OPINION
MORRISON, Judge.Appellant was convicted, on pleas of guilty, upon separate indictments, for the offenses of burglary to commit theft and felony theft. He was assessed a penalty of three (3) years in each case. There is no showing that these sentences were cumulative.
Appellant’s court appointed counsel on appeal has filed a brief stating that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. However, an examination of the record reveals a serious question in regard to the sufficiency of the admonition to support appellant’s guilty pleas. Article 26.13, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P.
The record reflects the following colloquy after the court informed appellant of the range of punishment:
“THE COURT: Are you prepared to enter your plea to this charge against you, Mr. Heathcock?
“MR. HEATHCOCK: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: How do you plead?
“MR. HEATHCOCK: Guilty.
“THE COURT: Are either one of you pleading guilty because someone has forced you to plead guilty, or has anyone threatened either of you ?
“MR. ROBERTSON [Other Defendant] : No, sir.
“MR. HEATHCOCK: No, sir.
“THE COURT: Anyone ever questioned your sanity?
“MR. ROBERTSON: No, sir.
“MR. HEATHCOCK: No, sir.
“THE COURT: Counsel, have you conferred with your clients sufficiently to believe and understand and be convinced that they understand the nature and consequences of their acts and they are sane?
*571“MR. ANDERSON [Appellant’s Trial Attorney]: Yes, Your Honor; they are sane.
“THE COURT: All right, I will accept the plea and hear the evidence.”
The purpose of the admonishment is to determine the voluntariness of the plea. While we have repeatedly prevailed on trial judges to follow the exact wording of Article 26.13, V.A.C.C.P., in making that determination, reversal is not required where the trial court’s inquiry, taken as a whole, is sufficient to establish the voluntary nature of the plea.
In our recent opinion in Mitchell v. State, 493 S.W.2d 174 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), and Espinosa v. State, 493 S.W.2d 172 (Tex.Cr.App.1973), the essential ingredients requisite for minimal compliance with Article 26.13, V.A.C.C.P., were present.1
In the cases at bar the court made no inquiry as to “promise” or “persuasion”. We have concluded that the admonition with this omission fails to meet the requirements of the statute.
For the error pointed out, the judgments are reversed and the causes are remanded.
. In Mitchell, supra, we have these two questions in addition to a statement on the range of punishment:
“THE COURT: Has anyone threatened you to force you to plead guilty? [Emphasis Supplied]
“DEFENDANT: No, sir.
“THE COURT: Anyone promised, you anything to induce you to plead guilty? [Emphasis Supplied]
“DEFENDANT: No, sir.”
In Espinosa, supra:
“THE COURT: Did anybody place you in fear, threaten you, abuse you, mistreat you or do anything that would force you to plead guilty? [Emphasis Supplied]
“THE DEFENDANT: No sir.
“THE COURT: Did anybody promise you anything at all to get you to plead guilty? [Emphasis Supplied]
“THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.”