(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s affirmance of the decision of the trial court in this case. Having found that the township’s zoning ordinance § 1812, which requires site specifications that apply only to mobile homes, violates MCL 125.2307(6); MSA 19.855(107)(6), the majority proceeds to affirm the decision of the trial court, finding that the zoning classification does not violate due process, does not constitute a taking, and that plaintiff’s proposed use of the property is unreasonable. I agree that zoning ordinance § 1812 violates MCL 125.2307(6); MSA 19.855(107)(6) for the reasons set forth by the majority; however, I would remand to the trial court for it to reconsider whether plaintiff’s proposed use of the property is unreasonable in light of the fact that zoning ordinance § 1812 must be stricken.
The trial court’s findings are far too conclusory for this Court to engage in effective appellate review regarding the reasonableness issue. The trial court stated in its opinion in pertinent part:
The Court finds from the testimony of the Township Planner and the documentary evidence that the current classification is consistent with the Master Plan, claimed deviations of which are found untenable. The unavailability of public utilities, the compatibility with surrounding uses, the remoteness of the site, and the impact of a relatively large population on township resources, the Court finds, support Defendant’s denial of Plaintiff’s application.
Contrary to the trial court’s conclusory findings in this regard, the actions of the township do not necessarily support the finding that plaintiff’s proposed use is unreasonable. This issue needs reexamination in *139light of the fact that the site specifications that apply only to mobile homes have been ordered stricken.
Further, I do not find the township’s reasons for denying the zoning change to be supported by the record evidence. The township contends that the proposed use does not conform to its master plan. The master plan does not provide for the potential development of mobile homes anywhere in the township. This appears to be nothing more than subterfuge to completely defeat the development of mobile homes in the township. Moreover, while the current master plan was adopted in 1981, there have been five rezonings since that time, two of which did not conform to the master plan. Therefore, the actions of the township indicate a clear willingness to deviate from the master plan under other circumstances, and the reliance on the master plan by the township in this case is quite dubious.
Other reasons given by the township for denying the zoning change included the claim of a lack of access to public utilities, specifically water and sewer lines. Julie Ann Wallace, the township’s clerk and a member of the planning board and sewer authority, testified in her deposition that it was the board’s policy to require developers to run water and sewer lines even though the planning board recognized that it could not lawfully require developers to run these lines to new developments. She then changed her testimony at trial and stated that the board “encouraged” developers to run water and sewer lines to the developments. Wallace’s testimony in this regard is clearly problematic and, I believe, further indicates that the township never had any intention of permitting the building of mobile homes in its community. Such an *140intention raises serious due process concerns that the zoning classification does indeed violate due process rights because it is an arbitrary and unreasonable restriction upon the owner’s use of its property.
Looking at the actions and admissions of the township, the trial court’s conclusion that plaintiff’s proposed use of the property is unreasonable is not really supported by the record. It is not possible to determine how the trial court came to its conclusions regarding reasonableness, because it made no findings regarding credibility or how it considered the conflicting evidence. Further, because the ordinance requiring special uses relating only to mobile homes has been stricken, the reasonableness of plaintiff’s proposed use should be reconsidered. See Schwartz v City of Flint, 426 Mich 295, 325, 330; 395 NW2d 678 (1986).
I would remand this case to the trial court for it to determine whether plaintiff’s proposed use is reasonable.