¶ 58. {concurring). Perhaps I am missing something. Wisconsin Stat. § 32.05(7)(d), which is applicable to this case, provides that a condemnor's check for the amount of the award either be sent to the property owners "or be deposited with the clerk of the circuit court of the county for the benefit of the persons named in the award." (Emphasis added.) Wisconsin Stat. § 59.40(3) sets the general rule as to how money deposited with the clerk is handled. The pertinent portions of that section are as follows:
(b) Except as provided in par. (c), the clerk may invest any funds that are paid into his or her office and are being held for repayment. The investments shall be made in suitably protected accounts in the manner specified in s. 66.0603(lm) and all income that may accrue shall be paid into the county general fund.
(c) A judge may direct that par. (b) does not apply to certain funds paid into the office. The judge's authority *30applies only to funds relating to cases before his or her court.
Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3).1 Thus, paragraph (b) of the general statute grants the clerk of courts the authority to invest funds paid into that office in suitably protected accounts, and requires interest income that accrues to be paid into the county general fund. Paragraph (c), on the other hand, provides a judge, in cases before that judge, the authority to veto the application of paragraph (b) to certain funds paid to the clerk. Should a judge direct that Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(b) does not apply to certain funds, then gone is the authority of the clerk to invest funds held for repayment under the statute; gone is the authority to invest in suitably protected accounts under the statute; and gone is the requirement that interest income accrued be paid into the county general fund under the statute.
¶ 59. Wisconsin Stat. § 59.40(3)(c) grants the court only a negative statutory veto authority to deem § 59.40(3)(b) inapplicable in some cases. It does not grant the court an additional positive authority to affirmatively order a transfer of funds from the clerk's office into a private interest-bearing account, which the majority *31contends is implicit in the meaning of the statute. Majority op., ¶¶ 4, 27-28, 51.
¶ 60. I note that Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(c) does not provide a judge with the authority to parse the statute in a manner that would allow the circuit court to disregard a portion of paragraph (b). Thus, under the statute in question, once a judge invokes paragraph (c), a clerk's authority to invest the funds held in the condemnation award must be found elsewhere.
¶ 61. This takes us back to Wis. Stat. § 32.05(7)(d), which allows a condemnor to deposit with the clerk of circuit court a check "for the benefit of the persons named in the award." The clerk then gives notice to the parties, who may receive their proper share of the award by petition to and order of the circuit court. Id. Nowhere in the statute does the legislature provide the judge with the authority to order the clerk of courts to invest the award in the first instance, much less invest it in a particular account. And nowhere does the statute allow the clerk to keep any interest accrued at the expense of, as opposed to the benefit of, the parties.
¶ 62. Thus, when Wis. Stat. § 59.4Q(3)(b) is rendered inapplicable by a judge pursuant to § 59.40(3)(c), and those sections are read in conjunction with Wis. Stat. § 32.05(7)(d), which requires condemnation awards to be held for the benefit of the parties, these statutes do not grant the judge the power to order the clerk of court to transfer funds to a private interest-bearing account. Without a clear legislative grant of power, and without any other source of authority identified, such as the inherent powers or equitable authority of the court,2 the *32majority is simply rewriting the statute in a manner that produces a result it deems to be reasonable.3
¶ 63. I concur with the result only because none of the "interested persons" in this case objected to the request for transfer of funds by one of the parties to a private interest-bearing account for the benefit of the parties. Majority op., ¶ 8. It was their money. Whether the circuit court had the authority to order the transfer of funds to an interest-bearing account in the first instance is one thing. That in no way alters the fact that the circuit court in this case did order the transfer of funds to an interest-bearing account. Now that that has occurred, something must be done with the interest that was earned during the period of the transfer. Because the circuit court invoked Wis. Stat. § 59.40(3)(c), the clerk of courts lacked the authority under paragraph (b) to pay the income accrued into the county general fund. Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 32.05(7)(d), the award was to be held for the benefit of the parties. Thus, any interest accrued in this case must, under § 32.05(7) (d), revert to the parties.
¶ 64. I have no quarrel with the public policy advocated in the majority opinion. Nonetheless, it remains the role of the legislature, not the judiciary to rewrite legislation where necessary to implement positive public policy goals. Accordingly, while I concur with the court's mandate, I decline to join its opinion.
¶ 65. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur.
*33¶ 66. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON joins this concurring opinion.
Wisconsin Stat. § 59.40(3) provides in full:
Clerk of court; fees; investment of funds, (a) The clerk of the circuit court shall collect the fees that are prescribed in ss. 814.60 to 814.63. The clerk may refuse to accept any paper for filing or recording until the fee prescribed in subch. II of ch. 814 or any applicable statute is paid.
(b) Except as provided in par. (c), the clerk may invest any funds that are paid into his or her office and are being held for repayment. The investments shall he made in suitably protected accounts in the manner specified in s. 66.0603(lm) and all income that may accrue shall he paid into the county general fund.
(c) A judge may direct that par. (b) does not apply to certain funds paid into the office. The judge's authority applies only to funds relating to cases before his or her court.
See, e.g., Flynn v. Dep't of Admin., 216 Wis. 2d 521, 548, 576 N.W.2d 245 (1998); Perpignani v. Vonasek, 139 Wis. 2d 695, 737, 408 N.W.2d 1 (1987); Weeden v. City of Beloit, 29 Wis. 2d 662, 673, 139 N.W.2d 616 (1966); but c.f. majority opinion at *32¶ 14 n.7 ("[b]ecause we decide this case on statutory grounds, we do not address the parties' arguments concerning the circuit court's inherent and equitable authority . . .").
Indeed, the result may not only be reasonable, it may be preferable. Nevertheless, that determination is for the legislature, absent some legitimate independent grant of authority.