dissenting.
This is an appeal from an order overruling appellant’s plea of privilege and pertains to Tex.Bus. & Comm.Code Ann. § 17.56 (1977). Section 17.56 fixes venue for causes filed pursuant to the Deceptive Trade Practices Consumer Protection Act.
Appellee, R. Clyde Hargrove, Jr., sued appellant, John Herfort, doing business as Herfort Diamond Ring Factory, in the district court of Travis County alleging deceptive and unconscionable conduct by appellant in the sale of diamonds to appellee in violation of §§ 17.46 and 17.45(5).
Appellant filed a plea of privilege praying that the cause be transferred to Fort Bend County, the county of his residence. In response to the plea, appellee filed a controverting plea asserting that appellant “had done business” in Travis County within the meaning of § 17.56. After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment overruling appellant’s plea of privilege.
Appellee filed suit on March 26,1979. At that time, § 17.56 provided:
“An action brought which alleges a claim to relief under Section 17.50 of this sub-*361chapter may be commenced in the county in which the person against whom the suit is brought resides, has his principal place of business or has done business." (Emphasis added).
Appellant claims that the district court erred in concluding that appellant “had done business” in Travis County within the meaning of § 17.56 because there was no evidence or, alternatively, insufficient evidence to support that conclusion.
Appellee does not claim that the venue fact proved is the transaction which is the basis of the suit. In such a case, the defendant “has done business” within the meaning of § 17.56, as amended in 1977. Legal Security Life Insurance Company v. Trevino, et vir, 605 S.W.2d 857, 23 Tex. Sup.Ct.J. 577 (Tex.1980), affirming 594 S.W.2d 481 (Tex.Civ.App.)
To fix venue in Travis County appellant, instead, relies upon the following venue facts: for some years appellant has sold jewelry to Travis County residents who have come to his store in Fort Bend County; some such sales were on credit and appellant sent billings and receipts to customers in Travis County; the receipts sent to credit customers bore appellant’s “logo” and the slogan “Factory Prices on Diamonds”; and appellant considers his “factory prices” to be one of the selling points of his business.
By advertising for the purpose of soliciting business within a county, one may “do business” in that county within the meaning of § 17.56, as amended in 1977. Dairy-land County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 578 S.W.2d 186 (Tex.Civ.App.1979, no writ). It occurs to me that the inclusion of an advertising slogan in receipts sent to credit customers in Travis County is an effort, however modest, by appellant to promote future sales. As suggested by appellee, solicitation of “repeat business” is a marketing technique now commonly employed.
I would hold that appellant, by soliciting repeat business in Travis County from his credit customers, “has done business” in Travis County within § 17.56, as amended in 1977, and, accordingly, that the district court properly overruled the plea of privilege.