concurring.
I write separately to express my conclusion that it was error to exclude evidence of other pipeline explosions. Because, however, I find the error to be harmless, I concur in the judgment.
Public knowledge and fear of pipeline explosions is a proper element of damages in a condemnation suit because that fear adversely affects the market value of the land. Public records of pipeline accidents are relevant to show public knowledge. Proof of such fear is proper if it is shown that (1) there is a basis in reason or experience for the fear, (2) the fear enters into the calculations of persons who deal in buying and selling similar property, and (3) depreciation of market value occurs because of the fear. Heddin v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Co., 522 S.W.2d 886 (Tex.1975).
It is not necessary that the other pipelines involved in accidents be similar to the one being placed on the condemned property. That kind of showing is necessary only when it is sought to prove that the pipeline being installed is likely to cause actual danger. Heddin v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Co., supra. Obviously, other explosions are not relevant to actual danger unless the lines are similar. That is not the case, however, when one is proving fear in the mind of the buying public. The public does not know whether pipelines are similar or not — they simply fear pipelines in general and they reflect that fear by downgrading the market value of land which contains them. Heddin v. Delhi Gas Pipeline Co. does not hold that similarity is necessary in proving public fear, and Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp. v. Gibbs, 643 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.), which did so hold, misinterpreted and erroneously relied on Heddin in doing so.
Stinson did produce evidence that the public was afraid of pipelines and that the fear adversely affected the land’s market value. Witness Click testified that people have a “distinct fear” of being close to a *773pipeline, that he took that in consideration in his calculations of the market value of the property involved in this suit, and that newspaper reports of pipeline failures directly affect the land’s market value. Johnnie May Stinson testified that anyone would be scared of the pipeline and that such fear would affect the land’s susceptibility to development. Terry Stinson testified that the line made him nervous and that the danger of the line had a direct impact on the use of the property.
Nevertheless, I cannot conclude that the exclusion of the Department of Transportation reports of other pipeline accidents caused the rendition of an improper verdict. Tex. R. App. P. 81(b)(1). Evidence of thirteen accidents involving similar pipelines was admitted into evidence, and there was ample testimony that the buying public’s fear of pipeline accidents adversely affected the market value. I cannot conclude that the exclusion of the additional accidents caused the jury to disregard the other evidence showing an adverse effect on the market value. Thus, I concur in the affirmance of the judgment on this ground.