This is a direct appeal from a judgment, in the form of a permanent injunction, setting aside a prior order of a county hospital board of trustees which had temporarily suspended the staff privileges of one of its medical staff.
The cause was heard by the Honorable H.A. Kelso, Senior Judge, pursuant to an order of the Chief Justice of the Missouri Supreme Court.
The judgment is affirmed.
Appellants present three points, charging that the trial court erred in entering the permanent injunction, because (1) the trial court abused its discretion by applying the wrong scope of review to the Board’s decision; (2) if § 536.150, RSMo 1978 is applicable, the trial court failed to comply with the standard prescribed by that statutory section; and (3) the trial court’s judgment was based solely upon the testimony of a single witness, whereas the trial court should have considered all of the evidence in a light most favorable to the Board’s decision, and if such evidence would support either of two opposite findings, the trial court was bound to uphold the Board’s decision.
In summary, the record reveals the following facts. Respondent, Dr. Long, received a letter from the appellant, Board of Trustees, dated March 22, 1982, informing him that due to an incident of February 9, 1982, his medical staff privileges for admitting patients to the Bates County Memorial Hospital were to be suspended for a period of twenty-one days. The Board based its decision upon an investigative report by the hospital’s attorney, the progress record of a hospital patient, six affidavits from members of the nursing staff, and a report of *421the hospital Credentials Committee. Based upon the foregoing informational source, the Board concluded that Dr. Long had “surrepetitiously administered” a sedative (in the form of a rectal suppository) in an effort and for the purpose of performing a diagnostic test (which was recommended by Dr. Long but which the patient refused to undergo) upon the patient. The Board further concluded that it found no evidence that the patient was incompetent (she was 87 years of age), and did find evidence that the patient was fully aware of her surroundings, the nature and importance of the diagnostic test, and the recommendation by her family and Dr. Long that she undergo the test.
On March 24, 1982, Dr. Long filed his petition for a restraining order and injunction with the Circuit Court of Bates County. On June 14, 1982, the matter was heard. A hearing on the temporary injunction was waived by the parties, and the hearing was limited to the issuance or denial of a permanent injunction. In addition to his own testimony, Dr. Long produced other witnesses which included three physicians and the patient in question. The Board called four witnesses, which included two nurses, the chairman of the board, and the hospital administrator.
At the close of the hearing, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court entered a permanent injunction, which suspended the previous order of the Board. This appeal followed.
Under point (1), appellants charge that the trial court erred in abusing its discretion by applying the wrong scope of review of the Board’s decision. The Board contends on this appeal that the trial court should have reviewed only the evidence that was before the Board at the time the Board rendered its decision, should have weighed only that evidence, and should not have taken additional evidence.
Appellant’s point (1) is taken up and after full consideration is found to be mer-itless because of the following reasons:
(1) The action before the Board was an uncontested case, thus judicial review is prescribed by § 536.150, RSMo 1978 (formerly § 536.105). State v. Jensen, 318 S.W.2d 353, 356 (Mo. banc 1958); Phipps v. School District of Kansas City, 645 S.W.2d 91, 95 (Mo.App.1982). A noneon-tested case has been described as a case “not required to be contested in a hearing before the agency.” Jensen at 356. The instant case falls within this definition because neither the statute creating the board of trustees, § 205.170-195, RSMo 1978, nor the hospital by-laws, requires a hearing.
(2) It has already been ruled that in a noncontested case the “administrative body acts on discretion or on evidence not formally adduced and preserved.” Phipps at 94-95. In such cases, there is no transcript for the trial or circuit court to review. Section 536.150 was enacted to address this situation. Section 536.150 “provides for the making in court, in a certiora-ri proceeding, for example, of the same kind of record that would be made before the agency in a case reviewable under Section 22 of Article Y of the Constitution. In other words it gives the court power to hear evidence on the merits of the plaintiff’s case before the agency, so that it can determine in light of the facts as they appear to the court whether the agency’s decision is proper.” State ex rel. State Tax Commission v. Walsh, 315 S.W.2d 830, 834 (Mo. banc 1958).
(3) The trial court herein did not err by applying the scope of review prescribed by § 536.150.
Under point (2), appellants charge that if § 536.150 is found to be applicable [as it has been under (1) above], then the trial court herein erred by failing to comply with the standard of review prescribed by that statute.
Appellants initially assert (and such assertion is correct) that the applicable standard of review pursuant to § 536.150.1 is whether the administrative body, with sole discretion to grant or withhold a privilege, in fact exercised its discretion lawfully. *422Appellants contend further that the evidence herein was overwhelming in support of the lawfulness of appellants’ decision to suspend Dr. Long. Appellants further contend that the trial court erred when it concluded that appellants’ decision was capricious, because said conclusion was based solely upon the evidence of the patient (i.e., that she consented to the administration of the sedative by Dr. Long). From this, appellants conclude that the trial court, contrary to the direction of § 536.150, substituted its discretion for that of the Board.
Appellants’ point (2) is taken up, and after full consideration, is found to be mer-itless because of the following reasons:
(1) Review by this court of the trial court’s action in this noncontested case is within Rule 73.01, as that rule has been construed in Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976). A judgment entered pursuant to § 536.150 is essentially the same as any other judgment declared in a court-tried case. Phipps at 97. See also Rule 100.08. As further stated in Phipps at 97, “Accordingly, the court of appeals reviews the judgment of the circuit court to determine whether the adjudication that the administrative decision was or was not ‘unconstitutional, unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious or involves an abuse of discretion’ [§ 536.150.1 and Rule 100.-08(a)] rests on substantial evidence and validly decides the questions of law.” In a contested case the scope of review differs in that the courts of appeal review the decision of the agency as opposed to the judgment or decision of the trial or circuit court. In the instant case, this court defers to the trial court for its opportunity to assess the facts and the credibility of the witnesses, but does not defer to the facts or credibility of witnesses assessed by the Board.
(2) Within the foregoing scope of review, this court concludes that there was, contrary to the contention of appellants, substantial evidence to support the trial court’s judgment. Further, the judgment was not against the weight of the evidence, nor did it erroneously apply or declare the law.
Under final point (3), appellants charge that the trial court erred in granting the permanent injunction, because the trial court’s judgment was based solely upon the testimony of the patient, whereas the trial court should have considered all the evidence in a light most favorable to the decision of the Board, and if such evidence would support either of two opposite findings, the trial court was bound to uphold the Board’s decision to suspend Dr. Long.
Appellants contend that since the trial court was presented with evidence contrary to the evidence upon which the Board based its decision, the trial court was bound to uphold the Board’s decision. In support of this contention, this court is referred to Hermel v. State Tax Commission, 564 S.W.2d 888 (Mo. banc 1978).
Appellants’ final point (3) is taken up, and after full consideration is found to be meritless because of the following reasons:
(1) Appellants’ reliance upon Hermel is misplaced, because in Hermel, the court reviewed a contested case pursuant to § 536.140, RSMo 1978. Thus, as prescribed by § 536.140, the court in Hermel properly reviewed the evidence before the agency and determination was made based upon that evidentiary source. See Board of Education, Mt. Vernon Schools v. Shank, 542 S.W.2d 779 (Mo. banc 1976), for the same rule found in Hermel that in a contested case “if evidence before an administrative body would warrant either of two opposed findings ...” the court is bound to uphold the agency decision. The rule in Hermel and Shank has no application to the instant case because herein the case is uncontested.
(2) Review in an uncontested case, such as the case herein, is essentially a hearing de novo pursuant to § 536.150. Phipps, supra. The reviewing court is not bound by the evidence solely before the administrative agency, i.e., the Board herein.
(3) Within the foregoing principles and in conjunction with the ruling herein that *423there was substantial evidence to support the trial court’s judgment, this court concludes that the trial court herein was not bound to uphold the Board's decision because controverted evidence upon the whole of the record might have supported either of two opposite findings.
Judgment affirmed.
KENNEDY, J., concurs.
CLARK, J., dissents in separate dissenting opinion.