(dissenting). I dissent. The majority opinion holds that the public intervenor does not have standing to seek judicial review of a rule adopted by the DNR. This conclusion ignores the clear *42and unequivocal language and intent of sec. 165.07, Stats., ignores the legislative history behind the creation of the public intervenor, and leads to a result that the legislature could not have intended.
The Wisconsin rule of standing requires a two-step analysis: first, a determination whether there is direct injury to an interest of the petitioner; second, a determination whether that interest is recognized by statute or the constitution.
The majority opinion is unclear whether its conclusion that the public intervenor lacks standing is based on (1) section 165.07, Stats.; or (2) that the public intervenor has suffered no injury in fact; or (3) that the injured interest is not one protected by statute or constitution; or (4) that the public intervenor cannot challenge the constitutionality of an administrative rule; or (5) a combination of the above. Having considered each of these factors, I conclude that the public intervenor does have standing.
1. THE PUBLIC INTERVENOR HAS STANDING UNDER SEC. 165.07, STATS.
Under sec. 165.07, Stats., the public intervenor has standing to intervene in a DNR administrative proceeding to adopt a rule under ch. 30, and has standing to initiate a declaratory judgment action under sec. 227.05 to challenge the validity of the administrative rule that was adopted. Section 165.07 provides:
“165.07 Assistant attorney general — public inter-venor. The attorney general shall designate an assistant attorney general on his staff as public intervenor. Written notices of all proceedings under chs. 30, 31, 144 and 147 shall be given to the public intervenor and to the administrators of divisions primarily assigned the departmental functions under chs. 29 and 144 by the agency head responsible for such proceedings. A copy of such notice shall also be given to the scientific areas *43preservation council. The public intervenor shall formally intervene in such proceedings when requested to do so by an administrator of a division primarily assigned the departmental functions under ch. 29 or 144. The public intervenor may, on his own initiative or upon request of any committee of the legislature, formally intervene in all such proceedings where such intervention is needed for the protection of ‘public rights’ in water and other natural resources, as provided in chs. 30 and 31 and defined by the supreme court. Personnel of the department of natural resources shall upon the request of the public intervenor make such investigations, studies and reports as he may request in connection with such proceedings, either before or after formal intervention. Personnel of state agencies shall at his request provide information, serve as witnesses in such proceedings and otherwise cooperate in the carrying out of his intervention functions. Formal intervention shall be by filing a statement to that effect with the examiner or other person immediately in charge of the proceeding. Thereupon the public intervenor shall be deemed a party in interest with full power to present evidence, subpoena and cross-examine witnesses, submit proof, file briefs or do any other acts appropriate for a party to the proceedings. He may appeal from administrative rulings to the courts and in all administrative proceedings and judicial review proceedings he shall be identified as ‘public inter-venor’. This section does not preclude or prevent any division of the department of natural resources, or any other department or independent agency from appearing by its staff as a party in such proceedings.”
The majority asserts that although sec. 165.07, Stats., gives the public intervenor the right to intervene in proceedings, he was not given the authority to initiate a declaratory judgment action to challenge an administrative rule. See supra at 34. The majority cites no authority for this conclusion and has none. The majority does not challenge the public intervenor’s right to intervene in a ch. 30 rule-making proceeding. The public intervenor did intervene in this case. Section 165.07 provides that *44upon formal intervention in ch. 30 proceedings, the public intervenor may do “. . . other acts appropriate for a party to the proceedings. . . .” Such other appropriate acts include declaratory judgment actions. Section 165.07 authorizes the public intervenor to file a notice and statement of intervention in a ch. 30 rule-making procedure and to seek judicial review of an adverse decision in the rule-making procedure. The public inter-venor did intervene and did seek review.
2. THE PUBLIC INTERVENOR HAS SUFFERED INJURY IN FACT.
The majority states there is no injury in fact because the public intervenor is already authorized to receive notice of all sec. 30.20, Stats., permit proceedings. Under the majority’s holding, however, that authorization is rendered meaningless. Even if the public intervenor received all such notices,1 including those under proposed Wis. Adm. Code Sec. NR 345, the injury remains because without the right to a hearing, the public inter-venor has no effective way to challenge the noticed actions. Without the right to a hearing, the public inter-venor is effectively hamstrung in carrying out his duty to challenge a permit issued pursuant to sec. 30.20 that he deems will adversely affect the public rights in water.
3. THE INJURED INTEREST IS ONE PROTECTED BY STATUTE.
The second step in establishing standing involves a determination whether the injured interest is one protected by statute or the constitution. The language found *45in sec. 165.07, Stats., could hardly be more protective in that it allows the public intervenor to intervene in “all ;proceedings” where he deems such intervention is needed for the protection of public waters. It is hard to imagine clearer language evincing a legislative intent that the public intervenor have the authority to intervene in all proceedings when he deems such intervention is needed for the protection of public rights in water and other natural resources.
4. THE PUBLIC INTERVENOR HAS THE AUTHORITY TO CHALLENGE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE RULE.
I also conclude that although the public intervenor is a legislatively-created entity, he can challenge the constitutionality of the legislative enactment. In Wisconsin, the general rule is that “an arm of the state has no right to question the constitutionality of the acts of its superior and creator or of another arm of governmental agency of the state.” Columbia County v. Wisconsin Retirement Fund, 17 Wis. 2d 310, 317, 116 N.W.2d 142 (1962). We have, however, recognized an exception to the general rule. A state agency or public officer may challenge the constitutionality of a legislative enactment if it is the agency’s official duty to do so. See 17 Wis. 2d at 318. This exception applies in this case.
The public intervenor seeks to challenge the constitutionality of NR 345 on the grounds that the rule denies the public due process and equal protection of the law because it does not provide the public or public inter-venor with notice and a hearing in sec. 30.20, Stats., permit proceedings. Without notice and a hearing, the public rights in water could be impaired. The public intervenor’s constitutional challenge is therefore aimed at protecting the public’s rights in state waters.
*46As previously noted, sec. 165.07, Stats., imposes a duty on the public intervenor to intervene in proceedings when necessary to protect public rights in water and. other natural resources. If a proceeding involves the adoption of an administrative rule that allegedly violates the public’s constitutional rights, and those rights involve the public’s rights in water, the public inter-venor’s duty to intervene under sec. 165.07 necessarily encompasses the duty to challenge the constitutionality of that rule if such action is necessary to protect the public rights in water. The public intervenor therefore has standing to challenge the constitutionality of NR 345.
5. THE PUBLIC INTERVENOR WAS CREATED PRECISELY TO FULFILL AN ADVERSARY PURPOSE.
The decision in this case also ignores the legislative history behind the creation of the official of the public intervenor. See The Public Intervenor in Wisconsin, A Report Prepared For The Wisconsin State Department Of Administration By The Center For Public Representation, Inc. (November 14, 1975). Its genesis was the reorganization of the state’s administrative agencies, boards and councils in the late 60’s. It involved very lengthy and at times very bitter proceedings and debates, including marches in Madison by conservation groups protesting the merger of the Conservation Commission and the Resource Development Board into one agency: the DNR. The concern of the supporters of the Conservation Commission was that conservation interests and resource development interests did not belong together because both would inevitably collide if the supporters of both interests were doing their respective jobs. Id. at 6. The obvious concern was that “conservation” and “resource development” were distinct interests that *47would at times conflict. The final compromise was the creation of the public intervenor to protect the adversary process that the Conservation Commission had relied upon prior to the merger in court and in its hearings before the PSC.
Thus, the sole basis for the creation of the public intervenor was to create an adversarial force independent of the newly created DNR. That concept is seriously undermined by the majority’s holding in this case, and certainly destroyed with respect to challenging an administrative rule.
Last, and perhaps most important, the majority’s construction of sec. 165.07, Stats., as prohibiting the public intervenor from seeking judicial review leads to a result that the legislature could not have intended. Statutes must be construed to avoid absurd or unreasonable results. State v. Clausen, 105 Wis. 2d 231, 245, 313 N.W. 2d 819 (1982).
The legislature could not have intended to provide the public intervenor with a duty to protect the public interest without the right to challenge an administrative rule that could cause irreversible damage to public rights in state waters. That an administrative rule has the potential to cause irreparable harm to the public’s interest in water is obvious. The majority’s decision, however, renders the public intervenor powerless to challenge such a rule and to fulfill the legislative mandate of sec. 165.07, Stats.
Because the majority opinion concluded that the public intervenor did not have standing to challenge the constitutionality of NR 345, it did not reach the question of the constitutionality of that rule, and I therefore do not address that issue.
I am authorized to state that Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson joins in this dissent.
At oral argument, the state conceded the public intervenor’s right to receive notice of all chapter 30 permit proceedings. The state did not contest the public intervenor’s assertion that of 188 sec. 30.20, Stats., permit proceedings thus far in 1983, he had received notice of only 3.