(concurring in part and dissenting in part). While I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the offense of endangering the lives of persons traveling on a railroad is a specific intent crime, I do not agree that the trial judge’s instructions were inadequate.
The defense attorney requested a specific intent instruction as set forth in the Michigan Criminal Jury Instructions. See CJI 3:1:16. This request was refused. Although this Court has encouraged the use of CJI, it has not required it. See Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 1978-5, 402 Mich lxxxvii; Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 1977-1, 399 Mich lxxii. Hence, while a specific intent instruction was necessary, it need not have been CJI 3:1:16. The trial judge did read the statute to the jury, and at one point the following colloquy occurred between a juror and the trial judge:
"Juror Adams: Well, I am still puzzled about the willful intent. In other words, by removing the bolt, or whatever obstruction, you are thereby willfully intending or do you have to prove otherwise that there is willful intent to harm?
"The Court: It is not an easy statute to understánd. It doesn’t say willful intent, it says 'willfully endanger’, it says: 'Whether such engineer or cars be thrown from said track or not, or shall by any other means whatsoever, willfully endanger’, so you have to decide if the defendant did willfully endanger or attempt to endanger the lives of persons engaged in the work of the railroad or persons traveling on the engines or cars of the road.
"Juror Adams: Does that mean that he premeditatedly thought he was—
*578'Tie Court: It doesn’t say premeditated, it just says 'willfully endanger’.
"Juror Adams: In other words, he had to be thinking he was going to endanger somebody by doing it. Was it just — you know — we are just trying to decide was it just a prank with no thought given to the consequences or was there a willful desire to harm somebody.
'Tie Court: I think willfully endanger means that he had to have some thought in his mind, or should have had, sis to what consequences would arise from what he did. ” (Emphasis added.)
On the basis of the above, the trial judge adequately instructed the jury.
In view of the foregoing, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the jurors were not adequately instructed on specific intent.
Boyle, J., concurred with Williams, C.J.