John E. Green, a real estate appraiser testifying on behalf of the State, gave his opinion testimony as to the value of the subject property. He expressed an opinion based upon the income approach as well as other approaches. He stated that in connection with the income approach the annual fair rental value of the property is first determined. This is then “computed” into the “indication of value” by applying the proper capitalization. He explained how he derived the figure of $22,800.00 as the fair reasonable annual rent for the. property that was condemned. On cross-examination he was asked by the attorney for the appellees the following question:
“Do you consider the operating income, or the income producing from the property a factor that goes into the relative value of the property?”
I consider this question to be proper under the authority of Alabama Power Company v. Herzfeld, 216 Ala. 671, 114 So. 49. This question was on cross-examination and would be admissible for the purpose of testing the accuracy of the knowledge of the witness, the reasonableness of his estimate and the credibility of his testimony.
The witness Green, in response to the above question stated as follows:
“I consider the type of activity being conducted there would certainly have an effect upon the amount of rent which could be paid; we are concerned with the value of the real estate and the amount of rent which it could demand in the market. Certainly the type, its location, the type of business conducted there, and the amount of profit therefrom could help determine the amount of rent which could he paid.” (Emphasis supplied)
Under this testimony the appellees had the right to inquire further concerning income and related matters on cross-examination.
After extensive cross-examination, the witness Green admitted he had not ascertained the amount of income from the business. He had used only what he termed “comparable annual rents” in determining what he f'elt was the fair reasonable annual rent which the property should bring. Thus the appellees had the right to' introduce evidence of income from the *616business for the limited purpose of showing its influence upon the calculation of the fair reasonable annual rent of the property under the income approach.
It should also be pointed out that the trial court charged the jury, in part, as follows:
“Now, the Court permitted certain testimony to go before you, as to the income produced by this property, or the profits that were being realized from the use of this property. Income is an element of market value; the value of property, generally speaking, is determined by its productiveness; the profits which its use brings to the owner; the net revenue arising from the use of the land may be shown on an issue as to value, although it does not furnish a conclusive test. These questions were allowed to go to you for the purpose of testing the accuracy of the knowledge of the witness or witnesses. The reasonableness of his or their estimates, and the credibility of his or their testimony and is limited for that purpose.” (Emphasis supplied)
This language basically follows that portion of the Hersfeld case set out in the majority opinion. Therefore, under all of the circumstances, I feel that loss of profits was not considered as an element of damages, and the contentions of the appellant are without merit.
One of the appellee owners, Archie Woodham, testified there were display cases, meat cases, produce cases, frozen food cases and gondolas which were particularly adapted to the building upon the land condemned by the State of Alabama and could not be used elsewhere. He also testified that these items of property had no value otherwise.
Mark Cannon, a Superintendent for the Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company testifying as an expert witness for the appellees, stated that the produce counters, meat counters, equipment and gondolas of the appel-
lees could not be salvaged and removed from the building. He further stated that the items of refrigeration equipment could not be moved, and in substance that they wouldn’t be worth what it would cost to haul them off if they were removed.
There was conflicting testimony concerning whether these items could be moved and not destroyed. But, in view of the fact that there was conflicting testimony, the jury had the right to determine whether or not these items of property were or were not rendered valueless as a result of the taking. In the case of In re Slum Clearance, City of Detroit, 332 Mich. 485, 52 N.W.2d 195, it was held that an electrolytic plating business whose property was condemned for slum clearance was entitled to recover for chemical solutions necessary to the business which could not be removed from the premises, or the removal of which would be unwarrantedly expensive. See also Futrovsky v. United States, 62 App.D.C. 235, 66 F.2d 215, 216 (1933) ; Springfield Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Schweitzer, 173 Mo.App. 650, 158 S.W. 1058 and McRea v. Central National Bank of Troy, 66 N.Y. 489.
Futrovsky, supra, held that damages were not recoverable pertaining to personal property but the case contained the following statement:
“No evidence was offered to show that the removal of any of these chattels would cause injury either to the real estate or to the chattels, and the only articles which from their description appear to be subject to such injury were the pipes cut to fit the building.”
Since there was evidence in this case which supports a jury finding that these items were completely destroyed because of the condemnation, I feel the case of the City of Dothan v. Wilkes, 269 Ala. 444, 114 So.2d 237, is not controlling.
I, therefore, respectfully dissent.