(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. There were various theories upon which the trial court could have reached the result it did, both on legal grounds and on issues of credibility.
One of the important issues presented is whether Mr. Hart is relieved from child support payments when Mrs. Hart removed *683the child from the state, thus in effect depriving Mr. Hart of his visitation rights pursuant to the divorce decree.1
The circumstances here show that (1) the original decree granted custody to Mrs. Hart with rights of visitation in the father, Mr. Hart, (2) the custodial parent, without permission, removed the child from this state to California, thus practically depriving Mr. Hart of his rights of visitation, or at least making it extremely difficult for him to exercise those rights granted under the decree, and (3) the child did not suffer any detriment, since, according to the testimony of Mrs. Hart, her needs were provided for.2 Here, there were concomitant rights between husband and wife — the right to child support payments and the rights of visitation. Here the child did not suffer,and here Mrs. Hart did not make any demand for child support payments during the time she and the child were in California. Under such circumstances, I believe that the trial court may in the exercise of its discretion refuse to enforce installments which accrued while Mrs. Hart was outside the jurisdiction of the court which made the award of both custody and support, and I cannot conclude that the trial court clearly abused its discretion in sustaining the motion.
Second, the finding of the trial court that the appellant, Mrs. Hart, made no demand upon the respondent during the period that the child was removed from the state was a reasonable one and a basis for sustaining the motion. Rodgers v. Rodgers, 505 S.W.2d 138, 145 (Mo.App.1974), distinguishing Cervantes v. Cervantes, 239 Mo.App. 932, 203 S.W.2d 143, 146 (1947). While the defense of laches on the part of a spouse attempting to enforce a decree for support has often been rejected,3 the failure to demand any support payments is a factor the trial court may consider in sustaining the motion.
Third, there were various other theories upon which the trial court could have reached the result it did. For example, while past due child support payments constitute, under our law, an enforceable debt, like any other debt, it is subject to settlement or compromise if supported by adequate consideration. Rodgers v. Rodgers, supra, 505 S.W.2d at 144. The trial court, based upon the credibility of the witnesses, could well have found such an agreement to which finding I would defer. See 24 Am. Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 871 (1966).
Fourth, while it is true, as appellant contends, accrued unpaid installments for sup*684port cannot be modified retroactively,4 Schaffer v. Security Fire Door Company, 326 S.W.2d 376, 379 (Mo.App.1959); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 453 S.W.2d 619, 621 (Mo.App.1970), this does not mean that a court of competent jurisdiction does not have the discretion to refuse to enforce any accrued installments for adequate or equitable reasons. The cases relied upon by appellant are not dispositive of the issues presented in this proceeding.
For the above reasons, I dissent and would affirm.
.Whether a trial court has discretion to relieve the spouse from making support payments if the custodial parent removes the child to another distant state which in effect deprives the parent of visitation rights granted under the divorce decree does not seem to have been definitively settled in this state. Compare Pelts v. Pelts, 425 S.W.2d 269 (Mo.App.1968), and Riesenmey v. Riesenmey, 236 Mo.App. 551, 155 S.W.2d 505 (1941). In neither case was the issue definitively settled. In Riesenmey, the court held that the welfare of the child required the “continuance of payments” for support. 155 S.W.2d at 508. In Pelts, it was held that where the custodial parent removes the child to another state, there may be a ground for a motion to modify.
Under the new law, § 452.365 provides that if a party fails to comply with a provision of a decree the obligation of the other party to make payments for support is not “suspended,” but he may move for an appropriate order. The parties here were divorced prior to the effective date of the new dissolution law. The appellant moved to California in 1972. Her request for garnishment was made in 1975. The garnishment is an independent proceeding. As such, this case, I believe, does not come within the provisions of § 452.415; hence, § 452.365 is not applicable to this garnishment.
. There is a seeming conflict of authority on the question. See cases collected in Annot., “Violation of visitation provision of . decree as affecting child support payment provision . . 95 A.L.R.2d 118, 126 (1964); 24 Am.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 870 (1966). Cf. Gannon v. Gannon, 258 Minn. 57, 102 N.W.2d 677, 680 (1960); Griffith v. Griffith, 152 Colo. 292, 381 P.2d 455 (banc 1963); Briggs v. Briggs, 319 Mass. 149, 65 N.E.2d 9 (1946); Clawson v. Clawson, 125 So.2d 104 (Fla.App.1960); Fish v. Fish, 280 Minn. 316, 159 N.W.2d 271, 276 (1968); Smith v. Smith, 282 Minn. 190, 163 N.W.2d 852, 856 (1968); Pronesti v. Pronesti, 368 Mich. 453, 118 N.W.2d 254, 256-257 (1962).
. See cases collected in Annot., 70 A.L.R.2d 1250, 1269 (1960).
. See cases collected in Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d 1277, 1284-1285 (1949).