(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
The decision of this court reversing the decision of the three-judge district court panel is based both upon sustaining the broad discretion of the trial court and extending the holding of Auge v. Auge, 334 N.W.2d 393 (Minn.1983), to joint legal custody cases. I disagree on both counts. The court remanded with instructions that the original county court decision be reinstated. I too would reverse, but, unlike the majority, I would remand with directions for the county court to make findings consistent with the evidence and the statutory mandate to analyze joint legal custody cases under the “best interests of the child” standard.
The instant case is distinguishable from Auge in two significant respects. First, in Auge, sole legal custody was placed in the mother, who was seeking removal of the child, whereas here, the custody of the children was in both parents under a joint legal custody decree. Second, in Auge, the trial court specifically determined that the child’s best interests were served by moving, whereas in the instant case, the county court failed to determine that the move was in the children’s best interests.1
The legislature has specifically provided that in the context of “joint legal custody” both parents have “equal rights and responsibilities, including the right to participate in major decisions determining the child’s upbringing, including education, health care and religious training.” Minn.Stat. § 518.-003, subd. 3(b) (1982). The extension of Auge to joint legal custody erodes all significance of granting both parents equal rights and responsibilities.
Once the child is removed from the state, the noncustodial parent’s right to participate in the major decisions regarding the child’s upbringing may be substantially diminished. Further, to impose a presumption, as in Auge, that the custodial parent in a joint legal custody ease may remove the child from the state unless the opposing party establishes that removal would not be in the child’s best interests is unprecedented. In Auge, we specifically declined to decide the appropriate rule for cases involving joint legal custody, because the mother was awarded sole legal custody. See Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 396 n. 2. The issue of joint legal custody was not a factor in any of the cases relied on by this court in Auge, nor was it a factor in Nice-Petersen v. Nice-Petersen, 310 N.W.2d 471 (Minn.1981), relied on by the majority.
The legislature has explicitly mandated that when joint legal custody is initially *273sought, the trial court must consider the child’s best interests, as well as three additional factors, including whether it would be detrimental to the child if one parent were to have sole authority over the child’s upbringing. See Minn.Stat. § 518.17, subds. 1, 2(c) (1982). Once the trial court determined by stipulation of the parties that the Gordon children’s best interests would be served by a joint legal custody arrangement, it necessarily determined that sole legal custody in one parent would not be in the children’s best interests. Any major change in this joint legal custody relationship, such as removal of the children from this state, should be made only if the change is in the children’s best interests. This examination should be made without any predetermined presumptions in favor of allowing the custodial parent to remove the children from the state. The court’s extension of Auge to instances of joint legal custody is misplaced. The focus of the trial court’s findings must be “where the legislature placed it, on the best interests of the child.” Auge, 334 N.W.2d at 400. Thus, I would adopt the view that in the context of joint legal custody, there is no presumption, but the trial court may allow removal if it is in the child’s best interests.
The majority improperly substitutes its own findings of fact for those of the trial court. The court should remand this case to the trial court for findings of fact regarding the children’s best interests, because the county court’s findings regarding the children’s best interests are wholly inadequate. I find confusing and enigmatic the county court’s finding that “while it may not be in the best interests of the children to allow petitioner to remove the children from the state, it does not appear that such a move would have serious adverse effects.” This confusion and uncertainty is evinced in the record and in the county court’s memorandum accompanying its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The memorandum begins with noted “misgivings” and is devoid of any analysis of the children’s best interests.2
Quite apart from abuse of discretion, the county court abrogated its duty to clearly delineate whether the move is in the children’s best interests. It failed to analyze or comment on the only expert witness’ testimony opining that a move to Illinois was not in the children’s best interests. The qualifications and close relationship of the expert, Dr. Mary Stevens, to the family, is unusual in this case. Dr. Stevens, a licensed consulting psychologist, was well known to the family, for she had on numerous prior occasions been employed by Sandra Gordon to counsel and study the effects of the dissolution on the children. The fact that Stephen Gordon used the same expert witness to testify concerning whether the move was in the children’s best interests should be of importance to the trial court, because an analysis of what is in the children’s best interests is required by the legislature. It was improper for the trial court to disregard this pertinent testimony without comment.
Because the county court’s findings of fact are deficient and incomplete with respect to the pivotal issue of whether the best interests of the children are served by moving to Illinois, I would reverse and remand with instructions for the county court to making findings consistent with the evi*274dence and the legislative mandate to determine the children’s best interests.
YETKA, Justice(dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Peterson.
SCOTT, Justice(dissenting).
I join in the dissent of Justice Peterson.
. In Auge, there was a unique mother-to-child relationship established centering around the child’s special learning disabilities. From birth, the child suffered from a nervous twitch (tic) and a motor development handicap. Carol Ann Auge took a very active role at home and school in helping the child mature into a healthy, normal person. In 1979, she placed the child in a special education program in Roseville, Minnesota. In 1980, she enrolled the child in the Early School Experience Program, a special education program at Wildwood School in Mahtomedi, Minnesota, established to help children with learning disabilities. Teachers involved in both special education programs testified that she was the most active and supportive parent in the programs. When Carol Ann Auge moved to Hawaii, the child attended a special learning program in accord with the Minnesota programs. The father, on the other hand, intended to place the child in a public school that did not have special educational programs. The mother, moreover, had remarried and had established a family unit with this child and other children. Under the circumstances in Auge, clearly distinguishable from those in the instant case, there was no doubt that the best interests of the child justified removal by the mother to another state.
. It is as inappropriate for this court as it was for the district court appellate panel to make findings of fact. But, to the extent that the majority opinion does so, I think that on this record a proper finder of fact could conclude that the mother’s move to Illinois was motivated by personal convenience rather than the best interests of the children. The fact that the employment she took in Illinois was substantially equivalent to the position she left in Minnesota would indicate that it was not a matter of economic necessity. It is undisputed that the children have strong educational, recreational, and religious commitments in this state, which is distinguishable from the situation in Auge, where the move to Hawaii provided an environmental essential to the special educational and emotional needs of the child. The majority opinion states that it is “clear from the record that Sandra considers the children’s relationship with their father to be very important,” but that is patently gainsaid by her insistence on a move to Illinois which so obviously thwarts the closeness and spontaneity of a daily relationship by the children with their father.