dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The chronology of relevant events is important to an analysis of the issues in this case, and is as follows:
June 18, 1992 Order to withhold child support filed (June 17) by Marissa Christensen signed by the judge. Withholding to begin no later than the first pay period that occurs 14 days following the date the order is served on the employer. Employer to remit to Harris County Child Support Division. The record does not reflect when this order was served upon the employer.
June 23, 1992 Final divorce decree signed by the judge. Orders child support of $350 per month to be paid to Marissa Christensen on the first and fifteenth. Order also permits employer withholding as an alternate method of satisfying this obligation. This provision is set out more fully below.
June 30, 1992 Motion for enforcement and order to appear filed by Marissa Christensen alleging Ronald Christensen violated the divorce decree by not paying the 6-1-92 and the 6-15-92 child support. She also asked for enforcement of future child support payments due on 7-1-92, 7-15-92, 8-1-92, and 8-15-92.
August 13, 1992 Relator responds to this motion. Among other things, he alleges inability to pay the June child support and that the divorce decree is void, and generally denies the allegations.
September 2, 1992 Hearing on motion held.
September 9,1992 Contempt order entered, but suspended. Judge found that Ronald Christensen was in contempt for failing to pay the 8-1-92 and 8-15-92 child support payments.
January 28, 1993 Motion to revoke suspension of commitment filed by Marissa Christensen. Judge orders Ronald Christensen to appear on April 13, 1993.
April 26, 1993 Hearing held. Order revoking suspension and for commitment to county jail signed. Ronald Christensen remanded to the custody of Harris County sheriff. This is the commitment order about which relator complains.
Those familiar with the law governing contempt and enforcement of child support orders will no doubt notice several problems from the above chronology. Relator, however, has asked us to consider only those issues set forth in the majority opinion. I agree with the majority that relator’s complaints, other than the one concerning payment by withholding, are without merit. The real issue before this Court is whether an obligor may be found in contempt when child support payments are made in accordance with an order for employer withholding, but neither the amount nor the timing of the payments withheld accord with the regular child support order, i.e. $175 payable on the first and fifteenth of each month.
The portion of the divorce decree concerning relator’s child support obligations and employer withholding reads as follows:
It is ORDERED and DECREED that Ronald Alton Christensen is obligated to pay and, subject to the provisions for withholding from earnings for child support specified below, shall pay to Marissa Dawn Christensen child support of $350.00 per month, in two installments of $175.00 each, with the first installment of $175.00 being due and payable on April 15,1992, and like payments of $175.00 being due and payable on each 1st and 15th days of each month thereafter....
Withhold from Earnings. IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that any employer of Ronald Alton Christensen shall be ordered to withhold from earnings for child support from the disposable earnings of Ronald Alton Christensen for the support of the child.... Depending on the regularly scheduled wage and salary payments established by the employer, the employer shall be ordered to withhold *382from earnings for child support on the schedule appropriate to the employer’s payroll period, as follows: $850.00 monthly, $175.00 semimonthly, $161.54, biweekly or $80.77 weekly, provided that the amount of income withheld for any pay period shall not exceed 50 percent of Ronald Alton Christensen’s disposable earnings. The first payment is due and payable no later than the first pay period that occurs 14 days following the date on which the “Order Withholding from Earnings for Child Support” is served on the employer. The employer shall continue to withhold income as long as Ronald Alton Christensen remains employed, until further order of this Court.
Withholding as Credit Against Support Obligation. IT IS ORDERED AND DECREED that all amounts withheld from the disposable earnings of Ronald Alton Christensen by the employer and paid in accordance with the order to that employer shall constitute a credit against the child support obligation. Payment of the full amount of child support ordered paid by this order through the means of withholding from earnings shall discharge the child support obligation. If the amount withheld from earnings and credited against the child support obligation is less than 100 percent of the amount ordered to be paid by this order, the balance due remains an obligation of Ronald Alton Christensen, and it is hereby ORDERED AND DECREED that Ronald Alton Christensen pay the balance due directly to the registry of the court specified below.
(Emphasis added.)
I construe the child support provisions of the divorce decree as requiring relator to pay $175 on the first and fifteenth of every month, including August 1 and August 15, 1992, unless an employer withholding order is in effect. If there is such an order in effect and the employer regularly pays biweekly, the child support provisions state that $161.54 is the appropriate withholding amount.
The record shows two payments of $161.54 were withheld by relator’s employer in August 1992. Mrs. Christensen testified as follows on cross-examination during the September 2, 1992, hearing:
Relator’s Counsel: And you further have obtained a wage withholding order.
Mrs. Christensen: Yes.
Q: And you have served that on his employer, haven’t you?
A: Yes.
Q: And, in fact, August and September amounts have been withheld from his paycheck; have they not?
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A: I know that September has not been withheld.
Q: Okay, but you don’t know whether or not August is not [sic] been withheld?
A: I know that August was withheld. I don’t know anything about September.
Despite the evidence that a withholding order was in effect and child support for August had been paid in accordance with that order, the trial court found in the April 26, 1993, order revoking suspension and for commitment to county jail:
[T]hat Respondent [relator] is in contempt of court for failing to pay to Marissa Dawn Christensen through the Harris County Juvenile Probation Office the full amount of child support on each of the payment dates shown below:
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I believe we should find that the order revoking suspension and for commitment to county jail is void because there is simply no evidence to support the court’s findings of no August 1992 child support payments. See, e.g., Ex parte Williams, 690 S.W.2d 243, 244 (Tex.1985, orig. proceeding) (contempt order is void absent proof that contemnor violated the temporary injunction of the trial court).
It should also be noted that if relator is being incarcerated for late payments in August, rather than nonpayment, the divorce decree, for violation of which relator has been held in contempt, is ambiguous. It is clear that if relator pays Marissa Christensen directly, payments must be made on the first and fifteenth of each month. However, *383the decree provides for payment of this child support obligation by employer withholding, and recognizes that the withholding may be made on a “schedule appropriate to the employer’s payroll periods.” The decree also provides that, “Payment of the full amount of child support ordered paid by this order through the means of withholding from earnings shall discharge the child support obligation.” These withholding provisions have no practical effect if the obligor may be found in contempt when the employer’s regular payroll schedule is not on the first and fifteenth of every month.
For a person to be held in contempt for disobeying a court order, the order must spell out the details of compliance in clear, specific, and unambiguous terms, or the order is void. Ex parte Slavin, 412 S.W.2d 43, 44, 45 (Tex.1967, orig. proceeding). This Court has the power to order release of a relator if the underlying order is void. Ex parte Occhipenti, 796 S.W.2d 805, 807 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig proceeding).
Relator should be discharged from custody.