(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
My disagreement with the majority opinion is a narrow one. I entirely concur in the majority’s recitation of the facts, statement of issues and its legal conclusions. I agree that respondent’s convictions amount to conduct for which he should be disciplined. I disagree only with the sanction imposed because under the circumstances I am convinced that a reprimand is all that is necessary or warranted.
The majority is clearly correct in holding that alcoholism cannot justify unlawful conduct. The majority is also correct in observing both that operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated is a serious criminal offense, and respondent’s third such offense is a felony reflecting adversely on him and consequently on the profession. I emphasize, in disagreeing with the suspension, that in no way do I minimize the seriousness of respondent’s misconduct.
Mitigating circumstances nevertheless convince me that license suspension is unnecessarily harsh and inappropriate here. First, though of course not binding on us, the commission and board recommend a reprimand, a recommendation that should weigh in the balance. Second, as noted by the majority, the respondent’s professional efforts were in no way compromised by his alcoholism. The majority points out that we often see cases in which alcoholism leads directly to a client’s harm. That is not the case here; respondent has been an outstanding lawyer of unquestioned ability and integrity.
Third, to his considerable credit, the respondent has resolutely faced up to his alcoholism and has demonstrated a willingness and ability to control it. I recognize this disciplinary proceeding may have been a motivating factor. Even so, the sure knowledge that another proceeding would inevitably follow any similar misconduct in the future would surely be a continuing motivation.
Because he has so well addressed it, I think it should militate in respondent’s favor that his alcoholism, now under recovery, is the prime element in the criminal offense that has led him here. I yield to no one in my insistence that our court holds the exclusive power and responsibility in matters of licensing and disciplining lawyers. We should nevertheless consider the societal decision that labels alcoholism as a handicap. This is the view taken in the state and federal legislation mentioned in Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. Cedar Rapids Civil Rights Commission, 366 N.W.2d 522, 527-28 (Iowa 1985) (recognizing alcoholism as a disability/handicap if it does not interfere with job performance). I point to this legislation, not to suggest it bears on lawyer disciplinary cases, but only because it casts light on how the respondent’s misconduct reflects on the *884public perception of the profession. Society views alcoholism as an affliction.
Under the authority cited by the majority, alcoholism does not justify wrongful acts. I would have no patience with respondent if he had failed to come to terms with his alcoholism. Because he did however, I think the case falls within those appropriate for the reprimand recommended by the commission.
The respondent has answered in criminal court. He has also addressed the root cause of his difficulty. A reprimand, though clearly a much lighter sanction than the suspension, is no trifling matter. I would order nothing more.