dissenting.
I disagree with the majority holding that the common-law doctrine of res judicata is abrogated by the municipal ordinance at issue. I agree with the proposition that to interpret the effect of the ordinance on the common-law doctrine of res judicata, it is necessary to look at the ordinance’s plain language and give such language its plain and ordinary meaning. However, we must also be mindful of the well-settled rule that legislative enactments which effect a change in the common law or take away a common-law right should be strictly construed. See, State v. Tingle, 239 Neb. 558, 477 N.W.2d 544 (1991); Mason v. Schumacher, 231 Neb. 929, 439 N.W.2d 61 (1989).
The ordinance at issue provides that following the denial of a requested zoning variance, no new request shall be made for the same or substantially similar variance within 1 year of said denial. Strictly construed, the ordinance only precludes an individual from making a new request for a variance when the same or substantially similar request was denied within the previous 12-month period. Strictly construed, the ordinance is silent as to whether a board must redetermine the merits of such request every 12 months.
In my view, the ordinance represents a legislative attempt to prevent the zoning docket from being cluttered with successive applications by applicants previously denied relief. It does not evince a legislative intent to permit such an applicant to force the redetermination of the identical issue every 12 months. See Marks v. Zoning Bd. of Providence, 98 R.I. 405, 203 A.2d 761 (1964).
When a material change of circumstances affecting the merits of an application has not occurred or the application is not for a use that materially differs in nature and degree from its predecessor, there is no heed for the board of adjustment to reach the merits of the application.
Traditional zoning law itself has long recognized the quasi-judicial function of zoning boards and incorporated the concept of claim preclusion or res judicata. As a general proposition, when a special exception or variance is denied and the applicant, after a required waiting period, resubmits the same or a substantially similar application, the applicant must demon*105strate that conditions have changed such that the reasons for the previous denial no longer apply. Rhema Christian Ctr. v. Bd. of Zoning Adj., 515 A.2d 189 (D.C. App. 1986); Bright v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 149 Conn. 698, 705, 183 A.2d 603, 606 (1962) (on reapplication after board denied variance, board may not “revoke its former action” without “change in conditions or new considerations materially affecting the merits”); Marks v. Zoning Bd. of Providence, 98 R.I. at 406, 203 A.2d at 763 (on reapplication 18 months after board denied variance, board may not reverse decision without “substantial or material change in circumstances” between the two decisions). See First Baptist Church v. District of Columbia, 432 A.2d 695, 701 (D.C. App. 1981), quoting Spencer v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 141 Conn. 155, 104 A.2d 373 (1954) (opponent to reissuance of permit extending special exception must show “ ‘change of conditions [or] other considerations materially affecting the merits . . .’ ”). See, generally, 4 Robert M. Anderson, American Law of Zoning §§ 22.53 and 22.54 (3d ed. 1986).
In the instant case, the same, or substantially the same, request for a variance had been denied at five previous hearings since 1983. The board inquired of the applicant as to whether a material change in circumstances had taken place as to the zoning, parking requirements, or open space requirements, or in the neighborhood, and it was determined that no changes had occurred since the last hearing. To hold that the ordinance at issue compels the board to redetermine the merits of an applicant’s petition without a scintilla of evidence that a change in circumstances has taken place eliminates finality in proceedings before the board, threatens the integrity of the zoning plan, and places an undue burden on property owners and city officials seeking to uphold an established zoning plan. See Fisher v. City of Dover, 120 N.H. 187, 412 A.2d 1024 (1980). As a practical matter, the majority’s holding also effects a substantial waste of valuable governmental and human resources.
The municipal board correctly applied the doctrine of res judicata in the instant case. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
Reagan, DJ., joins in this dissent.