 801(d)(1) was not designed to permit testimony by persons other than the identifying witness.*5001 The question whether other persons may testify regarding a prior identification and, if so, under what circumstances raises issues under the Confrontation Clause and has been the subject of considerable discussion.2
We do not address that question because the error in admitting the officer’s testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The victim’s identification of the defendants was not disputed by any evidence offered by them; the officer’s testimony, which in another case might tend to give added weight to out-of-court identification, did not tend to influence the jury’s resolution of a disputed issue.
Comment, The Use of Prior Identiñcation Evidence in Criminal Trials under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 66 J Criminal L & Criminology 240, 250, fn 89 (1975). See also Robinson, Civil arid Criminal Evidence, 23 Wayne L Rev 611, 651-652 (1977).
Comment, 66 J Criminal L & Criminology, supra; 4 Weinstein, Evidence, ¶ 801(d)(1)(C)[01], See also, Case Note, Evidence: Extrajudicial Identification, 8 UCLA L Rev 467 (1961); Anno: Admissibility of evidence as to extrajudicial or pretrial identiñcation of accused, 71 ALR2d 449.