(dissenting). Difficulties confronting those who designed the ballot title and who gave to the initiated amendment its popular title were complicated by our decision in Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corporation where a'so-called “caviet” was expressed. In Winston v. Personal Finance Co. of Pine Bluff this statement appears: “We are allowing the inspection fee in this case because of the holding of this court in Mathews v. Georgia State Savings Association, 132 Ark. 219, 200 S. W. 130, 21 A. L. R. 789.” It is quite evident, therefore, that the court’s majority felt that the constitution contained certain inclusive or exclusive provisions that had not been enforced, otherwise a warning of what the court would or might do in the future would have been surplusage. But in today’s opinion the majority takes fright at use of the word “modern” preceding the reference to consumer credit and speaks of it as “salesmanship” and as an effort to deride Art. XIX, § 13, of the Constitution, as ‘ ‘ old-fogeyish and outmoded. ’ ’
I think the objection made to the term “authorize and define” is equally without persuasive virtue. No doubt a popular name and a ballot title more acceptable to those who oppose the measure could have been selected, but I do not deem it the function of this tribunal to judicially indorse only those things we would, as individuals, personally approve. If the proposed amendment had gone on the ballot I would have voted against its adoption. However, it is one thing to say whether a document such as this advertised amendment meets the constitutional test entitling it to a place on the ballot, and quite another thing to say whether a particular person likes it. My own view is that there is ample authority under the present constitution to prevent usury, directly or indirectly; but if the people want a different system and are willing to authorize the General Assembly to pass laws legalizing charges that are not now permissive, it is a part of the democratic process to permit these people to express themselves at the polls.
In language that is too clear for misunderstanding the majority opinion says that the proposed amendment “has a twofold purpose: (a) It would legalize service charges that have previously been regarded as usurious, and (b) it would legalize credit price differentials that have previously been regarded as usurious.” It must be remembered that the amendment itself appears for many weeks in a newspaper in every county in the state. We are not to assume that the public will be wholly uninformed.
While opposing the amendment personally, yet as a judge I would permit the electors to vote on it.