concurring. I concur. The chancellor’s decree clearly runs afoul of Ark. R. App. P. 2, and is not an appealable order. The chancellor declared the Arkansas school funding system (School Finance Act of 1984) unconstitutional under Article II, § § 2,3, 18 and Article XIV, § 1 of the Arkansas Constitution, but she never put her directives into execution. The plaintiff school district filed suit, asking the trial court to declare Arkansas’s statutory funding structure unconstitutional and requesting the State Board of Education be enjoined from implementing that unlawful funding structure. Although the chancellor decreed Arkansas’s educational funding laws were unconstitutional, she denied plaintiffs any remedies, and instead stayed the effect of her decision for two years to give the General Assembly time to implement a school funding system in conformity with her opinion. The chancellor further stated the following:
The court has declared the Arkansas school funding “system” unconstitutional. At this point in time, the court will not consider the constitutionality of the individual elements of the “system.” (Emphasis added.)
Exactly where the chancellor’s decree left the prevailing plaintiffs is unclear, since plaintiffs were unable to enforce their rights under the trial court’s declaration. Apparently, plaintiffs must wait two years at which time the chancellor would decide if the General Assembly had adopted and implemented a school funding system which complied with her decision. Apparently, when the two-year period ends, another hearing would be required to review any new law to determine if conformity was achieved.
Our court has held that, to be final and appealable, a trial court’s order, decree or judgment must dismiss the parties from the court, discharge them from the action, or conclude their rights to the subject matter in controversy. Estate of Hastings v. Planters and Stockmen Bank, 296 Ark. 409, 757 S.W.2d 546 (1988). This court also related the rule that a final judgment or decision is one that finally adjudicated the rights of the parties, putting it beyond the power of the court which made it to place the parties in their original positions. It must be such a final determination as may be enforced by execution or in some other appropriate manner. Here, the chancellor’s decree meets none of the foregoing requirements, since the parties are still before the trial court, and the plaintiffs must wait to enforce their rights. That being so, I would dismiss this appeal, because no final order exists.
In conclusion, I take exception to the majority opinion wherein it concludes the question of whether the chancellor can stay the effect of her decision is not before this court. Sure it is. The chancellor’s action staying its decision for two years is part of the reason why the judgment is not final and failed to grant any remedies. In addition, I would state the subject-matter jurisdiction issue is not clear to me, especially since mandamus was requested by the plaintiffs and that relief must be sought in circuit court. Thus, I reserve my opinion on this issue. Concerning the mootness issue, however, I see no merit. I merely point out that the School Finance Act of 1984 which the chancellor declared unconstitutional (effective in two years) is not, as yet, repealed. In fact, Act 917 of 1995 (the Equitable School Finance System Act) mentioned in the majority opinion does not repeal the 1984 Act until July 1, 1996. Nor is it clear at this juncture whether Act 917 cures those constitutional infirmities that the chancellor says exist in the 1984 Act. In sum, the parties have not benefited us with a comparison of these laws or offered an argument that Act 917 caused this litigation to be moot. Based on what is before this court now, mootness is not shown.
I respectfully join in the result reached by the majority on the finality issue and find it reason enough to dismiss.