Tony M. Smith appeals from an order denying his postconviction motion. Smith pleaded no contest to one count of burglary and pleaded guilty to three misdemeanors: attempted theft, entry into a locked vehicle, and criminal damage to property. Smith seeks resentencing on the grounds that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object at the sentencing hearing when the prosecutor breached the plea bargain. Because Smith's counsel's performance was not prejudicial, we affirm.2
I. BACKGROUND
Smith entered into a plea bargain, under which he would plead no contest to the burglary charge and guilty to the three misdemeanors. In exchange for his pleas, three additional misdemeanor charges would be dismissed (although read-in at sentencing), and the prosecutor would not make any sentencing recommendation.
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor represented to the trial court that a fifty-eight month sentence would be appropriate. Smith's counsel did not object. The trial court sentenced Smith to six years in prison on the burglary count and nine months in prison on each misdemeanor to run concurrent to the burglary sentence.
*823Smith filed three separate motions post-sentencing: (1) a motion to modify the sentence; (2) a motion for credit for time-served; and (3) a motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel on the grounds that counsel was ineffective for failing to object during sentencing when the plea bargain was breached. The ineffective assistance motion was filed after this court granted Smith's motion to extend time for filing a notice of appeal.
The trial court granted Smith's first two motions by giving Smith credit for time served and modifying the misdemeanor sentences from nine month terms each, to four month terms each. The trial court denied Smith's motion alleging ineffective assistance. Smith now appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
Smith claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, he asserts that his counsel failed to object during his sentencing hearing when the prosecutor breached their plea bargain by making a sentencing recommendation.3 The United States Supreme Court set out the two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The first prong of Strickland requires that the defendant *824show that counsel's performance was deficient. Id. at 687. This demonstration must be accomplished against the "strong presumption that counsel acted reasonably within professional norms." State v. Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d 121, 127, 449 N.W.2d 845, 848 (1990). The second Strickland prong requires that the defendant show that counsel's errors were serious enough to render the resulting conviction unreliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. In reviewing the trial court's decision, we accept its findings of fact, its " 'underlying findings of what happened,'" unless they are clearly erroneous, while reviewing "the ultimate determination of whether counsel's performance was deficient and prejudicial" de novo. Johnson, 153 Wis. 2d at 127-28, 449 N.W.2d at 848.
The trial court that denied Smith's postconviction motion on the ineffective assistance claim concluded that trial counsel's failure to object to the breach constituted deficient performance, but that this deficient performance did not prejudice the outcome. It further determined that the sentencing court did not rely on the prosecutor's recommendation in imposing sentence. Based on our review of the record, we conclude that this determination was not clearly erroneous. Moreover, we agree that the deficient performance did not prejudice Smith.
When a defendant enters into a plea bargain, he is entitled to the benefit for which he bargained. State v. Poole, 131 Wis. 2d 359, 361-62, 394 N.W.2d 909, 910 (Ct. App. 1986). In the instant case, it is undisputed that the prosecutor agreed to make no sentencing recommendation in exchange for Smith's plea. It is undisputed that Smith did not receive that bargain because the prosecutor recommended a specific sen*825tence at the time of the sentencing hearing. Such a clear and absolute breach should have triggered an objection from Smith's counsel. Failure to object under these circumstances constitutes deficient performance.
Nevertheless, we are affirming the order in this case because Smith has not satisfied the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. First, it is clear from the record that the trial court, which accepted Smith's plea, informed Smith that the sentencing court is not bound by any recommendations made by the prosecutor and that the sentencing court could sentence Smith to the maximum prison term for each offense. Smith acknowledged that he understood. Second, we conclude from our review of the record that the sentencing court did not rely on the prosecutor's sentencing recommendation in imposing sentence.
The prosecutor recommended total jail time of fifty-eight months.4 The sentencing court at no time referenced the prosecutor's recommendation. Instead, the sentencing court set forth its independent reasons for imposing a six-year sentence: *827We are convinced from these extracts and our review of the record that the sentencing court did not rely on the prosecutor's recommendation when it imposed sentence. Instead, the sentencing court relied on the sentencing guidelines, Smith's extensive prior record, Smith's character, and the number of crimes involved. The sentencing court apparently ignored the prosecutor's recommendation.5 Accordingly, we conclude that Smith has not proven that he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to object when the prosecutor made a specific sentencing recommendation. He has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's failure to object, the "result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. The result of the proceeding was his sentence. The outcome of the proceeding was his sentence. Smith has not demonstrated that the outcome is unreliable. He has failed to show that if the prosecutor would not have made a sentencing recommendation or if his counsel would have objected, there is a reasonable probability that he would have received a lesser sentence.6 As *828noted above, our review of the record reveals that the trial court ignored the prosecutor's recommendation; hence, Smith has not proven that there is reasonable probability to undermine confidence in the outcome of the sentencing hearing. We must therefore reject his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.7
*825Now, in this particular instance, what brings you before the court is not one crime, it's not two. It's not three or four. It's five convictions.
You have had problems with the law. Aggravated battery in 1978, burglary in 1980, retail theft *826in 1982, burglary in '82, resisting officer in '88, resisting officer, receiving stolen property and domestic abuse in 1989. You have now offended in the seventies, the eighties, and nineties, three decades of committing crimes.
When I look at your record, in conjunction with your explanation of your record, that also concerns me. You always seem to have an excuse for something that has happened. You never seem to take responsibility for something that happened. There is always somebody to blame.
This is not a case where a four-year or less sentence is appropriate, Mr. Smith and the reason I say that is, the guideline puts you in the 48 to 50 month range. I think the high range, even above it. But what complicates matters is all the misdemeanors.
If you only had, if you only had the burglary, perhaps the Court could take a chance and put you in intensive sanctions for four years with a year confinement time. But I can't take that chance because of the multiple misdemeanors and number of read-ins. It would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the offense. I don't think it could work for you.
I'm not going to give the defendant any consecutive time, but I am going to factor in the misdemeanors in terms of the sentence I impose on the burglary.
For all of these reasons, with respect to the burglary, it is the sentence of this Court that you be incarcerated for an indeterminate term not to exceed 6 years.
*828By the Court. — Order affirmed.
Although the State concedes that the breach was prejudicial, this court is not bound by concessions that do not comport with the law.
The State concedes that the prosecutor breached the plea bargain, but argues that Smith waived any right to raise an ineffective assistance claim because this claim was not raised in his first two postconviction motions. By a July 15, 1995 order, this court denied the State's motion seeking summary affirmance on the grounds that Smith waived this claim. Accordingly, we reject the State's argument and address the merits of the ineffective assistance claim.
At the beginning of the prosecutor's sentence recommendation, the transcript indicates a recommendation of 4 or 5 months. We conclude that this recommendation must have been either a typographical error or a misstatement by the prosecutor because at the conclusion of the prosecutor's statement, he clearly states that the State is recommending 58 months in prison.
Although the record in this case sufficiently demonstrates that the sentencing court did not rely on the prosecutor's sentencing recommendation, we respectfully suggest to all trial courts that a trial court's explicit reference to whether or not it is relying on a prosecutor's sentencing recommendation would assist us in handling future appeals in this area.
Smith makes two additional arguments regarding prejudice: (1) that he does not have to prove prejudice in this case; and (2) that to satisfy the prejudice prong, he need only show that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different, not that a different or lesser sentence would have been imposed. Smith has failed to provide any controlling *828authority on either contention and, therefore, we reject both. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 633, 642 (Ct. App. 1992) (appellate court may decline to address issues that are inadequately briefed; arguments that are not supported by legal authority will not be considered).
The dissent states that Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) stands for the proposition that "result" of a sentencing hearing is the sentence recommendation and the "outcome" of the sentencing hearing is the sentence. This does not comport with Strickland. Strickland defines the prejudice prong: "The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694. In applying this standard, the Supreme Court specifically references "the sentence" as the result/outcome of the sentencing hearing. Id. at 700 ("Given the overwhelming aggravating factors, there is no reasonable probability that the omitted evidence would have changed the conclusion that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances and, hence, the sentence imposed.") (emphasis added).