Claim of Bania
This is one of a series of test cases in which the Court interprets from varied factual situations the concept of back-to-work pay as provided in the Michigan Employment Security Act (MESA).
The specific question assigned to the claim of Bania against Ford Motor Company (Ford) is:
Does the payment of vacation pay during a period of unemployment commencing with a layoff under the provisions of § 27(c)(2) of MESA have any effect upon the computation of time necessary to qualify for a back-to-work payment?
We find that the designated paid vacation period cannot be calculated in determining qualification for back-to-work pay. Also, in this case claimant was notified well in advance that he would be laid off as of Monday, July 15, 1968, so regardless of the computation of vacation time, he was not laid off in excess of three weeks.
I. Facts
Claimant Bania and others in the same plant were notified on March 12 and April 29, 1968 that there would be a layoff and vacation shutdown of *219the plant beginning Monday, July 15, 1968. The notice relative to Bania read:
"The VACATION and LAYOFF Schedule shall begin: Week of July 15, 1968 as a LAYOFF. Week of July 22 and 29th as a VACATION SHUTDOWN.”
Claimant Bania was laid off beginning July 15 for a period of two weeks. He requested and received one week of vacation beginning July 29. He returned to work on Monday, August 5. Claimant’s vacation (full) pay had been received with his last paycheck on July 12. The Michigan Employment Security Appeal Board in addition awarded Bania back-to-work benefits, which decision was reversed by the Ingham Circuit Court.1 The Court of Appeals in turn reversed the Ingham Circuit Court. 47 Mich App 700; 209 NW2d 794 (1973). Ford now appeals.
II. Michigan Employment Security Act
MCLA 421.27(c)(2); MSA 17.529(c)(2):
"When an individual has had a period of unemployment: (i) for which he has been paid benefits for 1 or more weeks or has received credit for a waiting week, (ii) which commenced with a layoff by an employing unit that continued with such employing unit for more than 3 weeks, and (iii) which has been terminated by his accepting and engaging in full-time work with an employing unit within the 13 weeks immediately following his last week of employment with such employing unit, such individual shall be paid, for the most recent week in such period for which benefits are payable or were paid to him or for which he was entitled to credit *220for a waiting week, an amount equal to his currently applicable weekly benefit rate in addition to any benefits otherwise payable or paid to him for such week.”
MCLA 421.48; MSA 17.552:
"All amounts paid to a claimant by an employing unit or former employing unit for a vacation or a holiday, and amounts paid in the form of retroactive pay, or in lieu of notice, shall be deemed remuneration in determining whether an individual is unemployed under this section and also in determining his benefít payments under section 27(c), for the period designated by the contract or agreement providing for the payment, or if there is no contractual specification of the period to which such payments shall be allocated, then for the period designated by the employing unit or former employing unit.”
III. Vacation Pay
Ford claims that the Court of Appeals erred because § 27(c)(2) does not provide for back-to-work pay under the stated circumstances. Ford argues that claimant had not had a period of unemployment which commenced with a layoff and which lasted in excess of three consecutive weeks. Bania was on vacation and received vacation pay for one week which was included by claimant in his computation of time.
Claimant Bania argues that layoffs are measured from the last day of work2 to the first day of return and that he is eligible for back-to-work pay because he was laid off, although not unemployed, *221in excess of three weeks. But this computation included vacation time plus the Saturday and Sunday before the layoff as noticed.
Applying the rationale of test case General Motors Corp v Erves, we proceed to an analysis based upon the economic (wage) impact.
Justice Williams, writing in a related opinion, Brown v LTV Aerospace Corp, 394 Mich 702; 232 NW2d 656 (1975), states:
"That the employer may lawfully designate a vacation period during a layoff for the allocation of vacation pay has been settled in this state. See Malone v Employment Security Commission, 352 Mich 472; 90 NW2d 468 (1958).”
Of specific relevancy are the parts of § 48 which read:
"An individual shall be deemed 'unemployed’ with respect to any week during which he performs no services and with respect to which no remuneration is payable to him.”
Claimant’s one week of vacation pay is treated as remuneration under § 48, thus leaving him with two weeks of unemployment.3
In accordance with Brown, claimant Bania lost two weeks of wages and he also was "unemployed” for two weeks. Claimant, however, would have his cake and eat it too. He wishes full pay for the *222week of vacation and also to have that week credited for back-to-work benefits. Such a result would do violence to the intent of the act which speaks throughout to "unemployment”. The title declares that it is an act "to provide for the protection of the people of this state from the hazards of unemployment”. The declaration of policy speaks solely of "unemployment” (i.e., "Economic insecurity due to unemployment”, "Involuntary unemployment”, "unemployed worker” etc.) and provides for the systematic setting aside of funds to provide benefits for "periods of unemployment”. MCLA 421.2; MSA 17.502.
It is highly unlikely that in this context the Legislature intended a "windfall”, as it has been aptly designated.
However, claimant Bania still is not entitled to back-to-work pay regardless of whether one accepts his rationale of this battle of semantics.
Notice well in advance was given to claimant of the layoff beginning Monday, July 15, 1968. Such advance notice was certainly in his best interest. Bania then returned to work in exactly three weeks after July 15. Even if we accepted claimant’s argument (which we do not) that he actually was laid off on Friday because he conceivably could have been called in for work during the weekend, claimant fails. His logic is defective on its face. If he were laid off Friday, he would not have been called in for work Saturday or Sunday. If layoff status began on Monday, under his argument he would have been available for week-end work. He is either laid off on Friday or he is not. We find that he was not.
It is a heady experience for any of us to be in a situation of "Heads I win, tails you lose”, but if business is to thrive so that jobs will be available, *223a sound business and commonsense approach must be applied.
From whatever aspect the circumstances of this case is viewed — whether it be the intent of the act, the application of logic or common sense or a balanced weighing of the common welfare — claimant Bania did not qualify for back-to-work benefits.4
The Court of Appeals is reversed.
Claim op Mohammed
The question assigned to this case is:
Can a "class action” appeal including a successful Michigan Employment Security Commission claimant in one county filed before an appeal by the unsuccessful employer in another county, force dismissal of the second appeal while the first is pending?
Under the circumstances of this case, we hold that the Ingham County appeal should not have been dismissed and therefore we reverse the Court of Appeals.
I. Facts
Mohammed, a resident of Wayne County, was employed at Ford’s Sterling plant when he and others were notified that the plant would be shut down from July 22 through August 9, 1968. Although Mohammed’s last day of work was Friday, July 19, 1968, he had received notice that the layoff would begin Monday, July 22. He returned *224to work on Monday, August 12.5 He received no vacation pay. Nevertheless, he was administratively awarded back-to-work benefits.
The MESC Appeal Board affirmed the referee’s ruling that Mohammed and other test claimants were entitled to back-to-work benefits. Ford appealed.
Prior to Ford’s appeal to the Ingham Circuit Court, Mohammed joined with five others6 in filing (with later amendment) a "class action” appeal in Wayne Circuit Court. Of these, two resided in other counties and four were successful claimants. Wayne Circuit Judge O’Hair eventually dismissed the Wayne claims for lack of jurisdiction, adding that the arguments for "class action” also failed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision and this Court denied appeal.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the Ingham appeal on the basis that the Wayne appeal was still pending.
Other questions arising from the facts of the Mohammed claim are answered in other test cases, so we adhere solely to the assigned question as stated.
II. Abatement of Appeals
The Court of Appeals, in dismissing Ford’s Ingham County appeal, cited GCR 1963, 116.1(4):
*225"In a party’s first responsive pleading, or by motion filed not later than his first responsive pleading, a party may demand that service of process be quashed or that judgment be entered dismissing 1 or more claims asserted against him upon any of the following grounds:
* * *
"(4) another action is pending between the same parties involving the same claim.”
Mohammed, however, had won his case, having benefited from the decision of the appeal board. Claimants had presented . various factual situations. Mohammed and three other Wayne residents had prevailed and in appealing had no viable issue in dispute.
GCR 1963, 208.67 permits a class action only when "a common relief is sought”. The Wayne suit was instituted by claimants seeking back-to-work benefits. But Mohammed already had been awarded back-to-work benefits and therefore was an improper member of the "class” in that he did not seek the "common relief’ of the class and had no standing in such an action. He was not aggrieved.
It is a general rule in this state8 and elsewhere that only a party aggrieved by a decision has a right to appeal from that decision.
In Whiting v Neuman, 11 Mich App 201; 160 *226NW2d 795 (1968), T. G. Kavanagh (now Chief Justice of this Court) wrote:
"We also agree that only an aggrieved party may properly seek relief from an appellate court * * *
Whiting refers with approval to the case of In re Estate of Trankla, 321 Mich 478; 32 NW2d 715 (1948), which has been substantially restated in 7A Callaghan’s Michigan Pleading & Practice (2d ed), § 54.08.9
4 Am Jur 2d, Appeal and Error, §§ 182, 184, 185, concludes that:
"A party who could not benefit from a change in the judgment has no appealable interest.
"of course one may not appeal from a judgment, order or decree in his favor by which he is not injuriously affected.
"a successful party who has been granted full relief is not entitled to a review of alleged defects in the proceedings on which the judgment is founded * * * .”
It is properly argued by Ford that the mere existence of an appeal pending in one court is not *227of itself sufficient to abate a second appeal in another court.10 The argument of claimants is unreasonable which would require dismissal of the second appeal, then dismissal of the first appeal, followed supposedly by a repeat performance of filing an appeal in the second court.
The Attorney General speaking for MESC said:
"the appeal to the circuit court for the county of Ingham was * * * not subject to dismissal unless and until it was finally held that the circuit court for the county of Wayne had jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would be to hold that a party who is entitled to appellate review may have that right to review defeated by a prior abortive appeal by the opposite party.”
We agree that the Ingham Circuit Court was correct in refusing to dismiss the second appeal when on its face the first appeal was invalid, two of the claimants living out of the Wayne Circuit Court’s jurisdiction and the remaining four having no right of appeal because they were not aggrieved parties.
To hold otherwise would impose upon the courts a tortuous procedure which would undermine attempts to give aggrieved persons an opportunity to be heard on review as expeditiously and at as little cost as possible. Such a thrust is in the best interest of all parties.
We hold that Ford’s appeal to the Circuit Court for the County of Ingham was erroneously dismissed by the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals is reversed.
"A mere suggestion of another action pending involving some of the same questions, between different parties, in a court of another jurisdiction would not constitute a good plea in abatement and is not sufficient to abate the suit or void a decree made herein.”*228Fitzgerald and Lindemer, JJ., concurred with Coleman, J. Levin, J., took no part in the decision of this case.
Bania and other successful claimants were parties to a "class action” appeal in Wayne County. Mohammed was one such claimant and that aspect of the case will be discussed in the "Claim of Mohammed” to follow.
The issue of when § 27(c)(2) becomes operational and the computation of time begins is discussed in test case General Motors Corp v Erves, 395 Mich 604; 236 NW2d 432 (1975). The application of the economic impact standard is here adopted. (The issue of time computation when claimant receives on Friday a notice of layoff when the next work day is Monday is irrelevant to this case.)
Our analysis is not novel. It was employed in Employment Security Commission v Vulcan Forging Co, 375 Mich 374, 378; 134 NW2d 749 (1965):
"Our conclusion is buttressed by the second paragraph of the amended section which, among other things, provides that vacation pay received for such periods of unemployment is considered remuneration in determining whether an employee is unemployed and in determining the amount of unemployment compensation benefits, under section 27 of the act, to which he is entitled.”
Although $50 is entailed in Bania’s claim alone, there are thousands of others in like circumstances, we are informed. Therefore a large amount of monies is involved for corporations, large and small, which have similar claims pending against them.
See General Motors Corp v Erves for a discussion of time computation in back-to-work cases.
See Brown for the dispositive test case opinion regarding jurisdiction of a circuit court to hear appeals from MESC Appeal Board decisions.
A seventh claimant, Rivenburgh, in a separate action, was denied appeal to the Wayne circuit court because he was not a resident of Wayne County and therefore that court was without jurisdiction. This Court denied Rivenburgh’s application for leave to appeal.
"Claimants under the Michigan Employment Security Act whose rights to unemployment compensation turn upon the provisions of said act shall, as hereinafter provided, be deemed to constitute a class for appeal to the circuit court under section 38 of said act and any subsequent appeals. Any one or more claimants, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all, may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued in proceedings under Rule 706 when the character of the rights sought to be enforced for the class is several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought.”
Also see, In re Critchell Estate, 361 Mich 432; 105 NW2d 417 (1960); Groeneveld v Groeneveld, 3 Mich App 284; 142 NW2d 14 (1966).
“To be entitled to appeal, in addition to being interested in the subject matter of the controversy, one must also be injuriously affected or aggrieved by the judgment or order. To be aggrieved, the determination must in some substantial manner prejudice him in his rights or adversely affect his legal interests, and a party unquestionably is aggrieved by a judgment or order if it operates on his rights in property or bears directly on his interest, but one is not aggrieved by a mere possibility of injury arising from some unknown and future contingency, and there is a strong presumption against possible future grievance where there is nothing to show any state of things which could give rise to any contingent claim which could be presented against appellant thereafter in connection with the order appealed from.”
See Detroit Fire & Marine Ins Co v Oakland County, 284 Mich 130; 278 NW 791 (1938):