This is an appeal from a judgment of the circuit court for Waukesha county, Honorable Neal Nettesheim, Judge, entered on September 16, 1982. The trial court dismissed Michael Hayne’s complaint against Progressive Northern Insurance Co. (Progressive). Hayne appealed the judgment to the court of appeals. On December 23, 1982, Hayne filed a petition to bypass the court of appeals, which this court granted on January 11,1983.
The sole issue on appeal is whether sec. 632.32 (4) (a) 2.b., Stats., requires uninsured motorist coverage for an accident involving an insured’s vehicle and an unidentified motor vehicle when there was no physical contact between the two vehicles.
We hold that sec. 632.32(4) (a) 2.b., Stats., does not mandate such coverage. We therefore affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
The stipulated facts indicate that on June 20, 1981, Hayne was operating a motor vehicle owned by Gregg Luedtke with Luedtke’s consent. While Hayne was driving the vehicle on a county highway, he swerved to avoid an oncoming vehicle. Hayne lost control of his vehicle and the vehicle overturned. There was no physical contact between Hayne’s vehicle and the other vehicle. Both the vehicle that Hayne swerved to avoid and its driver are unidentified.
Hayne sustained injuries as a result of the accident. He subsequently filed a claim against Progressive for payments for his medical expenses and for damages *70pursuant to the uninsured motorist coverage provisions of an automobile insurance policy that Progressive had issued to Luedtke, which covered the vehicle Hayne was operating at the time of the accident. Progressive denied the claim because it determined that the provisions of Luedtke’s policy did not provide coverage for that type of accident.
Hayne filed a complaint against Progressive, in which he sought compensatory and punitive damages. Hayne subsequently filed an amended complaint against Progressive seeking only compensatory damages. Progressive filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the following provisions of the insurance policy it issued to Luedtke precluded Hayne’s claim:
“Part IV — Uninsured Motorists
“Coverage 1 — Uninsured Motorists
“Coverage
“We will pay damages for bodily injury which an insured person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle up to the limit of liability as defined in this part. The bodily injury must be caused by accident and arise out of the ownership, maintenance or driving of the uninsured motor vehicle.
“As used in this Part:
“3. ‘Uninsured motor vehicle’ means a motor vehicle which is:
“d. ‘hit-and-run motor vehicle’
“4. ‘Hit-and-run motor vehicle’ means vehicle whose operator and owner are unknown, which strikes
“a. you or a relative; or
“b. your insured car, or a vehicle which you or a relative is occupying, resulting in injury to an insured person.1
*71Progressive argued that because there was no striking or physical contact between the vehicle Hayne was driving and the unidentified vehicle, the policy did not provide coverage for the type of accident Hayne was involved in. Progressive also contended that our prior decision in Amidzich v. Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co., 44 Wis. 2d 45, 170 N.W.2d 813 (1969), supported its assertion that the uninsured motorist provision of Luedtke’s policy precluded Hayne’s claim.
Hayne argued that he was entitled to coverage under secs. 632.32(4) (a)l. and 632.32(4) (a)2.b., Stats., 1979-80, which provided in pertinent part:2
“(4) Required uninsured motorist and medical payments coverages. Every policy of insurance subject to this section that insures with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall contain therein or supplemental thereto provisions approved by the commissioner:
“(a) Uninsured motorist. 1. For the protection of persons injured who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom, in limits of at least $15,000 per person and $30,000 per accident. The in*72surer may increase the coverage limits provided under this paragraph up to the bodily injury liability limits provided in the policy.
“2. In this paragraph ‘uninsured motor vehicle’ also includes:
“b. An unidentified motor vehicle involved in a hit- and-run accident.”
Hayne asserted that sec. 632.32 (4) (a) 2.b. should be construed to mandate coverage for an accident involving an unidentified motor vehicle even though there is no “hit” or physical contact between the vehicles involved in the accident.
The trial court concluded that Amidzieh remains the controlling interpretative decision of Wisconsin’s uninsured motorist statute. The court held that sec. 632.32 (4) (a) 2.b., Stats., does not require coverage for an accident involving an unidentified motor vehicle where there was no physical contact between the vehicles. The court therefore granted Progressive’s motion and dismissed Hayne’s complaint. Hayne appealed, and we granted his petition to bypass.
It is clear that the express terms of Progressive’s insurance policy requiring a striking between vehicles involved in a hit-and-run accident ordinarily would preclude Hayne’s claim because no striking occurred in his accident. However, coverages omitted from an insurance contract may be compelled and enforced as part of that contract where the inclusion of such coverage is statutorily required. Amidzieh, 44 Wis. 2d at 53. We must therefore determine whether the uninsured motorist coverage mandated by sec. 632.32(4) (a) 2.b., Stats., includes coverage for an accident involving an unidentified motor vehicle when there was no physical contact between the vehicles involved in the accident.
In construing a statute, first recourse must be to the statutory language itself. State v. Derenne, 102 Wis. 2d *7338, 45, 306 N.W. 2d 12 (1981). Section 990.01(1), Stats., relating to general rules of statutory construction, provides that all nontechnical statutory words and phrases must be construed according to their common and approved usage. The common and approved usage of words in a statute can be established by reference to a recognized dictionary. Kollasch v. Adamany, 104 Wis. 2d 552, 563, 313 N.W.2d 47 (1981).
The statutory language at issue in this case is the term “hit-and-run” as used in sec. 632.32(4) (a) 2.b., Stats. The question is whether the term “hit-and-run” includes “miss-and-run” or whether it requires an actual physical striking.
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1074 (1961) defines “hit-and-run” as “2a (1) of the driver of a vehicle: guilty of leaving the scene of an accident without stopping to render assistance or to comply with legal requirements (2) : caused by, resulting from, or involving a hit-and-run driver . . . .” Webster’s then refers to a “hit-and-run driver” in the definition of “hit- and-runner”: “one that hits and runs away; esp: a hit- and-run driver.” Id. “Hit” is defined as “to reach or or get at by striking with or as if with a sudden blow.” (Emphasis added.) Id. The American Heritage Dictionary 625 (1979) defines “hit-and-run” as “designating or involving the driver of a motor vehicle who drives on after striking a pedestrian or another vehicle.” (Emphasis added.) Funk and Wagnall’s Standard College Dictionary 636 (1968) provides the following definition of “hit-and-run”: “designating, characteristic of, or caused by the driver of a vehicle who illegally continues on his way after hitting a pedestrian or another vehicle.” (Emphasis added.) “Hit” is defined as “to give a blow to; strike forcibly.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 636. These definitions clearly indicate that the plain meaning of “hit-and-run” consists of two elements: a “hit” or *74striking, and a “run”, or fleeing from the scene of an accident.
When statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we must arrive at the legislature’s intention by according the language its ordinary and accepted meaning. State v. Engler, 80 Wis. 2d 402, 406, 259 N.W.2d 97 (1977). In addition, we will not resort to extrinsic aids, such as legislative history, to construe the statute when the statute is clear on its face. See Aparacor Inc. v. DILHR, 97 Wis. 2d 399, 403, 293 N.W.2d 545 (1980).
We conclude that the statutory language of sec. 632.-32(4) (a) 2.b., Stats., is unambiguous. We therefore arrive at the legislature’s intent by according the language its common and accepted meaning. Engler, 80 Wis. 2d at 406. As previously noted, the common and accepted meaning of the term “hit-and-run” includes an element of physical contact. Section 632.32(4) (a) 2.b. mandates coverage only for “hit-and-run” accidents involving an unidentified motor vehicle. The clear statutory language of see. 632.32(4) (a) 2.b. reflects a legislative intent that the statute apply only to accidents in which there has been physical contact. Because there was no physical contact under the circumstances of this case, sec. 632.32(4) (a) 2.b. does not support Hayne’s claim for coverage.
Hayne nevertheless argues that the term “hit-and-run” in sec. 632.32(4) (a) 2.b., Stats., is not synonymous with physical contact. He cites two dictionary definitions3 *75and a decision from another jurisdiction4 to support his assertion that hit-and-run simply means an. automobile involved in an accident, after which the driver flees the accident scene.
We find his argument unpersuasive. The dictionary definitions we previously cited uniformly indicate that “hit-and-run” includes two elements: a “hit” or striking, and a “run”, or fleeing from the accident scene.
We also note that courts in other states have concluded that the term “hit-and-run” in their uninsured motorist statutes does not connote physical contact. This conclusion is based, in part, on other statutes imposing a duty on a driver involved in an accident to stop, provide certain information, and render aid. Although the latter statutes are commonly known as “hit-and-run” statutes, they have been interpreted to apply to accidents not involving physical contact. See, e.g., Clark v. Regent Insurance Co., 270 N.W.2d 26, 30 (S.D. 1978). Soulee v. Stuyvesant Insurance Co., 364 A.2d 883, 885 (N.H. 1976). Wisconsin’s version of these statutes, however, is entitled “Duty upon striking person or attended or occupied vehicle.” Section 346.67, Stats. (Emphasis added.)5 Section 346.67(1) (a) provides, in part: “. . . he shall give his name, address and the registration number of the vehicle he is driving to the person struck . . .” The reference to “striking” in sec. 346.67 supports our conclusion that the plain meaning of “hit-and-run” in sec. 632.32(4) (a) 2.b. includes a physical contact element.
*76Finally, statutes must be construed, if possible, so that no word or clause is rendered surplusage. Donaldson v. State, 93 Wis. 2d 306, 315, 286 N.W.2d 817 (1980). If the legislature had intended its mandated uninsured motorist coverage to apply to any accident involving an unidentified motorist, as Hayne asserts, that result could have been reached merely by deleting the term “hit-and-run” from the language in sec. 632.32(4) (a) 2.b., Stats., and having that provision read: “an unidentified motor vehicle involved in an accident.” The legislature did not, however, omit the term “hit-and-run”. Therefore, to define “‘hit-and-run” in sec. 632.32(4) (a) 2.b. to include the type of accident Hayne was involved in or any other accident involving an unidentified motor vehicle where there is no physical contact would be to render the term “hit-and-run” in the statute mere surplusage. That we cannot do.
Hayne also contends that contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, our decision in Amidzieh is inapplicable because of changes in the uninsured motorist statute that occurred after Amidzieh was decided. Hayne argues that by these changes, the legislature deliberately intended to avoid the result reached in Amidzieh.
Because we have concluded that sec. 632.32(4) (a) 2.b., Stats., is clear on its face, we need not resort to legislative history to arrive at the legislature’s intent. We note, however, that the history and circumstances upon which Hayne relies actually support our conclusion that sec. 632.32(4) (a)2.b. does not require the type of coverage Hayne seeks.
In 1965, the Insurance Laws Revision Committee was created pursuant to chapter 406, Laws of 1965.6 The legislature directed that the committee study the then *77existing insurance laws and make recommendations for their systematic revision and codification. In accordance with this mandate, an advisory committee comprised primarily of insurance industry representatives provided expert assistance to the Insurance Laws Revision Committee for the project. At the Wisconsin Legislative Council’s request, the committee recommended proposals that eventually culminated in enactment of sec. 204.30 (5), Stats., relating to uninsured motorist coverage. Section 204.30(5) was subsequently renumbered to sec. 204.30 (5) (a) by chapter 598, Laws of 1965, which also created sec. 204.30(5) (b). Sections 204.30(5) (a) and (5) (b) (Supp. 1965), provided, in relevant part:
“204.30 Accident insurance, highway traffic, policy provisions.
“(5) Uninsured motorists coverage, (a) No automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy of insurance insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto in limits for bodily injury or death in the amount of $10,000 per person and $20,000 per accident under provisions approved by the commissioner of insurance, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom. The named insured has the right to reject such coverage. . .”
“ (b) For purposes of this coverage, ‘uninsured motor vehicle’ includes an insured motor vehicle if before or after the accident the liability insurer of the motor vehicle is declared insolvent by a court of competent jurisdiction. . .”
*78Sec. 204.80(5) was in effect at the time we decided Amidzich.
Amidzich involved the same type of accident as this case. The insured’s policy contained an uninsured motor vehicle clause, which extended coverage for damages resulting from a “hit-and-run” accident involving an unidentified vehicle. The policy defined a “hit-and-run” automobile as one “. . . which causes bodily injury to an insured arising out of physical contact of such automobile with the insured.” The insured argued that the phrase “physical contact” should be construed to provide coverage to an insured who was forced off the road by an unidentified vehicle with no physical contact between the vehicles. We held, however, that the plain meaning of the phrase “physical contact” is apparent and requires a hit or touching between the vehicles. We discussed the term “hit-and-run”, which is at issue in this case, and stated: “the very term, ‘hit-and-run’, contained in the policy itself supports the plain meaning that we attribute to the term, ‘physical contact.’ ” 44 Wis. 2d at 51. We also found no indication that the coverage the insured sought was mandated by sec. 204.30 (5), Stats., and noted: “Persuasive arguments could be made that statutory requirements to afford coverage to the plaintiff should be provided. The present statute [sec. 204.30(5)], however, does not require such coverage . . .” Id. at 54.
Hayne contends that the legislature had the preceding statement in mind when it enacted sec. 632.32(4) (a) 2.b., Stats., to include within the definition of uninsured motor vehicle an unidentified vehicle involved in a hit- and-run accident. He argues that had the legislature wanted to retain a physical contact requirement for “hit-and-run” accidents, it would have expressly stated that coverage under sec. 632.32(4) (a) 2.b. is limited to accidents involving physical contact. That is not persua*79sive. If, in fact, the legislature had that statement from Amidzich in mind when it enacted sec. 632.32(4) (a) 2.b., then it also was aware of the discussion in Amidzich of the term “hit-and-run”. Had the legislature intended Hayne’s assertion, the clearest way to effectuate that intent was simply to not include the term “hit-and-run”, thereby mandating coverage for “miss-and-run accidents” as well. The legislature did not do that, but instead deliberately included in sec. 632.32(4) (a) 2.b. the term “hit-and-run”. The unambiguous meaning of that term includes a physical contact element.
We also find nothing in the events surrounding changes in the uninsured motorist statute to support Hayne’s argument that the legislature intended to avoid the result reached in Amidzich. In fact, the legislative history supports the opposite conclusion.
After the decision in Amidzich, the Insurance Laws Revision Committee continued to study and recommend revisions to Wisconsin’s insurance laws. In 1975, Sec. 204.30(5), Stats., was repealed by ch. 375, Laws of 1975, which also created subchapter IV of ch. 632. Section 632.32 (1975) provided, in pertinent part:
“SUBCHAPTER IV
“ANIMAL, AUTOMOBILE AND MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE
“632.32 Required provisions for animal and automobile liability insurance.
“(3) Uninsured motorist coverage, (a) Required coverage. Every policy of insurance delivered or issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state and insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall provide therein or supplemental thereto in limits for bodily injury or death in the amount *80of at least $15,000 per person and $30,000 per accident under provisions approved by the commissioner, for the protection of persons injured who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom . . .
“ (b) Coverage in event of insolvency of insurer. For purposes of this coverage, ‘uninsured motor vehicle’ includes an insured motor vehicle if before or after the accident the liability insurer of the motor vehicle is declared insolvent by a court of competent jurisdiction. .
On July 25, 1977, the Insurance Laws Revision Committee met to consider further statutory revisions, including changes in the uninsured motorist provision. At that meeting, which was tape recorded, the committee discussed including “hit-and-run” accidents within the uninsured motor vehicle coverage that would be statutorily required. The tape reveals that one of the committee members suggested it was unnecessary to include “hit-and-run” accidents within the statutorily mandated uninsured motor vehicle coverage because existing, approved insurance policies explicitly included coverage for “hit-and-run” accidents. Another member indicated that a category for “hit-and-run” accidents should be added to the statutory definition of uninsured motor vehicle because if it was not included, the insurance commissioner could not require such coverage. The committee then agreed to recommend inclusion of “hit-and-run” accidents as a separate category of statutorily required uninsured motorist coverage.7
*81After this meeting, the Wisconsin Legislative Council submitted a report to the 1977 legislature concerning Senate Bill 636, which incorporated the committee’s recommendations concerning changes in statutorily required uninsured motorist coverage. This report provided, in relevant part:
“Section 632.32 contains several provisions. Under former law, s. 632.32 included the provisions that must be inserted in the ordinary automobile policy. Former s. 632.34, on the other hand, dealt with provisions required by the safety financial responsibility law (Ch. 344 of the statutes). The two sections were overlapping and in some instances inconsistent or ambiguous. In the provisions recommended by the Insurance Laws Revision Committee, the sections are combined into a new s. 632.-32. In addition, the new section makes the following substantive changes:
“b. The provisions relating to uninsured motorists [s. 632.32(4)] are amended to specifically include hit- and-run drivers. As a matter of practice, most automobile liability clauses now include these drivers anyway.”
Wisconsin Legislative Council, Report No. 31 to the 1977 legislature relating to insurance laws revision (January 30, 1978), cited in Wisconsin Legislative Council, Reports to 1977 Legislature, Vol. 2. Senate Bill 636 was introduced by the Legislative Council, but it failed to pass. In 1979, the legislature considered Senate Bill 146, which specifically included an unidentified motor involved in a “hit-and-run” accident within the definition of uninsured motor vehicle. The introductory note to Senate Bill 146 indicates that the bill was a combination of bills that the Insurance Laws Revision Committee approved at its July 25, 1977, meeting for recommendation to the Legislative Council. The 1979 Legislative Council Report to the legislature on Senate Bill 146 discussed proposed changes in sec. 632.32, Stats., and re*82peated the above quoted comments on sec. 632.32, and specifically sec. 632.32(4), contained in the Legislative Council’s Report to the 1977 legislature on Senate Bill 636.
Section 632.32, Stats., was subsequently repealed by ch. 102, sec. 171, Laws of 1979, and recreated to read, in part:
“SUBCHAPTER IV
“AUTOMOBILE AND MOTOR VEHICLE INSURANCE
“632.32 Provisions of motor vehicle insurance policies.
“(4) Required uninsured motorist and medical payments COVERAGES. Every policy of insurance subject to this section that insures with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally garaged in this state against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall contain therein or supplemental thereto provisions approved by the commissioners;
“(a) Uninsured motorist. 1. For the protection of persons injured who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom, in limits of at least $15,000 per person and $30,000 per accident. The insurer may increase the coverage limits provided under this paragraph up to the bodily injury liability limits provided in the policy.
“2. In this paragraph ‘uninsured motor vehicle’ also includes:
“a. An insured motor vehicle if before or after the accident the liability insurer of the motor vehicle is declared insolvent by a court of competent jurisdiction.
“b. An unidentified motor vehicle involved in a hit- and-run accident.”8
*83The remarks of Insurance Laws Revision Committee members at the July 25, 1977, meeting, and the January 30, 1978, Legislative Council report to the legislature indicate that those responsible for the revision adding “hit-and run” accidents as a category to be included in required uninsured motorist coverage were simply incorporating a category of coverage into the statute that most standard insurance policies already contained.
At the time the Insurance Laws Revision Committee discussed, and the legislature considered, defining uninsured motor vehicle to include an unidentified vehicle involved in a “hit-and-run” accident, the standard automobile insurance policy defined “hit-and-run” as requiring physical contact. In 1956, a committee comprised of representatives from the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters and Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau first drafted a Standard Coverage Part for uninsured motorist coverage provisions in insurance policies. The 1966 Standard Form issued by the committee specified that the term “uninsured highway vehicle” encompasses a “hit-and-run vehicle.”9 The form then defined a “hit- *84and-run vehicle” as “a highway vehicle which causes bodily injury to an insured arising out of physical contact of such vehicle with the insured . . .”10 It is reasonable to assume that if the legislature was aware of the standard policy provision defining uninsured motor vehicle to include one involved in a “hit-and-run” accident, it was also aware of the standard policy provision defining “hit-and-run” to include a physical contact requirement.
We also note that the legislature is presumed to enact statutory provisions with full knowledge of existing laws, including decisions of this court interpreting relevant statutes. Glinski v. Sheldon, 88 Wis. 2d 509, 519-20, 276 N.W.2d 815 (1979). When the legislature amended sec. 632.32, Stats., to include “hit-and-run” accidents within the general category of required uninsured motorist coverage, Amidzich had been decided. The legislature presumably was aware of the discussion in Amid-zich concerning the literal meaning of “hit-and-run”, and certain policy arguments favoring inclusion within the statutory uninsured motorists provision of coverage for “miss-and-run” accidents. The Insurance Law Revision Committee meeting notes and the Legislative Council’s January 30, 1978, report to the legislature also reflect knowledge of standard insurance policy provisions relating to uninsured motorist coverage. Given this background, the legislature was confronted with two distinct policy choices: One, it could define uninsured motor vehicle to include an unidentified motor vehicle involved in an accident, regardless of whether physical contact occurred; or two, it could define uninsured motor vehicle to include an unidentified motor vehicle involved in a “hit-and-run” accident. The legislature chose the second alternative.
As we recognized in Amidzich, there are persuasive *85policy arguments that the type of coverage Hayne seeks should be statutorily required. For us to conclude, however, that such coverage is presently mandated by sec. 632.32(4) (a) 2.b., Stats., would require that we ignore the clear language of the statute and substitute our judgment for that of the legislature.11
By the Court. — The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
The parties do not argue that Hayne would not be considered an “insured person” under the terms of the insurance policy *71Progressive issued to Luedtke. Part IV of the policy defines “insured person”, and includes within that definition any person occupying the insured car. Part IV also states, “However, no person shall he considered an insured person if the person driving your insured car does so without your expressed permission.” The parties stipulated that Hayne was driving Luedtke’s insured vehicle with Luedtke’s permission at the time of the accident.
Sections 632.32(4) (a) 1. and 632.32(4) (a)2.b., Stats. 1979-80, were in effect at the time Hayne filed his amended complaint. Section 632.32(4) (a) 1. was amended prior to the entry of judgment in this case by ch. 284, Laws of 1981, effective May 1, 1982. This amendment changed the minimum liability limits from $15,000 per person to $25,000, and from $30,000 per accident to $50,000. Section 632.32(4) (a)2.b. remained the same.
Hayne cites to the Random House Dictionary 426 (Concise ed. 1980) which he claims defines hit-and-run as “guilty of leaving the scene of an accident caused by a vehicle driven by oneself.” We note that the 1966 Unabridged Edition of the Random House Dictionary defines the term as: “1. hitting and running away, esp. from the scene of an automobile accident: a hit-and-run driver.” (p. 674). Hayne also cites to Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary 392 (1958), which defines “hit-and-run” as: “that hits and runs away; orig. and esp. used of motor vehicle drivers who flee after being involved in an accident.”
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Novak, 520 P.2d 1368 (Wash. 1974).
Although the term “hit-and run” is not used in sec. 346.67, Stats., this court has previously described the offense resulting from a violation of that provision as a “hit-and-run offense.” State ex rel. McDonald v. Douglas County Circuit Court, 100 Wis. 2d 569, 574, 302 N.W.2d 462 (1981).
The chairperson of the Insurance Laws Revision Committee was former acting Governor Martin Schreiber. Professor Spencer Kimball served as research director.
Wisconsin Legislative Council tape recording of July 25, 1977, meeting of the Insurance Laws Revision Committee. See, also, Wisconsin Legislative Council, Summary of Proceedings, Insurance Laws Revision Committee, July 25, 1977, in Summaries of Committee Meetings Vol. Ill (1975-77).
The legislature also adopted the following Legislative Council Note in ch. 102, Laws of 1979:
“Sub (4) [of sec. 632.32] continues former sub (3) and former s. 632.34(5) with major editorial changes but without intending *83change of meaning except to add an unidentified hit-and-run vehicle as an uninsured vehicle. A precise definition of hit-and-run is not necessary for in the rare case where a question arises, the court can draw the line.”
The dissent implicitly argues, as justification for its position, that “miss-and-run” cases are the kind of “rare” cases referred to in the above note. Given the voluminous number of reported cases involving “miss-and-run” accidents cited by the dissent, it is difficult to see how “miss-and-run” cases can be considered rare. On page 97 of the dissent, there are references to examples of accidents involving physical contact that the dissent contends do not fall within the majority’s definition of “hit-and-run”. Those examples are rare cases indeed, and would seem to he precisely the type of “rare” cases that the Legislative Council Note refers to.
Widiss, A., A Guide to Uninsured Motorist Coverage 295 (1969). See also, Widiss, A., A Guide To Uninsured Motorist Coverage sec. 2.41 at 139 (Supp. 1981).
Widiss, A., A Guide to Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 294 (1969).
Many of the policy arguments favoring uninsured motorist coverage for “miss-and-run” accidents involving unidentified motor vehicles are addressed in the dissent. We cannot, however, change the wording of a statute by liberal construction to mean something that the legislature did not intend, or that the plain language of the statute will not support. See Lukaszewicz v. Concrete Research, Inc., 43 Wis. 2d 335, 342, 168 N.W.2d 581 (1969). The legislature can, if it so desires, amend the uninsured motorist statute to reflect those policy arguments. However, for the dissent to say that a legislative change would “disavow the interpretation set forth in the majority opinion” is no more an accurate reflection of the dynamics of the legislative process than if the majority *86said that the legislature’s failure to do so would be a disavowal of the dissent. The majority does not assert that.