ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
On motion for rehearing, Naylor contends that since the power inherent in the trial court to conform its record to speak the truth, and the powers granted by Rules 316 and 329b are similar in nature, the powers are concurrent and the litigants may choose, by the denomination of a corrected judgment, the effect to be given that judgment. We cannot agree. Cf. Mathes v. Kelton, 569 S.W.2d 876, 878 (Tex.1978) (although judgment was denominated as a judgment nunc pro tunc, the supreme court determined that it would not have been a proper nunc pro tunc judgment since the correction was judicial in nature and would gave been of no effect, but since the judgment was entered while the trial court retained plenary power, it was a valid judgment); Alford v. Whaley, 794 S.W.2d 920, 922 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, not writ) (the denomination of the judgment as a nunc pro tune did not limit the trial court’s power to correct its judgment during its term of plenary power); and Go Leasing, Inc. v. Groos Nat. Bank, 628 S.W.2d 143, 144 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1982, no writ) (if a judgment is modified while the trial court retains plenary power, although denominated as a nunc pro, the formalities and requisite notice associated with a judgment nunc pro tunc are not necessary).
A true nunc pro tune judgment can only be used to correct the entry of a final written judgment that incorrectly states the judgment actually rendered. Escobar v. Escobar, 711 S.W.2d 230, 231-32 (Tex.1986). In determining the validity of the judgment, it is the substance and not the label or form that is controlling. Mathes v. Kelton, 569 S.W.2d at 878. We remain convinced that our original opinion is correct.
*130Naylor relies upon several eases in making the contention of concurrent powers, in particular, this court’s original holding in Mathes v. Kelton, 565 S.W.2d 78 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amariho 1977), aff'd, 569 S.W.2d 876 (Tex.1978) and the court’s decision in Alford v. Whaley, supra.
In Mathes, as material here, the trial judge on December 3, 1976, had originally awarded possession of a diamond ring to Mathes. On December 13, 1976, without vacating its prior judgment, the trial judge exeeured a second judgment awarding possession of the ring to Kelton. On December 14, Kelton filed a motion asking the trial judge to correct the December 3 judgment on the basis that the award of the ring to Mathes was a mistake. After notice and hearing, the trial judge signed a corrected judgment stating the December 3,1976 judgment was not correct because it “inadvertently awarded possession of the diamond ring to plaintiff (Mathes).” In the course of this court’s discussion, we recognized the distinction between the power of a court during the time it continues to have plenary power over the judgment and when that time has expired and the court may only enter a nunc pro tunc judgment. This court held the plenary time had expired; thus, the power of the trial court was limited to the correction of clerical errors. However, this court concluded what the trial court did was merely correct a clerical error which was within its nunc pro tunc power, and affirmed the judgment. Id. at 80. However, the supreme court, en route to affirming the judgments of the lower courts, determined that because the error intended to be corrected by the trial court was judicial, it could not be corrected by a nunc pro tunc judgment, but this court was in error in determining the judgment was a nunc pro tunc since it was entered while the trial court retained plenary power. That being true, it concluded, the trial court still had the right to correct the judicial error. Mathes v. Kelton, 569 S.W.2d at 878. Both courts recognized the distinction between a judgment nunc pro tunc and a judgment executed during a plenary period.
Likewise, in the Alford ease, the appellate court, while noting the correction made by the trial court in its order denominated as a “nunc pro tunc” judgment was judicial rather than clerical, held the judgment in question was not a nunc pro tunc because it was executed within the trial court’s plenary control period. That being true, the trial court still had the right to correct judicial errors. Again, the court recognized the distinction between the two types of judgments. Alford v. Whaley, 794 S.W.2d at 922. Moreover, as stated in our original opinion, by its terms, Rule 329b makes its operation mutually exclusive of the operation of Rule 316. Cavalier Corp. v. Store Enterprises, 742 S.W.2d 785, 787 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, writ denied).
We did not, as Naylor contends, determine the September 18, 1992 judgment was void because the court did not have power to correct its judgment. We determined the validity of the judgment based upon its own stated terms, wherein it expressly “vacated” the original judgment, and thereby entered a new judgment on September 18. Since there can be only one judgment, Tex.R.Civ.P. 301, and the September 18 judgment stated it vacated the original judgment and served as the corrected judgment, we took its recitations to be true.
This determination being made, we looked to the record to determine whether a default judgment was proper on September 18,1992. The defendants having filed answers on August 7, 1992, a default judgment entered on September 18, 1992, was improper. Maldonado v. Puente, 694 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1985, no writ).
In further support of our proposition that the denomination given a judgment by the parties does not change the effect of a judgment is the long line of cases holding that where a second judgment has been signed within the time the trial court retained plenary power, the court may change only the signatory date and the appellate time table commences from the date of the second judgment, regardless of its denomination; however, if the second judgment is signed after the trial court loses plenary power (a true nunc pro tunc entry), and the only change is the signatory date, the second judgment has no effect and the appellate time table runs from *131the date of the original judgment. Tex.R.Civ.P. 386 and 387; and Holder v. Holder, 808 S.W.2d 197, 198 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1991, no writ); Hamrah v. Hamrah, 547 S.W.2d 308 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
In contending that we were in error in stating that a true nunc pro tune judgment may only be entered after the court’s plenary powers under Rule 329b have expired, Nay-lor relies upon the court’s decision in Hatfield v. Christoph, 539 S.W.2d 396 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1976, no writ). In that case, the court recognized the general rule that nunc pro tune judgments may only be used to correct clerical errors in judgments. However, it noted there were two instances, other than the clerical correction of a final judgment, where a nunc pro tune entry is proper. First, where the trial has been held and the case is ripe for judgment but for some reason no judgment has been rendered, the court may render judgment nunc pro tunc as of the date it should have been rendered. Second, where a judgment has been rendered but was not entered on the minutes of the court, the court may order the judgment to be entered as of the date it was rendered. Id, at 397.
Parenthetically, we observe that neither of the situations described apply to the present matter. In neither situation has a judgment actually been entered as is the case here. No judgment having been entered, the dichotomy after entry of a judgment explicated by Rules 316 and 329b discussed by us in our original opinion has not arisen.
Naylor next contends that in our original opinion we held that it is. error for a trial court to expressly vacate a prior judgment that it is correcting. That is not a correct reading of our opinion. Indeed, we expressly recognized the power of the trial court to do so if it so desired.
To clarify, we determined that because the trial court in fact expressly exercised its power to vacate the July 10, 1992 judgment, that judgment no longer existed, and had no force or effect. The supreme court has determined that when a trial court sets aside its original determination, there is no longer a final judgment from which an appeal can be taken. Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Scott, 846 S.W.2d 832, 833 (Tex.1993).1 When, as was its right, the trial court chose to vacate the entire judgment, it was necessary for us to determine what effect the recitations of the September 18 judgment had.
Contending that by its September 18 judgment, the trial court only intended to vacate that portion of the July 10 judgment relating to the incorrect date, Naylor suggests that we have authority under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 80 to render the judgment which he contends the trial court should have entered. We disagree. Our authority under the rule is to modify a judgment to correct a clerical mistake. Baker v. Charles, 746 S.W.2d 854, 856 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1988, no writ). The action requested by Naylor would be much more than the correction of a clerical mistake and is beyond the power granted us by the rule. Id. We cannot second guess and ignore the trial court’s express ruling in the September 18 judgment that the July 10 judgment was vacated.
Based upon Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9, Naylor also contends this appeal should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction since the appeal was not timely perfected. We disagree. This appeal was perfected from the September 18 judgment, the only final judgment in the case, on December 16, 1992. That being true, it was timely perfected. Tex.R.App.P. 41(a). Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction over the appeal.
We remain convinced our disposition of the appeal is correct. Naylor’s motion for rehearing is overruled.
. Contrary to Naylor’s argument, there was no issue regarding an answer being on file at the time of the entry of the corrected judgment in Old Republic Insurance, supra.