OPINION
DOUGLAS, Judge.This is an appeal from a conviction for murder. Punishment was assessed by the court at thirty years.
Flores, in two grounds of error, contends that the trial court should have dismissed his indictment because the State failed to announce ready within the time limits of Article 32A.02, V.A.C.C.P. It is not necessary for us to reach this issue, however. Flores pled guilty to the indictment.
*860In Ramirez v. State, 590 S.W.2d 509 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), we held that a plea of guilty waives all rights granted by the Speedy Trial Act, Article 32A.02, Section 3, supra, which provides:
“The failure of a defendant to move for discharge under the provisions of this article prior to trial or the entry of a plea of guilty constitutes a waiver of the rights accorded by this article.”
In a supplemental brief, appellant contends that, because he raised in a pretrial written motion the issue of the lack of a speedy trial and because he received the trial court’s permission to appeal, he did not waive his rights under the Speedy Trial Act. See Article 44.02, V.A.C.C.P. Article 44.02, supra, however, merely sets forth the conditions that must be satisfied before the Court of Criminal Appeals can assume jurisdiction of a case following a guilty plea. See Ferguson v. State, 571 S.W.2d 508 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). This statute does not create any new rights under the Speedy Trial Act. Flores’ contentions are overruled.
The judgment is affirmed.