People v. Blount

J. H. Gillis, P.J.

(concurring in part, dissenting in part). While I agree with the majority’s position on the first issue and their determination that conviction on the felony-firearm charge violates principles of double jeopardy,1 I cannot concur in their resolution of this problem.

MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2) reads in pertinent part as follows:

"(1) A person who carries or has in his possession a firearm at the time he commits or attempts to commit a felony, except for violation of section 227 or section 227a, is guilty of a felony, and shall be imprisoned for 2 years. Upon a second conviction under this section, the person shall be imprisoned for 5 years. Upon a third or subsequent conviction under this section, the person shall be imprisoned for 10 years.
"(2) The term of imprisonment prescribed by this section shall be in addition to the sentence imposed for the conviction of the felony or the attempt to commit the felony, and shall be served consecutively with and *508preceding any term of imprisonment imposed for the conviction of the felony or attempt to commit the felony.”

This language is not ambiguous.2 The Legislature clearly intended to create an offense separate and distinct from the underlying felony and to impose a separate punishment upon a person guilty of this offense. Having determined that defendant’s conviction cannot stand, I do not think that the punishment prescribed by the statute for its violation can, nevertheless, be imposed for violation of the underlying felony.

I would, therefore, order defendant’s conviction on the felony-firearm charge vacated and the sentence for this offense set aside.

See my dissenting opinion in People v Moore, 87 Mich App 475; 275 NW2d 19 (1978).

Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, no interpretation is necessary. People v Carey, 382 Mich 285, 292; 170 NW2d 145 (1969), Acme Messenger Service Co v Unemployment Compensation Comm, 306 Mich 704, 709; 11 NW2d 296 (1943).