OPINION
PHILLIPS, Judge.This is a post-conviction application for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Article 11.07, V.A.C.C.P.
Petitioner contends that because of the language of V.T.C.A., Family Code, Section 51.02(1)(B)1 and his prior adjudicated status as a delinquent child,2 the district court lacked jurisdiction to try him for the offense of aggravated robbery committed after his 17th birthday without a waiver of jurisdiction being entered by the juvenile court under Section 54.02 of the Family Code.
We cannot interpret the statutory provisions cited to us without reference to their context. V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 8.07(b) and (c) provide:
(b) Unless the juvenile court waives jurisdiction and certifies the individual for criminal prosecution, a person may not be prosecuted for or convicted of any offense committed before reaching 17 years of age except:
(1) perjury and aggravated perjury when it appears by proof that he had sufficient discretion to understand the nature and obligation of an oath;
(2) a violation of a penal statute cognizable under Chapter 302, Acts of the 55th Legislature, Regular Session, 1957, as amended, except conduct which violates the laws of this state prohibiting driving while intoxicated or under the influence of intoxicating liquor (first or subsequent offense) or driving while under the influence of any narcotic drug or of any other drug to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving a vehicle (first or subsequent offense); or
(3) a violation of a motor vehicle traffic ordinance of an incorporated city or town in this state.
(c) Unless the juvenile court waives jurisdiction and certifies the individual for criminal prosecution, a person who has been alleged in a petition for an adjudication hearing to have engaged in delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision may not be prosecuted for or convicted of any offense alleged in the juvenile court petition or any offense within the knowledge of the juvenile court judge as evidenced by anything in the record of the juvenile court proceedings.
V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 1.05(a) provides:
(a) The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed does not apply to this code. The provisions of this code shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms, to promote justice and effect the objectives of the code.
V.T.C.A., Family Code, Section 51.01(3) provides:
*466This title shall be construed to effectuate the following public purposes: .
(3) consistent with the protection of the public interest, to remove from children committing unlawful acts the taint of criminality and the consequences of criminal behavior and to substitute a program of treatment, training, and rehabilitation; .
V.T.C.A., Family Code, Section 54.02(a) provides:
(a) The juvenile court may waive its exclusive original jurisdiction and transfer a child to the appropriate district court or criminal district court for criminal proceedings if:
(1) the child is alleged to have violated a penal law of the grade of felony;
(2) the child was 15 years of age or older at the time he is alleged to have committed the offense and no adjudication hearing has been conducted concerning that offense; and
(3) after full investigation and hearing the juvenile court determines that because of the seriousness of the offense or the background of the child the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings.
We believe that the Legislature did not intend to impede adult prosecution of adjudicated delinquents for offenses they commit between their 17th and. 18th birthdays. A reasonable interpretation of the statutory provisions relied on by petitioner is that he is not subject to prosecution as an adult for offenses against the Penal Code committed prior to his 17th birthday, save for those specifically excepted under V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Section 8.07(b), (1) through (3), or in which the juvenile court waives its jurisdiction. In fact, previously adjudicated delinquents who subsequently commit penal offenses after reaching age 17 demonstrate rather markedly the failure of the purposes of the Family Code — specifically the purpose of “treatment, training, and rehabilitation.” Section 51.01(3), supra. To interpret the statutes as petitioner contends would result in unequal protection of the laws for a small class of individuals without any justifying State interest.
In further and independent support of our interpretation is the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals opinion in In Matter of A_ N_M_, 542 S.W.2d 916 (1976). There the court interpreted the Family Code as not affecting previous law that held a commitment of a juvenile to the Texas Youth Council was an abdication of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction over the child in favor of the Council’s. See and cf. Tex. Att’y Gen. Op.No.H-642 (1975).
We therefore hold that any person, regardless of his or her previous history of juvenile adjudication, who commits an offense against the laws of this State after reaching 17 years of age is subject to prosecution as an adult without any preliminary proceedings in the juvenile courts. Accordingly, the relief petitioner seeks is denied. Before the court en banc.
. V.T.C.A., Family Code, Section 51.02(1)(B):
(1) “Child” means a person who is: .
(B) seventeen years of age or older and under 18 years of age who is alleged or found to have engaged in delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision as a result of acts committed before becoming 17 years of age.
. On June 6, 1975, prior to petitioner’s 17th birthday, he was so adjudicated in a juvenile court of Travis County in Cause No. J-5834.