On Motion for Rehearing by Corporate Defendant
During the years 1949 to 1952, Mr. H. V. Cockrell, Jr., served as vice president of the appellant company. During such period he *522made. cash, loans' to the company, leaving a cash balance due in 1952 of $14,500.
On January 1, 1953, the books of the company were carried forward for the last time and an entry was made on the ledger page showing an account payable to Cock-rell for $14,500. On December 3, 1956 an entry was made debiting this account $225, thereby reducing the balance to $14,275.
The $23,000 demand note declared upon was executed by J. M. Craugh & Co. April 11, 1952. When the books of the company were carried forward on January 1, 1953 an entry was made on a ledger page showing this same amount as a note payable to Cockrell.
No subsequent entries were made to this account, nor has it been carried forward on the books of the company in any later years.
The books of the company are not shown to have been signed by anyone.
Appellees did not plead and they do not now contend that there was an acknowledgment in writing sufficient to remove the bar of the statutes of limitation to the enforcement of these claims.1 They do contend, however, that since J. M. Craugh, president of the appellant corporation, testified, after being called to testify by appellees, that these claims constitute valid obligations of the corporation and that the corporation now owes this money, the bar of the statutes o.f limitation is removed, saying: “Certainly such sworn testimony should at least be the, equivalent of a letter or memorandum.”
Only two cases are cited to sustain this contention: Hanley v. Oil Capital Broadcasting Ass’n, 1943, 141 Tex. 243, 171 S.W.2d 864, and Small v. Lang, Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth, 239 S.W.2d 441, 444, writ ref., N.R.E.
The Hanley case is not. in point. The court there considered and determined the sufficiency of a writing acknowledging the justness of a debt under Art. 5539, V.A.C.S.
Neither is Small v. Lang in point. The court there held that current books of a partnership showing an indebtedness to plaintiff coupled with the oral admission of one of the partners admitting the debt “would remove the bar of limitations.”
In discussing the Hanley case, supra, the court in Small v. Lang said:
“The Hanley case also holds: ‘And, if the writing acknowledges the justness of the claim, the acknowledgment imports (1) an admission that the claim is a subsisting debt and (2) a promise to pay it, if unaccompanied by any circumstances repelling the presumption of willingness or intention to pay.’ There would appear to be no such circumstances shown here.”
It is obvious that the Court in Lang held that the current entry on the books of the company was a sufficient' writing under Art. 5539.
As shown above, we do not have a current entry on the books of appellant; neither do we have the contention, based on essential pleadings, that such books constitute a writing sufficient under Art. 5539.
It is elemental that the bar of a statute of limitations does not affect the debt, only its enforcement is denied.
If appellee’s contention is correct then a plea of limitations could be defeated by placing the debtor on the witness stand and proving the justness of the debt. A party is not required to perjure himself in order to successfully plead the statutes of limitation.
, It is to be noted that Mr. Craugh was not asked if he desired to withdraw the *523plea of limitations filed on behalf of the corporation.
The qufestion asked Mr. Craugh as to the validity of the claims against the corporation called for a legal conclusion and should not have been asked.
We are of the opinion that appellee’s claims against appellant, account and note are barred by the two and four year statutes of limitation. Art. 5526, 5527, V.A. C.S., respectively. Appellant’s motion for rehearing is granted and judgment is here rendered that appellees take nothing by their suit against appellant J. M. Craugh and Company.
Motion of appellants Cockrell et al. overruled and motion of appellant J. M. Craugh & Co. granted and as to it the judgment is reversed and rendered.