Stinnette v. Mauldin

On Motion for Rehearing.

Appellents, Stinnette and Light and those claiming under them, particularly urge on motion for rehearing that we erred in affirming that part of the judgment which denied them recovery on their cross action against Appellant, Producers Investment Corporation. The facts upon which the cross action is based as alleged in the pleadings of the Stinnette-Light parties are substantially as follows: That the judgment in the Stinnette-Light-Sanders case entered on October 8, 1932, awarded title to the lease here involved, one-third each to Mrs. Stinnette, Mrs. Light and Mrs. Sanders with the provision that as between such parties the one-third interest awarded to Mrs. Sanders should alone be chargeable with the rights, title, interest or liens, if any, of Perrenot and the Mauldins, Pettit and Producers Investment Corporation or the assignees of any such parties arising under and by virtue of the contract of April 17, 1931, and that the two-thirds interest vested in Mrs. Stinnette and Mrs. Light should be free and clear of any such rights, title, interests or liens; that Mrs. Stinnette and Mrs. Light were granted a lien against the interest of Mrs. Sanders to secure them against loss of any part of the two-thirds interest recovered by and vested in them; that Producers Investment Corporation purchased the interest of Mrs. Sanders prior to the judgment of September 19, 1936, with full knowledge and notice of the terms and *218provisions of the October 8, 1932 judgment and that Producers Investment Corporation is bound thereby. The judgment of September 19, 1936 adjudged title to the lease one-third each to Mrs. Stinnette, and those holding under her, Mrs. Light and those holding under her, and to Producers Investment Corporation, the holder of Mrs. Sanders’ interest, and denied the Mauldin-Perrenot parties any right, title or interest in the lease. Such judgement did not, as entered, conflict with the 1932 judgment. But if the 1936 judgment is by the terms of the judgment in the instant case set aside only to the extent of granting the Mauldin-Perrenot parties title to' the entire lease with the right to retain one-half the net profits from the operation thereof, and leaving the parties to the 1936 judgment only their proportional share in the remaining one-half of the net profits, then there is a conflict. The prayer in the cross action of the Stinnette-Light parties against Producers Investment Corporation was as follows:

“That should for any reason said judgment of September 19, 1936, in said cause No. 95,715 be set aside or altered in any part, that portion of it which quieted the title in said Producers Investment Corporation to an undivided one-third interest in said lease against any claim on the part of Mrs. Stinnette, Mrs. Light and William L. Evans should also be set aside, and, by reason of the premises, should plaintiffs or any defendant in this cause be decreed by this Honorable Court to be entitled to any interest whatever in and to the leasehold premises involved in this suit by reason of any contract or agreement made with reference thereto by Mrs. Virginia Sanders and her husband, these defendants are entitled to have such recovery on the part of plaintiffs or any such other defendant satisfied in full out of the interest in said leasehold premises now owned or claimed by said Producers Investment Corporation before any such recovery can foe allowed against the interest owned by these defendants in and to said leasehold premises.”

The prayer of Producers Investment Corporation in its answer was:

“ * * * that the title of this defendant in and to an undivided one-third of the leasehold estate in the Doby Lease, together with a like interest in personal property situated on said lease and used in connection therewith be cleared and freed of and from all of the claims asserted in this cause by plaintiffs, and, in the alternative and in any event, that the right to its oil payments and improvements be recognized and preserved, and that this defendant be granted such other and further relief, both general and special, in law and in equity, to which it may be entitled.”

No issue was submitted or requested to be submitted to the jury with reference to such cross action. The judgment in the instant case upon which this appeal is based, purported to set aside the judgment of September 19, 1936 only as to appellees herein, the Mauldin and Perrenot parties, and awarded them the entire title to the lease with the right to retain one-half the net profits from the operation thereof. It further provided:

“It is ordered, adjudged and decreed by the court that the parties hereto, to-wit, Mrs. J. M. Stinnette, Producers Investment Corporation, Leonard M. Levy, William L. Evans, Mrs. George E. Light and George E. Light, who- participated in the agreement resulting in and evidenced by the aforementioned and so-called ‘judgment’ of September 19, 1936, in said Cause No. 95,715-E and the other party hereto, to-wit: George E. Light, Jr., who was privy to such agreement, are all legally bound and hereby are decreed to- foe legally bound by same, to the extent of their division and allocation as between themselves and as hereinafter shown, of the undivided claims, rights, or interests they were entitled to- in and to that certain right to demand, collect and receive of and from the owners of said fifteen acre lease a sum equal to one-half of the net profits from pro*219duction of wells on said fifteen acre lease * * * That is, Mrs. J. M. Stinnette was entitled to a one-fourth; Mrs. George E. Light a one-fourth; Leonard M. Levy a one-twelfth; William L. Evans a one-twelfth; and Producers Investment Corporation a one-third of such right to demand, collect and receive of and from the owners of said fifteen acre lease said sum of money equal to one-half of the net profits from the production from the wells on said land, and own such money as their own property.”

It is the contention of the Stinnette-Light parties that if the judgment of September 19, 1936 is invalid as against appellees (Mauldin-Perrenot parties) then it is invalid for all purposes; it is urged that the essence of such judgment was its award of legal title one-third each to Mrs. Stinnette, Mrs. Light and Mrs. Sanders; or their respective assigns; that if such award is set aside and legal title is granted to entirely different claimants (the Mauldin Perrenot parties) the effect is to set aside the entire judgment, and the title to the lease is then in the same status that it was prior to the rendition of such judgment; that the parties thereto are each entitled to the same relative interest in the lease in question that they had prior to the rendition of such judgment, as determined by the judgment rendered on August 8, 1932 by the 14th District Court of Dallas County, in Cause No. 93,597; that the provision of the 1932 judgment to the effect that the Stinnette-Light two-thirds interest in the lease was free of, and that the Sanders one-third interest was charged with, all rights, title, interest or liens which arouse under or by reason of the Sanders-Mauldin-Perrenot agreement of April 17, 1931, was in substance a covenant running with the land and as such, is still binding on appellant, Producers Investment Corporation, and that appellants, the Stinnette and Light parties, are entitled to its benefits.

The contention of the Stinnette-Light parties concerning the cross action against Producers Investment Corporation is well taken. The wording of the judgment appealed from seems to indicate an intention to set aside the judgment of September 19, 1936 only as to the Mauldin-Perrenot parties and to otherwise leave such judgment in full force and effect. Under our practice, a judgment may be set aside in part in a proper case. The rule in such cases as stated in 25 Tex.Jur., page 581, 582 is that “a judgment may be void in part and stand as to the remainder where the valid portion is not so dependent on the invalid as to fall with it.”

After careful consideration of the two judgments, however, we feel that their provisions as a whole are so conflicting and inconsistent one with the other that the effect of the judgment in the instant case is to entirely set aside the 1936 judgment. The 1936 judgment awarded title to the lease one-third each in Mrs. Stinnette, Mrs. Light, their assigns and Producers Investment Corporation, which had acquired Mrs. Sanders’ one-third interest. The Mauldin-Perrenot parties were denied any title or interest therein. The judgment in the instant case denies the Stinnette-Light parties and Producers Investment Corporation any title to the lease and awards them only a one-half interest in the net profits therefrom in which they are to participate in the same proportion that they were to participate in the ownership of the title to the lease as provided in their agreed judgment of 1936. All of the title to the lease and the remaining one-half of the net profits are awarded to the Mauldin-Perrenot parties. The essence of the 1936 judgment was the award of the title to and possession of the lease in question to appellants on the theory that the Mauldins and Perrenots had not complied with the contract of April 17, 1931. The essence of the judgment appealed from is to grant title to the Mauldins and Perrenot on the theory that they did comply with such contract and the effect is to set aside the entire 1936 judgment.

The 1936 judgment granted Producers Investment Corporation title to a one-third interest in the lease free of all claims by any other parties to the cause, including the Stinnette-Light parties, and as entered was not in conflict with the 1932 *220judgment because the 1936 judgment found that the Mauldin-Perrenot parties had no title or interest in the lease. There is a conflict, however, if that portion of the 1936 judgment denying the Mauldin and Perrenot parties any interest in the lease is set aside and such parties are awarded title to the lease and the judgment is deemed and held to remain in full force and effect only to the extent of the division of one-half of the net profits in the lease between appellants. In such case the Stinnette-Light parties have suffered the loss of their title by reason of Mrs. Sanders’ contract with Perrenot and the Mauldins and Mrs. Sanders’ one-third interest is not required to protect them from such loss as provided in the 1932 judgment. In our opinion, the provisions of the 1936 judgment are interdependent and indivisible. That portion of such judgment which the trial court in this case correctly found to be invalid was so inseparably connected with the remaining portion that the latter cannot stand apart from the former. The effect of vacating or setting aside a judgment, generally speaking, is to place the parties in the same position that they occupied prior to its rendition. 25 Tex.Jur., page 183; Marmion v. Herrin Transp Co. Inc., Tex.Civ.App., 127 S.W.2d 558; Saunders v. Hornsby, Tex.Civ.App., 173 S.W.2d 795 (Err. Ref.). The status of the title to the lease in question prior to the entry of the judgment of September 19, 1936 was that Perrenot and the Mauldins had title thereto subject to their obligations under the contracts of April 17, July 27, and August 20, 1931, with the right to retain one-half of the net profits from the operation of the lease. Producers Investment Corporation was entitled to its two $40,000 oil payments to be paid out of the interest of Mauldin and Perrenot, and was the holder of Mrs. Sanders’ interest in the lease. The relative interests of Mrs. Sanders, Mrs. Stinnette and Mrs. Light in the lease were adjudicated in the judgment of October 8, 1932 which held that when Mrs. Sanders first acquired title to the lease she held it in trust for herself, Mrs. Stin-nette and Mrs. Light; that she was guilty of a breach of trust in entering into tjie contract of April 17, 1931 with Perrenot and the Mauldins and that whatever interest Mrs. Sanders retained in the lease or the proceeds therefrom after her contract with the Mauldins and Perrenot, was subject to a lien in favor of the two-thirds interest therein awarded to Mrs. Stinnette and Mrs. Light to secure them as far as possible against loss or damage to their interests caused by the willful act of Mrs. Sanders in breaching her trust duty. Producers Investment Corporation paid Mrs. Sanders $5,000 for her one-third interest in the lease and received a quit claim deed therefor. Such interest was acquired by them with full notice and knowledge of the existence of the judgment of October 8, 1932. Mrs. Sanders’ one-third interest in the hands of Producers Investment Corporation was and ts still subject to the 1932 judgment.

It is urged by appellant, Producers Investment Corporation, that the 1936 judgment was a contract between it and Mrs. Stinnette, et al; that the agreed judgment so entered is res adjudicata and that the parties are bound thereby. We cannot agree with this contention. The terms of the agreed judgment were interdependent. The judgment as a whole was indivisible and when it was set aside in part, the remaining portion also fell. To set aside that portion of the 1936 judgment awarding a two-thirds interest in the title to the Stinnette-Light parties and to grant the entire title to the Mauldin-Perrenot parties, leaving the Stinnette-Light parties with only a two-thirds interest in one-half of the net profits is not the contract agreed to by such parties in that judgment. The Stinnette-Light parties did agree that the one-third interest of Producers Investment Corporation be quieted “as against any of the parties” to such cause, but did not consent that the title of Producers be quieted as against them but not against the Mauldins and Perrenots. The 1936 judgment did not contemplate that the Sanders interest was to be free and clear of the lien placed against it by the 1932 judgment, except in the event that the two-thirds interest of the Stinnette-Light parties suffered no loss or damage by reason of the April 17, 1931 contract *221of Mrs. Sanders with the Mauldins and Perrenots. Kulow v. Farmers Royalty Holding Co., 144 Tex. 312, 190 S.W.2d 60 affirming Tex.Civ.App., 186 S.W.2d 318. The agreed judgment was indivisible and when a part of it was set aside as invalid the remaining portion was of necessity also set aside.

We are likewise unable to agree with the contention of Producers Investment Corporation that the Stinnette-Light parties are estopped to assert their claimed lien against Mrs. Sanders’ interest in the lease as provided for in the 1932 judgment. In 17 Tex.Jur., page 128, it is stated that:

“The idea or notion which inheres in the word ‘estoppel’ is that one who by his speech or conduct has induced another to act in a particular manner ought not to be permitted to adopt an inconsistent position, attitude or course of conduct and thereby cause loss or injury to such other.”

Producers Investment Corporation has suffered no loss or injury by reason of the entry and setting aside of the 1936 judgment. Their status in relation to the Stinnette-Light parties since such judgment is set aside is the same that it was before the judgment was entered and in each instance, is determined 'by the provisions of the 1932 judgment. Since no loss or injury has been suffered by Producers by reason of the entry and setting aside of the 1936 judgment, there can be no estoppel.

That portion of the judgment of the trial court which denied the Stinnette-Light parties recovery under their cross action against Producers Investment Corporation is reversed and judgment is here rendered decreeing that the interest in that portion of the profits derived from the operation of the subject lease which Producers Investment Corporation acquired from Mrs. Sanders is in all things inferior and is subordinate to the rights of the Stinnette-Light parties to have their proportionate part of said profits made good to them out of the Sanders one-third portion thereof, insofar as such portion will suffice to do so. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.