concurring.
I concur in the result achieved by the majority opinion but wish to state my views separately.
My initial concern is with the definition of the word “term” and the interpretation of the phrase “term of office” as it relates to the constitutional prohibition against a judge or a justice practicing law pursuant to Section 123 of the Kentucky Constitution.
I fully agree that Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution provides that the Chief Justice shall assign temporarily any justice or judge of the Commonwealth, active or retired, to sit in any court other than the Supreme Court when he deems such assignment appropriate for the prompt disposition of causes. In this case the appointment of Special Judge Karem was entirely proper to complete the work of a 12-day bench trial heard in late 1992. His appointment as Special Judge was dated February 2, 1993, in order to preside over nine eases on February 3, 1993, including the one in issue. Clearly that assisted in the prompt disposition of those causes. The record indicates that the parties to this particular case knew well in advance that Judge Karem had intended to retire and that in all likelihood his final decision on their case would be delayed until a few weeks after his retirement. The order itself is limited to one day, and Special Judge Karem’s decision was based on the work product that had occurred during his term as a regularly elected judge of the Jefferson Circuit Court. There is an element of untimeliness in the motion for a writ of prohibition but it does not approach the situation considered in Kentucky Utilities Company v. Southeast Coal Company, Ky., 836 S.W.2d 407 (1992).
The question of term, or term of office, can be addressed in essentially three ways. First, a duly elected judge has a definite term of office established by the statutes and electoral process. Second, a judge who is duly appointed by the Governor to fill a vacancy or unexpired term, has a definite term and term of office. Third, a judge who is appointed by the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110 of the Kentucky Constitution, or K.R.S. 26A.020 also should have a specific term or term in office as delineated by the order of appointment in which the reason and purpose for such appointment is provided.
The word “term” is generally defined as a fixed period of time. “When used with reference to a court, it frequently becomes the phase “term of court” which signifies the amount of time during which a court holds session or sits for the transaction of legal business. The session, or term of court, begins when the court convenes for the term and continues until final adjournment, either before or at the expiration of the term. Cf. Black’s Law Dictionary, West Publishing (4th ed. 1951).
Naturally all of these appointive powers must be exercised with careful discretion by the appointing authority. Discretion must also be used by the appointee in the use of authority. Unfortunately, there is a certain element of the possible appearance of impropriety in a retired or resigned judge or other special judge practicing law in a close proximity either before or after such special service to the judiciary. In an ideal situation, the work of a voluntarily retired judge should be scheduled in such a way as to avoid unnecessary extensions. The appointment in order to complete work can be justified on the basis of efficiency. Certainly the use of the word term, or term of office, as I have limited it above, removes any possibility of a special judge practicing while he is serving as a special judge.
In addition, great care must be used to continue the commitment to full time professional judges which was the basis of the judicial article adopted by the voters as a constitutional amendment in 1975. At that time, the people of the Commonwealth clearly spoke against the use of part-time judges in a new and modern judicial system. Careful compliance must be observed for the will of the people in order to continue respect for the judiciary. There is always the possibility of potential abuse in the use of part-time judges. There is no hint of such abuse currently but we must look to the future and scrupulously guard and protect the judicial function.
*760I concur in the result achieved by the majority opinion.