Petitioner Sandra Gordon obtained permission to appeal to this court, pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 487.39, subd. 2 (1982), from a decision of a three-judge panel of the Dakota County District Court reversing the decision of the county court which authorized her to remove the parties’ three minor children from this jurisdiction. We reverse and remand with instructions.
The petitioner and Stephen D. Gordon obtained a judgment and decree of marital dissolution in July 1982. The stipulated decree awarded joint legal custody of the three minor children to both parties but awarded sole physical custody to Sandra, subject to Stephen’s exercise of reasonable and liberal visitation.
In October 1982, petitioner moved the county court for an order authorizing her to remove the children to Illinois. At that time, she demonstrated that she had obtained employment in that state and asserted that the change in residence would be in the best interests of the children because they would remain in the physical custody of their primary caretaker and parent. Respondent opposed the motion and sought and obtained an evidentiary hearing. He also moved that he be awarded sole physical custody of the children. Following the hearings, the county court found that throughout the marriage Sandra had been the primary parent, and further found that her continued employment at the Sister Kenny Institute in Minnesota was not secure. The court ordered that Sandra be allowed to remove the children to Illinois and denied Stephen’s motion for change of custody. The court did not find that the move would be in furtherance of the children’s best interests but did conclude that it would not have serious adverse effects.
Upon Stephen’s appeal, the three-judge panel of the district court concluded, on review of the record, that the trial court’s order allowing removal was inconsistent with respect to the “best interests of the child” test. While agreeing that Sandra had been a good parent and the primary parent, the appeals panel differed from the trial court’s assessment of the facts and, in its order issued February 4, 1983, reversed. On March 22, 1983, this court granted permission to appeal and, by order dated April 22, 1983, stayed all trial court proceedings.
On June 3, 1983, this court decided Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393 (Minn.1983), in which we held that a motion by the custodial parent to permit removal to another state shall be granted unless the party opposing the motion establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the move is not in the best interests of the child. While recognizing the limited purpose of Minn. Stat. § 518.175, subd. 3 (1982), the removal statute, in safeguarding the visitation rights of the noncustodial parent, we also recognized that “[rjemoval may not be denied under this statute simply because the move may require an adjustment in the existing pattern of visitation.” 334 N.W.2d at 397. We noted that in many cases denial of permission to remove would effect a change in custody, as indeed it has in the case before us, and that in modification *271proceedings under Minn.Stat. § 518.18(d) (1982) the burden is on the party opposing the current custody arrangements. Nice-Peterson v. Nice-Peterson, 310 N.W.2d 471 (Minn.1981). Therefore, we concluded in Auge that section 518.18(d) should be construed as establishing an implicit presumption that removal will be permitted subject to the noncustodial parent’s ability to establish that removal is not in the best interests of the child. 334 N.W.2d at 399. This case differs from Auge in only one significant respect. In Auge, the custodial parent had both physical custody and legal custody. In the case before us, Sandra Gordon was granted physical custody of the children by the court, but joint legal custody is in both parties. Do the principles and holding of Auge extend to cover such a case? We conclude that they do.
Joint legal custody under Minn.Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3(b) (1982) gives both the parents equal rights and responsibilities in making major decisions involving the education, religion and health care of the children. In making the original custody decision in July 1982, the court determined that joint legal custody was in the best interests of the children. Minn.Stat. § 518.17, subd. 3(a) (1982). The court also determined that under section 518.17, subd. 3(b), it was in the best interests of the children that their physical custody and residence be with their mother. The person who has physical custody of the children, Sandra in this case, is the “custodial parent” or “custodian” for purposes of chapter 518. Minn.Stat. § 518.-003, subd. 3(e). Treating the parent with physical custody as the custodial parent, as does section 518.003, subd. 3(e), we hold that the presumption in favor of the custodial parent’s removal decision extends to cases of joint legal custody.
The question remaining then is whether Stephen overcame the presumption and established by a preponderance of the evidence that the move would be contrary to the best interests of the children. In our view, the appeals panel erred in concluding that he had. The dissent considers the findings of the county court regarding the best interests of the children inadequate. We note that the county court had already determined, in the initial dissolution decree, that it was in the children’s best interests that the physical custody and residence be with Sandra, their primary caretaker. It was not necessary for the court to make that determination again. The burden was on Stephen, the noncustodial parent, to establish that removal was not in the children’s best interests.
Sandra included in her motion for removal a statement of the reasons for her request and a designation of the geographic location of the proposed residence. She specifically sought an order directing visitation consistent with removal. Subsequent to the court’s order of November 22, 1982, she signed and filed with the county court of Dakota County a document giving that court exclusive jurisdiction to determine any disputes involving the children. Stephen presented evidence which led the court to find that the proposed move would not be in his best interests, but the court determined that, while the move would make visitation more difficult, given the parties’ resources, accommodation could be made.1 It is clear from the record that Sandra considers the children’s relationship with their father to be very important. The evidence points to a continuation of her cooperation with regard to visitation.
The appeals panel adopted findings consistent with those of the county court, disagreeing only with the ultimate conclusion with regard to the best interests of the children. We recognize that, while the county court did not conclude and was not required to conclude that the change of residence would further the interests of the children, it also did not conclude that the relocation was detrimental to or inconsistent with that criterion. Our view of the record leads to the conclusion that the pri*272mary caretaker and physical custodian’s motion for authorization to remove the children to the State of Illinois must be granted. There is no evidence that the move will interfere with Stephen’s involvement in major educational, religious, or health-care decisions for the children or that satisfactory visitation cannot be worked out. The matter is therefore remanded with instructions that the original county court decision be reinstated.
Reversed and remanded with instructions.
. The court made a finding in the decree of dissolution that Sandra’s annual income was approximately $23,500 and that Stephen’s annual income was approximately $130,000. The new employment in Chicago will give Sandra an annual income of $31,500.