OPINION
ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
ODOM, Judge.In his motion for rehearing appellant has asserted five “points of error” which read as follows:
1. “The majority opinion of this Honorable Court does not correctly state the facts of this case and relies upon assumed facts not in evidence before the jury to affirm the conviction in this case. This Honorable Court, by assuming that the naked offer of State’s Exhibits la, lb, lc and Id into evidence, without other proof offered in support thereof connecting Appellant with the stamps reflected in these exhibits, constituted proof that . . Appellant had drawn $8,500 in stamps . . .’ and was also proof that ‘. . . the stamps were not drawn for a legitimate purpose . . . .’ has denied Appellant’s rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.”
2. “This Honorable Court erred in holding that there was sufficient evidence that the stamps traded by Appellant for a pickup were property of the State.”
3. “The majority opinion has reached contradictory conclusions regarding the admissibility of State’s Exhibits la, lb, lc and Id, thereby creating a confusion in the law which should be clarified by a rehearing of this cause.”
4. “This Honorable Court erred in refusing to reverse this case because of the erroneous question propounded to the witness Miller.”
5. “The majority opinion of the Court has not properly applied House Simple Resolution No. 41, and has interpreted *436House Simple Resolution No. 41 contrary to the law.”
At the risk of being redundant, but in an effort to answer the appellant’s argument on the sufficiency of the evidence, some of the facts will be stated.
The indictment alleges that appellant stole United States Postage Stamps of the value of $1200.00 from the State of Texas with the intent to deprive the State of the value thereof, and appropriated them to his own use and benefit. Proof of the theft of such stamps of a value of over $50.00 would sustain that allegation.
The evidence showed that pursuant to a requisition $1200.00 worth of United States Postage Stamps were mailed from Austin to appellant’s Amarillo office on May 25, 1970, and that they were received by appellant’s secretary and placed on his desk in Amarillo on May 27 and 28, 1970. On May 28 the Plains Motor Company in Amarillo was given credit for $1230 worth of postage stamps by the post office in Amarillo, and consummated the sale of the pickup truck to appellant, for which he paid in part with $1230 worth of postage stamps.
Appellant argues that since the stamps were mailed from Austin on the afternoon of May 25, 1970, they could not have been used in the purchase of the pickup truck. Although the sales order for the truck was 'dated May 25 and the salesman who made the sale testified that he received some stamps in payment for the truck on that day, we note that the salesman’s testimony as to the date was not conclusive; that he did not testify as to the value of the stamps delivered, whatever the date; and that he did testify that he only saw the stamps appellant had with him, but that they never were delivered to him. The jury was authorized under the evidence and testimony which has been quoted in the majority and dissenting opinions to believe that the salesman was mistaken about the date given in his testimony and to resolve conflicts in the testimony against appellant.
We are convinced the circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s implied finding that the stamps traded for the pickup were those acquired from the State of Texas, and accordingly overrule appellant’s ground number two.
Appellant’s first and third “points” request clarification of the holding on original submission of two matters which he contends may be subject to misinterpretation.
First, appellant disputes the holding of this court that the discrepancy between the stamps requisitioned and envelopes requisitioned during the year was valid proof that stamps were not drawn for a legitimate purpose.
Appellant has misconstrued the holding of this court in speculating that the majority assumed the discrepancy constituted conclusive proof in and of itself that the stamps were mailed from Austin, that they were received by appellant in Amarillo, and that they were proof “of anything the jury might infer from the exhibit.”
The misconstrued language of the court was directed to the issue of the admissibility of the challenged exhibits, not to any question of their sufficiency, standing alone, to support the verdict. This court’s language that the discrepancy was valid proof1 was a statement on the validity, not conclusiveness, of the discrepancy as a circumstance relevant on the issue of whether the stamps drawn on May 25 were drawn for a legitimate purpose. As this *437court held in Haley v. State, 84 Tex.Cr.R. 629, 209 S.W. 675 (1919):
“In a case depending upon circumstantial evidence it is necessary only to render it admissible that it tends to prove the issue, or constitutes a link in the chain of proof, and it is not to be rejected, though standing alone it might not justify a verdict.”
See also Powell v. State, 134 Tex.Cr.R. 244, 114 S.W.2d 894; Ethridge v. State, 133 Tex.Cr.R. 287, 110 S.W.2d 576. Where the state relies entirely upon circumstantial evidence, the rules of admissibility are not as stringent as otherwise. See, e. g., Burns v. State, 124 Tex.Cr.R. 131, 60 S.W.2d 793.
Appellant complains that it was not shown that he received the requested stamps in the amount shown by the exhibits. Although evidence of such receipt would have strengthened the state’s case by showing stronger circumstantial evidence of intent, it was unnecessary as a predicate to the introduction of such exhibits.
Appellant also contends that the majority opinion on original submission reached contradictory conclusions regarding the admissibility of State’s Exhibits la, lb, lc, and Id. Specifically, appellant feels the following two portions of the opinion on original submission are contradictory:
“So then, no requests for withdrawals from such fund were illegal unless it was shown that appellant exceeded this sum or that some withdrawal was appropriated to appellant’s own use and not applied to the actual and necessary expenses of his office.”
And:
“This discrepancy was valid proof that the stamps were not drawn for a legitimate purpose and was the reason assigned by the trial court for admitting the evidence as to the stamps requisitioned by appellant both prior to and after May 28.”
Appellant contends the second excerpt is a holding by this court that the challenged exhibits were admissible as proof of extraneous offenses. To the contrary, as stated above, we held the challenged exhibits were admissible and were admitted because in conjunction with State’s Exhibit 12 (showing the requisition of 6,000 envelopes) they showed a discrepancy which constituted circumstantial evidence on the issue of intent, an element of the charged offense.
The prosecution was based upon the theory that, although the stamps were obtained with consent, appellant obtained them with the intent to deprive the State of Texas of their value and appropriate them for his own use and benefit. Thus, the prosecution rested upon the second mode of theft as defined in Article 1413, V.A.P.C., which provides:
“The taking must be wrongful, so that if the property came into the possession of the person accused of theft by lawful means, the subsequent appropriation of it is not theft, but if the taking, though originally lawful, was obtained by any false pretext, or with any intent to deprive the owner of the value thereof, and appropriate the property to the use and benefit of the person taking, and the same is so appropriated, the offense of theft is complete.” (Emphasis supplied.!
Intent therefore was clearly an issue in this case and the challenged exhibits, being relevant thereto, were admissible.2 See Windham v. State, 169 Tex.Cr.R. 451, 335 S.W.2d 219; Davenport v. State, 127 Tex.Cr.R. 552, 78 S.W.2d 605. These exhibits did not show an extraneous offense and no *438jury instruction concerning an extraneous offense was necessary.
Furthermore, having found the challenged exhibits admissible and admitted to prove an element of the charged offense, even if they also constituted evidence of an extraneous offense, such fact would not negate their admissibility as relevant circumstantial evidence in the instant case. As this court held in Sanders v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 449 S.W.2d 262:
“The fact that material evidence shows the commission of a separate offense will not suffice to reject it.”
See also: Meredith v. State, 115 Tex.Cr.R. 447, 27 S.W.2d 222; Wiggins v. State, 109 Tex.Cr.R. 195, 3 S.W.2d 811; Adams v. State, 95 Tex.Cr.R. 226, 252 S.W. 797.
Finally, appellant complains of our interpretation of House Resolution No. 41 and of our holding on the question propounded to the witness Miller. These contentions are without merit and we deem discussion beyond that in our opinion on original submission to be unnecessary.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.
ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
. “Proof in a strictly accurate and technical sense is the result or effect of evidence, while evidence is the medium or means by which a fact is proved or disproved, hut the words ‘proof’ and ‘evidence’ may be used interchangeable” Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th Rev.Ed. 1380. Technically, the discrepancy was proof; the quantity of envelopes and stamps requisitioned was the evidence by which the discrepancy was proven.
. It being the case that appellant, as a member of the Texas Legislature, was authorized to requisition stamps for official use in the execution of the duties of his office, the mere taking, in such a situation, is not itself evidence of unlawful intent. Here, however, more was shown.