(concurring in part; dissenting in part). Leave was granted in this case limited to the following issues:
1. Whether the Court’s instruction as to plaintiffs’ duty of care was prejudicially erroneous;
- 2. Whether reasonable minds can differ as to Officer Ernst’s negligence; and
3. Whether a comparative negligence standard should be adopted in Michigan.
We concur with Justice Williams’ determination that this Court should adopt a system of pure comparative negligence. Although cognizant of the view that such judicial action may be seen by some as usurping the legislative prerogative, we find the countervailing arguments to be persuasive, given the limited scope of legislative action in other jurisdictions1 and the judicial genesis of the contributory negligence concept which now is supplanted by the comparative negligence concept.
*684We also agree that the issue concerning Officer Ernst’s negligence is a question of fact to be decided by the jury.
Our disagreement with Justice Williams’ opinion is twofold. First, the retroactive application of today’s decision is both unwieldy and inequitable. It may reasonably be expected to have an adverse effect upon the orderly administration of justice and to fall unfairly upon litigants and others. Justice Williams’ opinion provides that the decision be effective as to all cases in which the "issue” was preserved and to all negligence cases which have not yet gone to the jury. The broad retroactive application is explained partially by the fact that the bench and bar knew as of July, 1977, that three justices "were ready to adopt comparative negligence”. Our Court divided 3 to 3 in Kirby,2 the effect of which was to retain the contributory negligence rule in accordance with the Court of Appeals opinion in the case. Bench and bar remained bound by the law. Therefore, the trial judge committed no "error” to be preserved. Conversely, it would have been error so to instruct. A theory of retroactivity dependent upon the clairvoyance or the gambling instincts of counsel is, in our opinion, not sound. Also, applicability to cases tried to the point of submission to the jury leaves litigants in the possible position of having presented proofs and arguments of law based on one tort theory but having the "ground rules” subsequently changed so the jury must decide their fate on entirely new rules.
Although we would have preferred to adopt the concept by court rule and supporting jury instructions, all of which would, of course, have been prospective in application, such is not to be. There*685fore, our assessment of the matter as it stands, leads us to the conclusion that it would be fair to the most litigants and less disruptive to the administration of justice if the Court would provide that this fundamental change in Michigan’s system of tort law be applied only in a purely prospective fashion, effective as to causes of action arising after the date of this opinion.
Such a decision would provide time for well considered and appropriate court rules and jury instructions to be drafted. It would provide adequate notice to attorneys in preparation of their .cases. Importantly, our already overburdened courts would not have to face now unknown quantities of retrials of error-free cases or extensive motions for amended pleadings and other devices to rescue in the course of trial cases which were commenced on a tort theory suddenly not in existence. Such an application also would avoid the possible invalidation of the bases of various contracts. It would give the Legislature fair notice.
Secondly, we find no reversible error in the trial court’s instruction to the jury concerning the plaintiffs’ duty of care. The charge fairly informed the jury of plaintiffs’ rights and duties.
Therefore, we would not reverse the jury’s verdict on either basis but would affirm with no costs to either party, a public question being at the heart of grant of leave to appeal. In our view, pure comparative negligence should be applicable to causes of action which accrue after the effective date of this opinion.
I
Historically, traditional notions of the role of appellate courts were that they merely discover *686and then declare the meaning of the common law. The reality that this body of law, as opposed to statutory law, was judge-made was ignored. From this Blackstonian premise that judges did not make law came the conclusion that all overruling decisions were necessarily retroactive — that is, the overruled decision was viewed as if it had never existed because the true rule, which had always been the law, was now discovered.3
Modern jurisprudence has abandoned this ostrich-like approach, recognized the obvious and acknowledged that whenever a court overrules prior precedent it is functioning in a lawmaking capacity. This acceptance has raised the concomitant question: what are the proper limits upon judges when they make law? One element of the problem is the extent to which the overruling decision should be applied. Because in some instances "considerations of convenience, of utility, and of the deepest sentiments of justice”4 militate against the retroactive application of a new rule, the doctrine of prospective overruling has been forwarded as a judicial tool to promote both stability and development in the law.
Prospective overruling "is a procedural device which expressly recognizes the legislative nature of the act of overruling prior decisions, and recognizing it proceeds to establish a time from which the new law applies”.5 It is relevant that new *687statutory law is prospective from the effective date unless otherwise provided.
We believe that because the shift from a system of contributory negligence to a system of comparative negligence is such a fundamental change in Michigan’s law of torts that considerations of justice, judicial administration and sound jurisprudence mandate a prospective application of our holding.
Prospective overruling came to prominence as a judicial method in Great Northern R Co v Sunburst Oil & Refíning Co, 287 US 358; 53 S Ct 145; 77 L Ed 360 (1932). Mr. Justice Cardozo, writing for a unanimous Court, held that the technique of prospective application utilized by the Montana Supreme Court was not proscribed by the Federal Constitution. Indeed, he stated that the choice between retroactive or prospective application of a new decision depends upon the "juristic philosophy” of the particular court, regardless of whether "the subject of the new decision is common law * * * or statute.” Id. at 365.6
*688"Sunbursting” became an accepted technique during the judicial activism of the 1960’s7 and its use has been embraced and advocated by legal commentators for many years.8 In civil cases, we believe that prospective application is primarily warranted in instances, such as this case, where the overruling decision replaces a rule which has been in existence and generally utilized for many years.9
Prospective application of a decision which affects every negligence action in our state is particularly appropriate because of its broad, legislative-like impact. As Justice Williams wrote in Siirila v Barrios, 398 Mich 576, 634; 248 NW2d 171 (1976):
"The rule decreeing that the standard of care of general practitioners is determined by reference to the *689standard in the same or similar communities has long been accepted by bench and bar. Therefore, rather than apply the new rule of law to the case at bar, we would apply it to all cases tried after the date this opinion issues. 'A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may make a choice for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward.’ Great Northern R Co v Sunburst Oil & Refining Co, 287 US 358, 364; 53 S Ct 145; 77 L Ed 360 (1932).” (Emphasis added.)
The determinative factor in Siirila was the longstanding usage and reliance of the bench and bar upon the old rule. It is clear in this case also that from the standpoint of justice, the crucial determinant of the extent of application of an overruling decision is the reliance placed upon the old rule by the people of our state.
II
A
In this case, Justice Williams, in a commendable desire to apply broadly the principle of comparative negligence, apparently has overlooked the fact that application of the overruling decision to the parties before us, cases which have not yet gone to the jury, and cases in the appellate pipeline ("issue” saved for appeal) leaves out a class of litigants who correctly relied upon the then-effective state of the law. There undoubtedly were many lawsuits which were not brought, or were settled or tried to a conclusion in the post-Kirby era alone which would not receive benefits possible from, today’s holding because of reliance upon our own mandates. It is unjust to deny benefits of the majority decision to such plaintiffs and defendants *690(perhaps even as counter-claimants) while granting them to other litigants.
We do not view the unreliable "foreshadowing” doctrine as a viable basis for bestowing any possible benefits of Placek upon those litigants who undertook the useless exercise of appending a trial request for a comparative negligence instruction to the exclusion of those who did not. The trial court was bound by our rule of contributory negligence. It would have been error to instruct on comparative negligence. Those who anticipated the Placek decision are no more deserving of its application than those who did not.
Perhaps most importantly, the decision undermines the application of stare decisis. If the bench and bar cannot rely upon our requirements, upon what can they rely? In this case, there can be change without injustice while preserving a stable and reliable judicial course.
We do not advocate full retroactivity for the reason that society’s interest in fairness and the stability and certainty of the law outweighs our desire to apply backwards into history what may prove to be a more sound legal principle, although not based on á constitutional precept.
Further, the reopening of the negligence cases affected would place a stunning burden upon our already clogged court system.
B
The majority opinion justifies its retroactive application by placing substantial weight upon the inequity of choosing one case (i.e., Placek) as a vehicle for making a needed chánge in the law to the exclusion of all others in which the proposal was raised after Kirby. This problem was created *691because the benefits of the decision were considered, seemingly automatically, to be due the parties in the instant case.
The central question then becomes whether the instant parties should be accorded any perceived benefits of our holding. Purely prospective application, as opposed to prevailing-party prospective or nonretroactive application, has been criticized on two grounds.10 It has been argued that litigants who believe that they will not receive the fruits of an overruling decision will have little incentive to seek needed development in the law. Necessary .change will be thwarted or delayed.
We give little credence to those who portend that meaningful growth in the law will be stifled.
Individual litigants will always maintain the hope that (1) the Court will change the law and (2) that the change will apply to them. It is well understood that neither is a certainty.
The effective date of opinions is usually selected after weighing considerations of fairness, intent, the extent of reliance upon former law and the impact upon the legal and judicial systems. In some cases, constitutional considerations must be placed on the scales. The fact that an occasional case may be given prospective application in the interests of justice is not seen as a deterrant to creative appeal.
In the majority of such cases decided by this Court, the appellant has received the benefit of the new law, and we anticipate no change. However, there will always be exceptional cases where dramatic changes are made in the legal scheme, raising considerations of fairness which extend far *692beyond the instant appellant(s). Such extensive reliance has been placed upon existing law that legislation, common law and rules of practice have been built upon the concept. Removal of the foundation will cause the collapse of those other rules of law. It is unlikely that an occasional change of law which does not benefit the instant plaintiff or defendant will result in any less litigation.
Also, in the real world, individual litigants will always exist who will bear the cost of litigation secure in the knowledge that their success or failure will have ramifications upon their own interests far beyond the scope of the instant litigation.
Such litigants will be supported and supplanted by lawyers and law firms who often fund the cost of the litigation through contingency fee contracts because it is in their own self-interest. In the words of Justice Black:
"The only defense offered in the books, for decisions of overrulement effective for the case at hand plus future causes of action, is that otherwise there will be no incentive for appeals which, even though successful in overturning an outmoded rule, will result in no benefit to the appellant. * * *
"With the dictum and its supporters I disagree. It discloses some little unfamiliarity with the resourcefulness of skilled lawyers and with what really goes on in the offices of modern law partnerships. Gauging risk against chance with care, deft counsel are always willing in selected cases to take appeals in the hope of changing generally if prospectively some rule which should be changed in the interest of justice and necessary growth of the law. Such counsel usually find that one intentionally risked loaf, when cast with timed care upon picked legal waters, is likely to bring multiple and worthy results even though the appellant — expendable or not expendable — is set down without day.” Williams *693v Detroit, 364 Mich 231, 283-284; 111 NW2d 1 (1961) (Black, J., separate opinion.)
This objection also assumes that the groundbreaking decision will always arise in the context of a single-issue appeal. We see no basis for this assumption and, in point of fact, appellants here sought reversal of the jury verdict on two other grounds.
The second obstacle raised against prospective application is that the Court’s language has no binding effect because it is merely dictum.
Realistically, we find insufficient persuasive force in this objection to deter us from utilizing the purely prospective approach even as we have in other suitable cases.
"Although the rule laid down for the future is dictum rather than holding, when the court indicates clearly that this rule will be applied by that court in future cases, it necessarily rises above the stature of ordinary dictum; from that time forward, no person would be justified in relying upon the old rule which the court has repudiated. Clearly this objective to the prospective rule which does not apply to the parties in the overruling case is grounded more on theoretical niceties than practicality.” Note, Limitation of Judicial Decisions to Prospective Operation, 46 Iowa L Rev 600, 613-614 (1961).
Finally, it is difficult to imagine a more legislative-like decision of the Court. Therefore, for all of the reasons that legislation is made prospective, this decision also should be given prospective effect.
As an alternative basis for reversal, it is contended that the trial judge erroneously instructed the jury on the plaintiff’s duty of due care. The judge instructed:
*694"Now, I want to instruct you jurors, that the Supreme Court has said that a so-called right of way is not an assurance of safety, and does not grant an absolute right of way under all conditions. The driver on the street who does have a so-called right of way is still required to exercise due care in driving his car, or her car, in view of the conditions as they existed at that time. The driver on a favored highway, the superior highway has a right to assume that other drivers will obey properly erected traffic signs, but you must keep in mind here that this accident is with an authorized emergency vehicle which had a right under certain conditions to violate an erected traffic sign. The driver on a through highway may not proceed blindly. The driver is required to remain alert to hazards on the highway and to make reasonable observations of other drivers approaching the intersection and must keep such lookout ahead and to the sides of intersecting highways as a reasonably prudent careful person would do in order to discover possible dangers, and he must act carefully with the same care that the ordinary careful and prudent person would act upon the existing conditions, that then existed.” (Emphasis added.)
It is claimed that the underscored language is inconsistent with or not supported by Michigan case law and that the instructions on the whole were erroneous.
In Krause v Ryan, 344 Mich 428, 432; 74 NW2d 20 (1955), this Court declared that a favored driver (one proceeding with the right of way) may not
"proceed blindly upon the arterial, secure in the supposition that he can do no wrong. He must remain alert to the hazards surrounding him and with which he is confronting others.” (Emphasis added.)
In Arnold v Krug, 279 Mich 702, 707-708; 273 NW 322 (1937), this Court declared that although a favored driver need not "have his car under such control at each intersecting road that he may stop *695at once and avoid collision with persons who may illegally come into his path”, such a driver still must
"keep such look-out ahead and to the sides and down intersecting highways as a reasonably prudent person would do in order to discover possible danger and must act carefully upon the existing conditions.” (Emphasis added.)
In McGuire v Rabaut, 354 Mich 230, 237; 92 NW2d 299 (1958), the trial judge had quoted the foregoing from Arnold v Krug, supra, in his instructions to the jury on the plaintiffs duty of due care. He had also added that the favored driver was "not required to look to the right because he has good reason to believe that he is protected from danger in that direction by the stop sign”. This Court held that the trial judge’s addition to the Arnold language was error, stating:
"The favored driver must make observation despite his favored status * * * and no device or sign will remove this burden from him.”
The language used by the trial judge in the case at bar is consistent with and supported by this Court’s pronouncements in Krause, Arnold and McGuire, supra.
Lansing v Hathaway, 280 Mich 87; 273 NW 403 (1937), and Holser v Midland, 330 Mich 581; 48 NW2d 208 (1951), both preceded Krause and McGuire, supra, and neither dealt with jury instructions such as those in the case at bar. The question in each case was whether a favored driver had been negligent as a matter of law. The Court did state in each that a favored driver has a right to proceed unless he or she should have noticed a *696warning to the contrary. This statement and the challenged instructions in the case at bar, however, are not mutually exclusive. The two are opposite sides of the same coin — one expressing the favored driver’s right to proceed and the other expressing that driver’s constant duty of due care. The gist of both should be communicated to the jury.
That was done in the case at bar. The trial judge told the jury:
"It is the plaintiff’s claim further that the defendant here, Mr. Ernst, must establish by convincing evidence that the plaintiff knew, or should have known, of the approach of the police car under the circumstances that she was confronted with.
"It is the plaintiffs’ theory that at all times * * * [she] acted as a reasonable, prudent person would have acted under the same or similar circumstances * * *.” (Emphasis added.)
The judge later instructed:
"What does the common law require of Patricia Placek? What did it require of her on that particular day under those particular circumstances. You take the facts as you find them to be on that particular day, and the common law says of her that she must drive her car, she must operate her motor vehicle in the same manner that the ordinary careful and prudent person would have operated the vehicle under the same or similar circumstances. I will reread what I have already read to you, and that is what the word negligence means. I am referring now to common-law negligence, in regard to Patricia Placek. When I use the word negligence with respect to her conduct I mean the failure to do something which a reasonably careful person would do, or the doing of something which a reasonably careful person would not* do under the circumstances which you find existed on that date in this *697case. It is for you to decide what a reasonable careful person would do or not do under such circumstances.
"So you take the facts as they are, and then you set up your own ordinary careful prudent operator, driver, and take the facts as they were at that time, and when I say the facts, I mean everything. I mean the roads, the rise, if any, the motor vehicles, everything, consider everything, and it is for you to decide what a reasonably careful person would do under those circumstances, and she is held to that degree of care. ” (Emphasis added.)
Finally, the trial judge did instruct that the plaintiff was driving on a "superior highway” and that
"[t]he driver on a favored highway, the superior highway, has a right to assume that other drivers will obey properly erected traffic signs * * *.” (Emphasis added.)
These instructions fairly informed the jury of the plaintiffs rights as a favored driver.
It is also claimed that the only instruction regarding the defendant’s duty of care was a reading by the judge of a statute which states that the driver of an emergency vehicle may proceed past a stop sign only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation, and that no reference was made to another statute which states that the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle is not relieved of the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using the highway.
The trial judge gave the following instructions regarding the defendant’s common-law duty of care:
"Now, what do we mean by common-law negligence? *698When I use the word negligence now, with respect to the defendant’s conduct, I mean the failure to do something which a reasonably careful person would do, or doing something which a reasonably careful person would not do under the circumstances which you ñnd existed in this case. It is for you to decide what a reasonable careful person would do or would not do under such circumstances.
"Now, in other words, the law, the common law did not say that you and I have to drive a motor vehicle in a manner so that we never become involved in an accident. What they have done is create what they call a reasonably careful person, and when you drive a motor vehicle, when I drive a motor vehicle, we must drive it in a manner commensurate with that manner in which you ñnd a reasonably careful person would have done under the same circumstances.” (Emphasis added.)
The judge then read from and explained the defendant’s statutory duties:
"The driver of any authorized emergency vehicle when responding to an emergency call but not while returning therefrom may exercise the privilege set forth in this section, but subject to the conditions herein stated. * * * The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle may: * * * park or stand irrespective of the provision of this act, * * * proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation, * * * exceed the prima facie speed limits so long as he does not endanger life op property.
"And so you have heard, as I read that statute, the words, some general terms which refer you back to this rule of reasonableness that you heard when I explained common law to you. It speaks about slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation. Well now, you can see that that is for you to determine, for you to determine whether it is necessary, and if so to what extent it *699is necessary. It picks no definite standard except the standard of reasonableness which says, 'may slow down as may be necessary for safe operation’. And when we have such words as 'safe operation’ you are to interpret that as meaning reasonable safe operation, because the rule of reason, of human judgment, is carried throughout the statute, the same as it is your conduct under common-law negligence. ” (Emphasis added.)
Later, in the course of explaining the plaintiffs statutory duty to yield to emergency vehicles, the judge instructed:
" 'This section shall not operate to relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using the highway.’
"Now, you will run into those words, 'With due regard for the safety of all persons using the highway. ’ Now, due regard, again, what do we mean by that? We mean that regard, that care which the ordinary person and prudent person would have exercised under the same conditions as then existed. ” (Emphasis added.)
These instructions fully and fairly informed the jury of the defendant’s duty of care; therefore, we find no reversible error.
Conclusion
We advocate prospective application because, on the facts of this case, considerations of judicial administration, stare decisis and justice to all similarly situated persons outweigh a judicial inclination to seek application of an overruling decision retroactively. Implementation of pure comparative negligence will not be easy under any approach. The necessary adjustments to shift from a contributory negligence system to a pure compara*700tive negligence system are numerous.11 Indeed, some inconsistencies between the two systems can only be eradicated by the Legislature.12 However, there is no question that the administrative problems inherent in prospective application of comparative negligence are eclipsed by the difficulties and disruptions willingly invited by the majority.
The primary reason for the development of the prospective application doctrine is that it provides a viable alternative to choosing between the disruptive effects of retroactivity and perpetuating outmoded law. Stability and development are en*701hanced through its utilization. It would be difficult to conceive of a situation more akin to legislation and thus more ideally suited for prospective application than the instant case.
Our colleagues have chosen a limited retroactive application. The problems of administration, procedure, and court congestion aside, this course is unjust. Because one plaintiffs counsel gambled on our holding today and its retroactive application, while another plaintiffs counsel followed the existing law and, finding no error, did not go througthe motion of "preserving” error, comparative negligence will be applied in the former case while contributory negligence bars the latter cause of action. We cannot justify nor can we support such unequal treatment. In our view, the choice is distinct. Neither can we support the disruptive effects inherent in the majority’s sudden retroactive application of such a pervasive change in our tort law.13
We also dissent from the finding of instructional error regarding the duty of care.
We would affirm the trial court without costs to either party. Pure comparative negligence should be applicable to all causes of action accruing after the effective date of this opinion.
Fitzgerald and Ryan, JJ., concurred with Coleman, C.J.There is little doubt that this Court has the power to change a common-law rule. The most compelling argument supporting legislative adoption of comparative negligence, rather than judicial adoption, is that the Legislature has unique abilities to consider the proper form and make the necessary adjustments in the law to provide for a smooth implementation of comparative negligence. Unfortunately, the experience in every other jurisdiction which has legislatively adopted comparative negligence has been that only a basic statute was passed. The ramifications of the change were not addressed. E.g., Symposium, Comments on Maki v Frelk — Comparative v Contributory Negligence: Should the Court or Legislature Decide, 21 Vand L Rev 889 (1968), Kaatz v State, 540 P 2d 1037 (Alaska, 1975), Li v Yellow Cab Co of California, 13 Cal 3d 804; 532 P 2d 1226; 119 Cal Rptr 858 (1975), Hoffman v Jones, 280 So 2d 431 (Fla, 1973).
Kirby v Larson, 400 Mich 585; 256 NW2d 400 (1977).
A historical development of retroactivity and prospectivity is set forth in Linkletter v Walker, 381 US 618; 85 S Ct 1731; 14 L Ed 2d 601 (1965). See, also, Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U Pa L Rev 1 (1960), Note, Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal Courts, 71 Yale L J 907 (1962).
Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, 149 (1921). For a discussion of the Cardozo philosophy see Schaefer, The Control of "Sunbursts”: Techniques of Prospective Overruling, 42 NYU L Rev 631 (1967).
Rogers, Perspectives on Prospective Overruling, 36 U of Missouri *687at Kansas City L Rev 35-36 (1968). Terminology can be misleading in this area:
"For the reader unfamiliar with the jurisprudence of retroactivity, an introductory perspective may be useful. The issue that the Court has sought to deal with is whether a case that substantially alters the relevant body of prior law should govern (1) only future cases and neither the parties before the court nor any previous or pending cases ('pure prospectivity’), (2) future cases as well as the litigants at bar but not previous or pending cases ('nonretroactivity’), or (3) future cases, the present litigants, and all fact situations arising before the date of the law-changing decision that are still reviewable either by direct appeal or by collateral attack ('retroactivity’).” Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61 Va L Rev 1557, fn 2 (1975).
Mr. Justice Cardozo said, in full:
"We think the federal constitution has no voice upon the subject. A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent may make a choice for itself between the principle of forward operation and that of relation backward. It may say that decisions of its highest court, though later overruled, are law none the less for intermediate trans*688actions. Indeed there are cases intimating, too broadly, that it must give them that effect; but never has doubt been expressed that it may so treat them if it pleases, whenever injustice or hardship will thereby be averted. On the other hand, it may hold to the ancient dogma that the law declared by its courts had a Platonic or ideal existence before the act of declaration, in which event the discredited declaration will be viewed as if it had never been, and the reconsidered declaration as law from the beginning. The alternative is the same whether the subject of the new decision is common law or statute. The choice for any state may be determined by the juristic philosophy of the judges of her courts, their conceptions of law, its origin and nature. We review not the wisdom of their philosophies, but the legality of their acts.” Great Northern R Co v Sunburst Oil & Refining Co, 287 US 358, 364-365; 53 S Ct 145; 77 L Ed 360 (1932). (Citations omitted.)
E.g., Linkletter v Walker, 381 US 618; 85 S Ct 1731; 14 L Ed 2d 601 (1965), Stovall v Denno, 388 US 293; 87 S Ct 1967; 18 L Ed 2d 1199 (1967), Desist v United States, 394 US 244; 89 S Ct 1030; 22 L Ed 2d 248 (1969).
E.g., Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U Pa L Rev 1 (1960), Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 Va L Rev 201 (1965), Beytagh, Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and a Proposal, 61 Va L Rev 1557 (1975).
Clearly, there are basic differences in the relevant considerations and their respective importance depending upon whether the case is civil or criminal.
A good discussion of the objections may be found in Currier, footnote 8 supra, at 214-234 and Beytagh, footnote 8 supra, at 1613-1615.
The number of substantive and procedural questions which must be resolved are troubling. For example:
1. What should be the role of the doctrines of last clear chance, avoidable consequences, assumption of risk, and sudden emergency in a pure comparative negligence system?
2. What is the proper standard for judicial review of the jury’s apportionment of negligence?
3. Procedural questions on joinder of parties, impleader, compulsory counter- and cross-claims, and affirmative defenses are raised.
4. The multiple tortfeasor situation has numerous ramifications, including joint and several liability, contribution, releases, indemnity and when one tortfeasor is uncollectible or immune from suit.
5. Questions concerning set-off, which vary when liability insurance is involved, abound when cross- or counter-claims are raised.
The Legislature has already implemented pure comparative negligence in the products liability area. 1978 PA 495, MCL 600.2949; MSA 27A.2949 reads:
"(1) In all products liability actions brought to recover damages resulting from death or injury to person or property, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery by the plaintiff or the plaintiffs legal representatives, but damages sustained by the plaintiff shall be diminished in proportion to the amount of negligence attributed to the plaintiff.
"(2) If the court determines that the claim or defense is frivolous, the court may award costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in a products liability action.”
Of particular concern is the present statute providing for contribution between joint tortfeasors on a pro-rata basis. MCL 600.2925a; MSA 27A.2925(1). The legislation is inconsistent with a pure comparative negligence system. RJA, § 2925b(a) reads:
"In determining the pro rata shares of tort-feasors in the entire liability:
"(a) Their relative degrees of fault shall not be considered.” MCL 600.2925b; MSA 27A.2925(2).
We approve of the material contained in the appendix to the majority opinion.