(to reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm circuit judge). I have signed Justice Levin’s opinion because I concur that the trial court’s conclusion regarding entrapment is not clearly erroneous.
I write separately, however, to mark my disagreement with the implication in Part I that this statute as written in 1971 can constitutionally be applied to physicians.
I am satisfied that if we would observe the standard we have recognized since 1918: "A crimi*597nal statute ought to be so plain and unambiguous that 'he who runs’ may read, and understand whether his conduct is in violation of its provisions.” People v Ellis, 204 Mich 157, 161; 169 NW 930 (1918); People v Downes, 394 Mich 17, 25; 228 NW2d 212 (1975), we would conclude that this statute as applied to physicians is too vague to pass constitutional muster.