ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
A copy of the letter dated November 3, 1959, from George Buckstaff to Covy Williams, discussed in the earlier paragraphs of the original opinion, has been located in the original exhibits forwarded to this court by order of the trial judge. In the interest of orderly procedure and the expedition of business observation seems justified on the recurrent difficulties caused by the filing of- original exhibits in the appellate courts. The instrument here is a carbon copy on two sheets of onionskin paper. It was forwarded to this court in a bundle of unindexed plats, photographs, and other exhibits rolled together and held by a rubber band. The letter was not found until its whereabouts was disclosed in the appellant’s motion for rehearing. An instrument of this nature should have been copied into the Statement of Facts. See McFadden v. McFadden, Tex.Civ.App., 213 S.W.2d 71. Counsel should direct the clerk and stenographer in the proper preparation of the record.
The agreement evidenced by the letter is clearly an option contract, and was not admissible in evidence. In addition to the authorities cited in the original opinion, see Wichita Falls R. & F. W. Ry. Co. v. Cooper, Tex.Civ.App., 235 S.W. 927, N.W.H., cited with apparent approval in the recent case of The State of Texas v. Ralph Oakley, Tex., 356 S.W.2d 909; and 5 Eminent Domain (Nichols) 307 Sec. 21.5.
• The inadmissibility of the option agreement brings to the forefront the question of harmless error. Three witnesses were tendered by the appellee who gave opinion testimony on the value of the land involved. No effort was made to qualify one of the witnesses, Mr. Morgan Johnson, as a value expert, and appellees do not now contend that he was qualified. The qualifications of the second witness, Mr. W. A. Griffin, was established. The third witness, Mr. Covy Williams, as landowner, was qualified to express an opinion on value, though his qualification as an expert on land values generally was not shown. Counsel for the State treated Mr. Williams as qualified, however, by asking him about comparable tracts and their sale price. The testimony of these witnesses is mentioned for the purpose of showing the inconclusive nature, of the proof the option agreement was intended to aid and invigorate. The jury could have and perhaps did accept the option as a firm basis for an opinion of the land’s value. There is strong indication that the jury gave it unusual weight from the- jury verdict that the per acre value of the land appropriated was substantially the same per acre price as that agreed to in the option.
*803The cumulative effect of the option letter with the errors discussed in the original opinion tilt the scale in favor of a conclusion that the admission of the incompetent evidence was harmful. When the record as a whole is examined, it appears that these errors probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment.
The motion for a new trial is granted, and the judgment of the trial court is reversed and the case remanded for another trial.