concurring.
I agree with the majority opinion, which clearly explains the basic principles involved in this kind of fee dispute. It is well established that a contingent fee which is not fair and reasonable cannot be recovered in an action for attorney fees.1 I write separately, in light of further proceedings in this case, because the parties have a fundamental disagreement on the evidence necessary for a lawyer to establish a prima facie case that the fees sought are reasonable. Further, the parties disagree on the evidence the client would then need to produce in order to show the existence of a material issue of fact precluding judgment as a matter of law on the issue of reasonableness in a contingency fee case.
*933As our opinion explains, in a suit to recover an unpaid fee, the lawyer has the burden of proving the existence and terms of any fee contract, the making of any disclosures to the client required to render a contract enforceable, and the extent and value of the lawyer’s services.2 A lawyer can establish the extent and value of his or her services in a contingency fee case by producing evidence showing, for example, the results obtained, the quality of the work, and whether the lawyer’s efforts substantially contributed to the result.3 We have also identified other factors relevant to the reasonableness of a contingency fee, such as the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the legal issues involved, the skill required to do the work properly, and the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer performing the services.4 While the pertinent factors will differ from case to case, generally, the inquiry should focus on the circumstances of the agreement and the work performed.5
At that point, the burden of going forward with evidence shifts to the client, and the client must object with specificity to demonstrate why the documented fees are not reasonable.6 The client must, for instance, produce competent evidence disputing specific facts respecting the reasonableness of the fees or set forth the basis for a qualified opinion that the fees are unreasonable.7 In particular, it will generally be insufficient to simply conclude that the size of a contingent fee, compared to the length of the litigation, makes the fee unreasonable. There *934are a number of reasons why, in any particular case, a contingency fee agreement may be more advantageous to a client than an- hourly fee paid on a monthly basis. A contingency fee will generally be reasonable if the lawyer offered the client a free and informed choice between an hourly fee and a contingency fee, the contract provides for a fee within the range commonly charged by other lawyers in similar representations, and there was no subsequent change in circumstances that made the fee contract unreasonable.8
And while events may occur after a fee agreement was made so that a contingent fee arrangement that was fair in the first instance becomes unfair in its enforcement, courts should be reluctant to disturb contingent fee arrangements freely entered into by knowledgeable and competent parties.9 A prompt and efficient attorney who achieves a fair settlement without litigation serves both the client and the interests of justice.10 It should therefore be the unusual circumstance that a court refuses to enforce a fully informed contingent fee arrangement because of events arising after the contract’s negotiation.11
A contingent-fee contract . . . allocates to the lawyer the risk that the case will require much time and produce no recovery and to the client the risk that the case will require little time and produce a substantial fee. Events within that range of risks, such as a high recovery, do not make unreasonable a contract that was reasonable when made.12
In short, once a lawyer has established a prima facie case that a demanded fee is reasonable, judgment as a matter of law is precluded only if the client produces specific evidence on factors relevant to the reasonableness of the fee. Only at that point does the client show a genuine issue of material fact, so as to place the burden on the lawyer to persuade the trier of fact *935that the fee demanded is reasonable under the circumstances.13 But because, as the majority opinion explains, the law firm in this case did not meet its initial burden, I agree that the summary judgment in this case should be reversed. I concur in the judgment.
Connolly and McCormack, JJ., join in this concurrence.See, Kirby v. Liska, 214 Neb. 356, 334 N.W.2d 179 (1983); Byrne v. Hauptman, O’Brien, 9 Neb. App. 77, 608 N.W.2d 208 (2000).
See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 42(2) (2000). See, also, Byrne v. Hauptman, O’Brien, supra note 1.
See McKenzie Const., Inc. v. Maynard, 758 F.2d 97 (3d Cir. 1985). See, also, King v. Fox, 418 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2005).
See Kirby v. Liska, supra note 1.
See King v. Fox, supra note 3.
In re Ralph Lauren Womenswear, Inc., 204 B.R. 363 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). See, also, e.g., Cloutier, Barrett, et al. v. Wax, 604 A.2d 42 (Me. 1992); Basin Credit Consultants, Inc. v. Obregon, 2 S.W.3d 372 (Tex. App. 1999).
See id. Compare, e.g., Hinkle, Cox, et al. v. Cadle Co., 115 N.M. 152, 848 P.2d 1079 (1993).
See Restatement, supra note 2, § 34, comment c.
McKenzie Const., Inc. v. Maynard, supra note 3.
See id.
See id.
Restatement, supra note 2, § 34, comment c. at 250.
See Restatement, supra note 2, §§ 34 and 42.