(concurring in part and dissenting in part). For the following reasons, I dissent.
i
LIMITED personal jurisdiction
As the lead opinion notes, in determining whether the exercise of limited personal jurisdiction over the defendant is proper in this case, a two-step analysis must be undertaken. First, it must be determined if the exercise of limited personal jurisdiction over Wilson would be consistent with the requirements of the Due Process Clause, US Const, Am XIV. Second, it must be determined if Wilson is within the reach of Michigan’s long-arm statute, MCL 600.705; MSA 27A.705. Jeffrey v Rapid American Corp, 448 Mich 178, 185; 529 NW2d 644 (1995). Also, because the trial court granted summary disposition in this case, it is assumed that all factual allegations in the complaint *362are true for the purposes of this appeal. Simko v Blake, 448 Mich 648, 654; 532 NW2d 842 (1995).
A
DUE PROCESS
The trial court found that the exercise of jurisdiction over Wilson would not violate the Due Process Clause, and defendants did not appeal this ruling. 211 Mich App 140, 142; 535 NW2d 233 (1995). Even though it was not presented, the Court of Appeals addressed this issue because it is potentially dispositive. As a general rule, this Court will not review issues that are not presented in the lower courts. Gordon Grossman Bldg Co v Elliott, 382 Mich 596, 602; 171 NW2d 441 (1969). Thus, in granting leave to appeal, this Court did not grant leave regarding the due process issue. Rather, leave to appeal with respect to the jurisdictional question was limited to “whether the circuit court had jurisdiction under MCL 600.705; MSA 27A.705 [Michigan’s long-arm statute] over defendant Wilson . . . .” 453 Mich 901 (1996). Although the due process issue has been waived, I will discuss this prong of the analysis for the sake of completeness.
In International Shoe Co v Washington, 326 US 310, 316; 66 S Ct 154; 90 L Ed 95 (1945), the United States Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause allowed a state to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident if the nonresident has “minimum contacts” with the state so that “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” are not offended. Under the “minimum contacts” principle of International Shoe, a defendant need not ever be physically present in a state in order to be subject to *363personal jurisdiction in that state. See McGee v Int’l Life Ins, 355 US 220; 78 S Ct 199; 2 L Ed 2d 233 (1957). Rather, the “minimum contacts” requirement would be satisfied if a defendant “purposely avails [himself] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Hanson v Denckla, 357 US 235, 253; 78 S Ct 1228; 2 L Ed 2d 1283 (1957). If a defendant purposefully avails himself of a state’s laws, he reasonably can anticipate being haled into that state’s courts. World-Wide Volkswagen v Woodson, 444 US 286, 297; 100 S Ct 559; 62 L Ed 2d 490 (1980).
Michigan courts have developed a three-part test to determine if a defendant has the minimum contacts necessary for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction. This test incorporates the United States Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on this issue.
First, the defendant must have purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in Michigan, thus invoking the benefits and protections of this state’s laws. Second, the cause of action must arise from the defendant’s activities in the state. Third, the defendant’s activities must be substantially connected with Michigan to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant reasonable. [Jeffrey, supra at 186; Starbrite Distributing, Inc v Excelda Mfg Co, 454 Mich 302, 309; 562 NW2d 640 (1997).]
Thus, in order to determine if Wilson has minimum contacts with Michigan, we must first ask if he purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of Michigan law. As this Court noted in Witbeck v Bill Cody’s Ranch Inn, 428 Mich 659, 667; 411 NW2d 439 (1987), the “ ‘purposeful availment’ requirement insures that a defendant will not be *364haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts,” quoting Burger King v Rudzewicz, 471 US 462, 475; 105 S Ct 2174; 85 L Ed 2d 528 (1985). In Burger King, the United States Supreme Court explained:
[W]here the defendant “deliberately” has engaged in significant activities within a State ... he manifestly has availed himself of the privilege of conducting business there, and because his activities are shielded by the “benefits and protections” of the forum’s laws it is presumptively not unreasonable to require him to submit to the burdens of litigation in that forum as well. [Id. at 475-476.]
In this case, Wilson’s contacts with Michigan are not random, fortuitous, or attenuated. He deliberately entered the state, patronized establishments that are licensed and regulated by Michigan law, and drove on roads that are maintained and governed by this state. By using Michigan’s roads and patronizing Michigan’s establishments, Wilson purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of Michigan law.
Second, it must be determined if the cause of action arose from the defendant’s activities in the state. In this case, Wilson allegedly patronized bars in Michigan, became intoxicated in Michigan, and chose to drive while intoxicated in Michigan. Wilson urges this Court to find that the accident is unrelated to his activities in Michigan, i.e., that the accident did not arise from his alleged acts of becoming intoxicated and choosing to drive while intoxicated. I would decline to make such a finding. Whether Wilson’s activities in Michigan are the cause of the accident is a question of fact that must be resolved by a jury. Riddle v McLouth Steel Products Corp, 440 Mich 85, 96; 485 NW2d 676 (1992); Prosser, Torts (5th ed), *365§ 41, pp 264-265. Certainly, the causal nexus alleged by the plaintiffs is not so attenuated that I would hold that a finding of causation is precluded as a matter of law. When a person drives while intoxicated, it is foreseeable that an accident might occur.1 Thus, taking the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, the accident arose from Wilson’s activities in Michigan.
Third, it must be determined if defendant’s activities were so substantially connected with Michigan that the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable. I note that this part of the test is generally easy to meet. That is, if a defendant has purposefully availed himself to this state’s law, he “ ‘must present a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.’ ” Starbrite, supra at 313, quoting Burger King, supra at 477. Although a court’s primary concern in assessing the reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction over a defendant is the burden on the defendant, the court will also consider other factors, including
the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, at least when that interest is not adequately protected by the plaintiff’s power to choose the forum, the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental social policies . . . .” [World-Wide Volkswagen, supra at 292; see Starbrite, supra at 313.]
In this case, Wilson cannot show compelling reasons why jurisdiction in Michigan would be unreason*366able. At the time of the accident, Wilson was allegedly a resident of Windsor.2 Because Detroit is close enough for defendant to socialize here, I could not say that it would be unreasonable for him to litigate here. Also, the alternative forum would likely be Windsor, and the burden of litigating in Detroit would be similar to the burden of litigating in Windsor.
In fact, the other factors support jurisdiction in Michigan. First, Michigan has a strong interest in adjudicating this dispute. This state seeks to ensure that people do not drive while intoxicated and to ensure that Michigan residents who are injured by drunk drivers are compensated. Second, because the plaintiffs are residents of Detroit, the plaintiffs’ interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief is best served by litigating in Wayne County. Third, the most efficient resolution of the controversy would occur in Wayne County, where most of the witnesses of Wilson’s alleged intoxication are likely to be. Finally, jurisdiction in Michigan would advance the shared interest of Michigan and Ontario in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. As do other jurisdictions, Michigan has an interest in holding those who injure others through drunk driving responsible for their actions.
Therefore, all three prongs of the “minimrim contacts” test are met, and jurisdiction over Wilson is constitutionally permissible.3
*367B
MICHIGAN’S LONG-ARM STATUTE
Michigan’s long-arm statute, MCL 600.705; MSA 27A.705, allows this state’s courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents in certain situations.
The existence of any of the following relationships between an individual or his agent and the state shall constitute a sufficient basis of jurisdiction to enable a court of record of this state to exercise limited personal jurisdiction over the individual and to enable the court to render per*368sonal judgments against the individual or his representative arising out of an act which creates any of the following relationships:
(1) The transaction of any business within the state.
(2) The doing or causing an act to be done, or consequences to occur, in the state resulting in an action for tort.
(3) The ownership, use, or possession of real or tangible personal property situated within the state.
(4) Contracting to insure a person, property, or risk located within this state at the time of contracting.
(5) Entering into a contract for services to be rendered or for materials to be furnished in the state by the defendant.
(6) Acting as a director, manager, trustee, or other officer of a corporation incorporated under the laws of, or having its principal place of business within this state.
(7) Maintaining a domicile in this state while subject to a marital or family relationship which is the basis of the claim for divorce, alimony, separate maintenance, property settlement, child support or child custody.[4]
Plaintiffs contend that Wilson falls within the scope of subsection 2: “The doing or causing an act to be done, or consequences to occur, in the state resulting in an action for tort.” In interpreting this provision, it is helpful to consider the history of long-arm statutes in the United States.
After the United States Supreme Court expanded the exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresidents in International Shoe4 5 6virtually every state *369enacted statutes to facilitate. the use of “long-arm” jurisdiction. Illinois was the first state to pass a long-arm statute, and this statute attempted to identify every situation in which a state could appropriately exercise jurisdiction.6 Soon after the Illinois statute was passed, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the statute permitted the state to exercise jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the Due Process Clause.7 Several other states followed Illinois’ lead and passed “laundry-list” style long-arm statutes,8 and many courts of states with these statutes held that the scope of the statute was coextensive with the Due Process Clause.9 Thus, in these states, the courts have essentially merged the constitutional and statutory questions. In 1970, California explicitly merged the two-steps of jurisdictional analysis by passing a statute that simply says that the state may assert jurisdiction in any situation allowed by the Due Process Clause.10
*370The Legislature passed Michigan’s long-arm statute in 1961. This statute resembles Illinois’ laundry-list-style long-arm statute. Not long after Michigan’s long-arm statute was passed, this Court indicated that it would follow the lead of other states and construe the long-arm statute to confer jurisdiction to the broadest extent constitutionally permissible. In Sifers v Horen, 385 Mich 195, 198; 188 NW2d 623 (1971), a majority of this Court stated:
We are called upon in this case to construe a Michigan statute which represents an attempt on the part of the Michigan legislature to expand to its full potential limited personal jurisdiction of Michigan courts over nonresidents.
Unless we are prepared to say that Michigan is forbidden by the Federal Constitution to exercise jurisdiction to the extent indicated in the statute we should not construe the statute so restrictively.
Likewise, the lead opinion in Schneider v Linkfield, 389 Mich 608, 616; 209 NW2d 225 (1973), repeated this proposition from Sifers:
“The courts of those states having ‘long-arm’ statutes similar to that of Michigan which confer, specifically, limited personal jurisdiction over defendants based on ‘the transaction of any business within the state,’ have generally construed their statutes as extending the state’s jurisdiction to the farthest limits permitted by due process.”[11]
*371Since this Court’s pronouncements in Sifers and Schneider, the proposition that Michigan’s long-arm statute is coextensive with the Due Process Clause has been continually repeated by the Michigan Court of Appeals12 and federal courts sitting in *372diversity.13
Despite the almost-universal assumption that Michigan’s long-arm statute was intended to grant the broadest jurisdictional powers constitutionally possible, some members of the Court have suggested that the long-arm statute may not be as broad as widely believed. In Hapner v Rolf Brauchli, Inc, 404 Mich 160, 168, n 2; 273 NW2d 822 (1978), Justice Levin, joined by Justice Fitzgerald, stated in a footnote:
I also note my disagreement with the statement that “[i]n previous decisions, this Court has viewed the statute as an attempt by the Legislature to expand to its full potential limited personal jurisdiction of Michigan courts over nonresidents.” . . . The Michigan statutes, in contrast with statutes or rules of other states (Cal Code Civ Proc 410.10; NJ *373Court Rules, 4:4-4[d]), does not contain a provision subjecting non-residents to jurisdiction to the fullest extent permissible under the Federal Constitution.
Likewise, in Witbeck, supra at 428 Mich 666, n 3, this Court in dicta equivocated on the scope of the long-arm statute.
In construing Michigan’s statute, some courts have concluded that its reach is coextensive with due process tests laid down by the United States Supreme Court. . . . This conclusion is based upon a statement made in Sifers v Horen, 385 Mich 195, 198; 188 NW2d 623 (1971), that the long-arm statute “represents an attempt on the part of the Michigan legislature to expand to its full potential limited personal jurisdiction of Michigan courts over nonresidents.” . . . However, the Sifers Court also declared that its holding rested upon the “exercise [of] jurisdiction to the extent indicated in the statute.”[14]
In order to resolve the present case, the precise contours of the long-arm statute need not be determined. I do note, however, that statutes that extend jurisdiction of courts are generally construed broadly. 3A Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction (5th ed), § 67.03, pp 67-69. Instead of determining if the long-arm statute is coextensive with the Due Process Clause, I would hold that Wilson’s actions are within the scope of the plain language of subsection 2 of the long-arm statute. This subsection allows this state’s courts to exercise long-arm jurisdiction for “[t]he *374doing or causing an act to be done, or consequences to occur, in the state resulting in an action for tort.”
Wilson allegedly came to Michigan, became intoxicated in Michigan, and chose to drive while intoxicated in Michigan. He argues that these acts did not result in the current action for tort, and that the only act that resulted in an action for tort was the act of crossing the center line in the Detroit-Windsor tunnel and striking plaintiff’s car. As I noted above, however, whether a causal link between Wilson’s alleged activities in Michigan and the accident exists is a question of fact. Because the trial court granted summary disposition in this case, I must accept the plaintiffs’ claim that the accident was caused by Wilson’s alleged intoxication. As also noted above, the causal link alleged by the plaintiffs is not so attenuated that I would find a lack of causation as a matter of law.
Moreover, the fact that the accident occurred outside Michigan does not remove defendant Wilson from the scope of subsection 2. Subsection 2 does not require that the entire tort occur in Michigan. Rather, it provides that either the act or the consequences of the act must occur in Michigan. In this case, Wilson began this tort when he breached his duty of care by choosing to drive while intoxicated.15 The consequences of this negligent conduct occurred in Canada when the plaintiffs suffered their damages.16 Because subsection 2 will reach a defendant if either the act *375or the consequences of the act occur in Michigan, Wilson is within the scope of subsection 2.17
Therefore, because Wilson allegedly became intoxicated in Michigan and chose to drive while intoxicated in Michigan, he committed acts in this state that “resulted] in an action for tort.” Jurisdiction is thus proper under the long-arm statute. Because both the constitutional and statutory requirements have been met, this state may exercise limited personal jurisdiction over Wilson.
n
NAME AND RETAIN CLAUSE
Because I would hold that Michigan courts have limited personal jurisdiction over Wilson, plaintiffs have complied with the name and retain clause of the dramshop act. I concur with Justice Kelly’s opinion insofar as it discusses the dramshop act.
*376in
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
In fact, the risk of accident is so great that the Legislature has criminalized driving while intoxicated. MCL 257.625; MSA 9.2325.
Plaintiffs alleged that Wilson resided in Windsor at the time of the accident, and Wilson does not deny this. Wilson is apparently presently living in London, Ontario, which is approximately ninety miles from Windsor.
We note that in the majority of cases in which motor vehicle accidents involving nonresident defendants have occurred outside a forum state, courts have found that the forum does not have personal jurisdic*367tion over the nonresident. Casad, Jurisdiction in Civil Actions, ¶ 7.02[2][e][i], pp 7-34 to 7-36. This is usually either because the nonresident has done nothing to purposefully avail himself of the forum’s laws or because the accident did not arise from the nonresident defendant’s contacts with the forum.
For example, in Clavenna v Holsey, 81 Mich App 472; 265 NW2d 378 (1978), a Michigan resident and a Canadian resident were involved in a boating accident on the Canadian side of the Detroit River. Although the Court of Appeals in that case did not carefully separate the constitutional question from the statutory question, it did indicate that the Canadian defendant lacked any contacts with Michigan. Id. at 476-477. The Court of Appeals also correctly noted that the fact that the injured Michigan resident was treated in Detroit hospitals would not provide minimum contacts sufficient for jurisdiction. After all, the defendant’s contacts with the forum state matter under International Shoe, not the plaintiff’s contacts. See also Zandee v Colisto, 505 F Supp 180 (WD Mich, 1981) (a Michigan resident and a resident of British Columbia were involved in an accident in North Dakota).
Likewise, in Helzer v F Joseph Lamb Co, 171 Mich App 6; 429 NW2d 835 (1988), a Michigan resident was struck by a van while crossing a street in Windsor. The nonresident defendant had contacts with Michigan, but these contacts were unrelated to the litigation. The driver of the van was a Canadian resident who drove daily into Michigan as part of his job. Although the defendant had conducted activities in Michigan, the Court of Appeals noted that no evidence established a causal nexus between the defendant’s activities in Michigan and the accident. Therefore, the accident did not “arise from” the defendant’s contacts with Michigan.
The present case presents a unique situation. In contrast to Clavenna and Zandee, the defendant has unequivocally availed himself of the benefits and protections of Michigan law. In contrast to Helzer, his activities in Michigan are causally linked to the resulting accident.
While § 705 only applies to personal jurisdiction over individuals, the long-arm statute has comparable provisions for corporations, MCL 600.715; MSA 27A.715, partnerships, MCL 600.725; MSA 27A.725, and partnership associations or unincorporated voluntary associations, MCL 600.735; MSA27A.735.
Before International Shoe, state courts could only exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents if the nonresident consented to jurisdiction *369or was served with process while physically within the state. Pennoyer v Neff 95 (5 Otto) US 714, 720; 24 L Ed 565 (1871).
See Scoles & Hay, Conflict of Laws (2d ed), § 8.33, pp 316-320; Casad, n 3 supra, ¶ 4.01, pp 4-3 to 4-4.
Nelson v Miller, 11 Ill 2d 378, 389; 143 NE2d 673 (1957).
Scoles & Hay, n 6 supra; Casad, n 3 supra.
See, e.g., Safari Outfitters, Inc v Superior Court, 167 Colo 456, 458-459; 448 P2d 783 (1969); Larsen v Scholl, 296 NW2d 785, 788 (Iowa, 1980); Hunt v Nevada State Bank, 285 Minn 77, 96; 172 NW2d 292 (1969); Fox v Fox, 559 SW2d 407, 409 (Tex Civ App, 1977); but see also Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co v Barnes & Reinecke, Inc, 15 NY2d 443, 460; 209 NE2d 68 (1965) (holding that the New York long-arm statute is not coextensive with the Due Process Clause).
Cal Code Civ P 410.10. Rhode Island, New Jersey, and Wyoming have followed California’s lead and enacted one-step long-arm statutes. RI Gen Laws 9-5-33; NJ Court Rule 4:4-4(b); WY Stat Ann 5-1-107. Also, Illinois, which passed the first laundry-list-style long-arm statute, added a catch-all provision to its statute in 1989. The catch-all provision states that the court may exercise long-arm jurisdiction in any situation that does not offend due process. See Anderson, The long reach of Elinois’ long-arm *370statute: The catch-all provision, 84 111 B J 504 (1996). Other states that originally enacted laundry-list-style long-arm statutes have also added catch-all provisions to their statutes. Ala R Civ P 4.2(a); La Rev Stat 13.3201; Neb Rev Stat 25-536.
The lead opinion in Schneider was written by Justice Swainson and joined by Justice Thomas Giles Kavanagh. An opinion written by Justice Williams and joined by Justice Coleman and Chief Justice T. M. Kavanagh, does not explicitly state the proposition that the long-arm statute is coextensive with the Due Process Clause, but does limit its disagreement with *371the lead opinion to an unrelated issue. Thus, one could reasonably conclude that five justices in Schneider agreed with the proposition that the long-arm statute stretches to the limits of the Due Process Clause.
See, e.g., Ins Comm’r v Arcilio, 221 Mich App 54, 73; 561 NW2d 412 (1997) (“[0]ur long-arm statute has been interpreted to grant the broadest basis for jurisdiction consistent with due process”); Rainsberger v McFadden, 174 Mich App 660, 662-663; 436 NW2d 412 (1989) (“This statute has been construed as giving the courts the broadest grant of jurisdiction consistent with due process”); Kriko v Allstate Ins Co of Canada, 137 Mich App 528, 531; 357 NW2d 882 (1984) (“[The long-arm statute] was intended to give Michigan courts the full extent of power possible to gain personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants as is consistent with the principles of due process”); Northern Ins Co of New York v B Elliott, Ltd, 117 Mich App 308, 316; 323 NW2d 683 (1982) (“all agree that, if constitutionally permissible, [Michigan’s long-arm statute] would allow Michigan to assume jurisdiction as the forum state in this case”); Hapner v Rolf Brauchli, Inc, 71 Mich App 263, 265-266; 247 NW2d 375 (1976) (“The broad language of the statute . . . indicates the Legislature’s desire to expand limited personal jurisdiction to its full potential”) (panel containing Justice Riley); Stan Sax Corp v Siefen Compounds, 68 Mich App 768, 769; 243 NW2d 724 (1976); Kiefer v May, 46 Mich App 566, 571; 208 NW2d 539 (1973) (“The only real limitation placed on this statute is the Due Process of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution”); Schneider v Linkfield, 40 Mich App 131, 135; 198 NW2d 834 (1972). But see Mallory v Conida Warehouses, Inc, 113 Mich App 280; 317 NW2d 597 (1982).
Wilson cites Woodward v Keenan, 79 Mich App 543; 261 NW2d 80 (1977) (panel containing Justice Riley) for the proposition that Michigan courts have shortened the reach of the long-arm statute. We believe that Wilson mischaracterizes the holding in Woodward. In Woodward, a Michigan resident was referred by her doctor to a clinic in South Bend, Indiana. The Michigan resident later sued the clinic in Michigan’s courts for malpractice. The trial court granted summary disposition, holding that the clime’s contacts with Michigan were insufficient under the Due Process Clause to warrant the exercise of limited personal jurisdiction. Id. at 546. The Court concurred with the trial court’s due process analysis, id. at 550, but remanded the case to the trial court in order to allow the plaintiff to show if the defendants had conducted business in Michigan. Id. When the case returned to the Court of Appeals, the court unequivocally stated that Michigan courts lacked jurisdiction on constitutional grounds. The court *372stated, “As defendants lacked sufficient due-process ties with this state making them amenable to the jurisdiction of our courts, we therefore affirm the court’s grant of accelerated judgment for want of in personam jurisdiction . . . .” Woodward v Keenan (After Remand), 88 Mich App 791, 792; 279 NW2d 317 (1979) (panel containing Justice Riley). Woodward, therefore, was decided on constitutional, not statutory grounds. It does not hold that the reach of the long-arm statute is shorter than that of the Due Process Clause.
See, e.g., Michigan Coalition of Radioactive Material Users v Griepentrog, 954 F2d 1174, 1176 (CA 6, 1992); Chandler v Barclays Bank PLC, 898 F2d 1148, 1150 (CA 6, 1990); FFOC Co v Invent AG, 882 F Supp 642, 651 (ED Mich, 1994); Chrysler Corp v Fedders Corp, 643 F2d 1229, 1236 (CA 6, 1981); Widger Chemical Corp v Chemfil Corp, 601 F Supp 845, 847 (ED Mich, 1985); Subacz v Town Tower Motel Corp, 567 F Supp 1308, 1311 (ND Ind, 1983); Speckine v Stanwick Int’l Inc, 503 F Supp 1055, 1057 (WD Mich, 1980); Gavelek v Coscol Petroleum Corp, 491 F Supp 188, 193 (ED Mich, 1979); Microelectronic Systems v Bamgerger’s, 434 F Supp 168, 171 (ED Mich, 1977); Central Transport, Inc v Theurer, Inc, 430 F Supp 1076, 1078 (ED Mich, 1977); Mad Hatter, Inc v Mad Hatters Night Club, 399 F Supp 889, 890 (ED Mich, 1975); Hill v Smith, 337 F Supp 981, 982-984 (WD Mich, 1972); Hadad v Lewis, 382 F Supp 1365, 1370 (ED Mich, 1974). But see Horvath v Niles, 802 F Supp 146, 148 (WD Mich, 1992) (suggesting that the long-arm statute has been shortened when applied to out-of-state medical providers), and Lak, Inc v Deer Creek Enterprises, 885 F2d 1293, 1298 (CA 6, 1989) (suggesting that the long-arm statute may not be coextensive with due process in tort cases).
Presently, all members of the Court agree that, in at least some situations, the scope of the long-arm statute exceeds the boundaries of the Due Process Clause. In Starbrite, supra at 307, all members of the Court agreed that the requirements of the long-arm statute were met. Two members, however, argued that jurisdiction was constitutionally impermissible.
Because Wilson’s alleged conduct is a violation of Michigan’s drunk driving laws, MCL 257.625; MSA 9.2325, it would create a rebuttable presumption of negligence. Klanseck v Anderson Sales & Service, Inc, 426 Mich 78, 86; 393 NW2d 356 (1986).
Again, we must take the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and assume that the accident was caused by Wilson’s alleged intoxication.
Wilson relies on Coleman v Gurwin, 443 Mich 59; 503 NW2d 435 (1993), and Gross v General Motors Corp, 448 Mich 147; 528 NW2d 707 (1995), in support of his argument that he is not within the scope of subsection 2. Both Coleman and Gross, however, interpret Michigan’s venue statute, MCL 600.1629; MSA 27A.1629, not the long-arm statute. Even if we were to analogize our venue cases to this case, they would support the plaintiffs’ position, not Wilson’s. In Gross, we noted that venue does not lie solely where the injury occurred, but also where part or all of the cause of action arose. Id. at 154. Likewise, in Coleman, we stated that we would examine the elements of the cause of action in determining where venue is proper. Id. at 63. Thus, in tort cases, we examine where the duty arose, where the duty was breached, the causal relationship between the breach and damages, and where the plaintiff suffered damages. Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 370, 375; 438 NW2d 844 (1992). Venue will be proper where the defendant breached his duty, even if the damages were suffered elsewhere.
In the present case, elements of the cause of action occurred in Michigan, namely, Wilson breached his duty of care when he allegedly chose to drive while intoxicated.